Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV23746, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

On July 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present premises liability action arising from an alleged incident on August 9, 2020, at premises located at 1042-1044 2nd Street, Santa Monica, CA 90403 (“Premises”). Defendants Kin Wa Yung, individually and as trustee for the Yung Family Trust; Janet Rhee, individually and as trustee for the Yung Family Trust; Kin Kwok Yung; and Weerts Real Estate, Inc. (“Defendants”) are alleged to be the owners, possessors, managers, supervisors, operators, maintainers, workers, and controllers of the Premises. Plaintiff claims that Defendants' negligence caused him physical injuries, medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, and other general damages.

On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendants participated in private mediation with mediator Robert Tessier. The case did not settle during mediation. Subsequently, Mr. Tessier sent a mediator’s proposal to the Parties. (Id.)

The mediator’s proposal states:
“Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of $75,000.00 in exchange for Plaintiff's acceptance of said sum. Plaintiff to be responsible for all liens he/she/they have incurred. Plaintiff to execute a more comprehensive Full Release of All Claims, which will include a Civil Code section 1542 waiver, and dismiss this entire action with prejudice following receipt of settlement monies. Each side to bear its own costs and attorney's fees.” (Exhibit A.)

On October 21, 2024, Defendants timely agreed to and accepted the mediator’s proposal via e-mail. (Exhibit B.) On the same day, Plaintiff also timely agreed to the mediator’s settlement proposal via e-mail. (Exhibit C.)

On October 23, 2024, Defendants’ counsel sent a release and a Request for Dismissal for Plaintiff to execute. (Exhibit E.)

On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent an e-mail stating:
“Please give us a call. In thirty years of practice, I’ve never had a client back out of a mediator proposal (although I’ve been the victim of it many times), but Nathan’s wife blew a gasket when she learned the amount (she’s his primary caretaker), and to stave off a divorce, he is rejecting the settlement. I apologize for the inconvenience this may cause you and your client. I know we owe you some supplemental discovery responses that we will get over to you shortly. Again, I apologize.” (Exhibit E.)

Plaintiff has not yet signed the release to oblige by the terms of the settlement agreement. Defendants now move the Court to enforce the settlement agreement.

CCP § 664.6 states: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”¿¿¿

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute.¿ (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.)¿ To enforce a written settlement agreement under CCP section 664.6, the following three elements must be met: (1) the parties must have come to a meeting of the minds on all material points; (2) there must be a writing that contains the material terms of the agreement; and (3) the writing must be signed by the parties.¿ (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 797-98.)¿¿¿

¿¿¿ CCP § 664.6 “require[s] the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6 and against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.”¿ (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.)¿ CCP § 664.6’s “requirement of a ‘writing signed by the parties’ must be read to apply to all parties bringing the section 664.6 motion and against whom the motion is directed.”¿ (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 306; see Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Const., Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 35-37 [“A written settlement agreement is not enforceable under section 664.6 unless it is signed by all of the parties to the agreement, not merely the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.”].)¿ “A procedure in which a settlement is evidenced by one writing signed by both sides minimizes the possibility of … dispute[s] and legitimizes the summary nature of the section 664.6 procedure.”¿ (Robertson v. Chen (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1293.)

The evidence shows an exchange of emails demonstrating that both parties agreed to the mediator’s proposal. Accordingly, there appears to have been a meeting of the minds on all material points, and the mediator’s proposal was in writing, with both parties agreeing to it via email.

Defendant argues that Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 requires a settlement agreement to be signed by the parties. Defendant contends that there is an email exchange by the parties’ attorneys and not by the parties, and therefore the agreement failed to meet the threshold requirements of 664.6. To support this position, Defendant cites Gallo v. Getz, (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 329 333, the court held that a signed letter from a plaintiff’s attorney to a defendant’s insurer confirming settlement did not meet § 664.6's requirement for a writing signed by the parties themselves. Defendant also cites Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc., (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1175 for the proposition that stipulation requires writing signed by parties.

However, as defendant points out, CCP §¿664.6 was amended in 2021 to allow attorneys who represent a party to sign the writing on behalf of his or her client. (CCP 664.6(b)(2).)

Plaintiff argues there was no meeting of the minds on the material terms. Plaintiff cites the principle that a settlement agreement must be sufficiently definite for courts to enforce it, asserting that if essential elements are reserved for future agreement, the agreement is too indefinite to be enforceable. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 50 Cal.App.4th 793, 810-812.) Plaintiff contends the settlement agreement was not definite because it left essential elements for future agreement in the comprehensive "Release of All Claims" sent by Defendants two days later, on October 23, 2024.

The question is whether the comprehensive release contained essential terms that required further negotiation or merely incorporated details already agreed upon. The language of the mediator’s proposal does not support Plaintiff’s argument that essential terms were reserved for future negotiation. The proposal contains no language suggesting that further negotiation on material terms was anticipated or required.

Plaintiff then argues that critical issues, such as Medi-Cal reimbursement, medical liens, and a Civil Code § 1542 waiver, were not addressed in the mediator’s proposal. However, these issues were discussed and agreed upon in the email exchange. The mediator’s proposal specifically stated that:

Regarding medical reimbursement and liens, the proposal clearly states that Plaintiff would be responsible for all liens. In the context of personal injury cases, this would typically include medical liens, as such liens are typically part of a personal injury settlement.

Plaintiff argues that § 1542, by its nature, requires an express and specific waiver, which cannot be satisfied by a vague or implied reference in an email. (Id.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide any legal authority or rationale to support this assertion.

Moreover, the mediator’s proposal explicitly mentions a § 1542 waiver and does not indicate that the waiver was limited in any respect or that its terms were subject to further negotiation. In fact, the waiver would be part of a comprehensive release, contradicting Plaintiff’s contention that the waiver must be specific or limited beyond its stated terms.

Second, when Plaintiff agreed to the mediator’s proposal, no objections or issues were raised regarding the § 1542 waiver. There is no evidence that the scope of the waiver was intended to be negotiated further, nor does the proposal suggest such an intention.

Third, the language of the waiver is standard and reflects a typical § 1542 waiver included in comprehensive releases. Specifically, the waiver states:

· “Releasors certify that they have read section 1542 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:

· ‘A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or released party.’

· Releasors hereby knowingly and voluntarily waive all rights under Civil Code section 1542 and acknowledge and agree that this waiver is an essential and material term of this Release and this settlement that led to it, and that without such waiver, this settlement would not have been entered into.

· Neither this Release nor this settlement that led to it shall be construed as an admission of liability by Releasees.

· This Release expressly reserves Releasees’ rights to pursue their claims, demands, actions, causes of action, legal remedies, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever.”

The language of the § 1542 waiver is consistent with what is typically expected in a comprehensive release. It provides no indication that the scope of the § 1542 waiver was unresolved or subject to further negotiation in the mediator’s proposal.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court