Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV24758, Date: 2024-10-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV24758 Hearing Date: October 11, 2024 Dept: 27
Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES¿AND REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS
Hearing Date: 10/11/24¿
CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV24758 JUAN MANUEL
FAJARDO RAMIREZ vs MOHAMMADREZA ZAREFARD
Moving Party: Plaintiff
Responding Party: Defendant Mohammadreza Zarefard
Notice: Sufficient¿
Ruling:
·
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES¿IS GRANTED¿IN PART
·
REQUESTS
FOR SANCTIONS ARE DENIED
Background
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August
4, 2020, at approximately 7:00 p.m. at the intersection of Winnetka Avenue and
Plummer Street in Chatsworth, CA. Plaintiff was stopped at a traffic light when
Defendant’s vehicle collided with the driver’s side of Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing
injuries.
In Defendant’s response to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatory No. 13.1,
Defendant disclosed that surveillance of Plaintiff had been conducted on April
23, 2024, by Ethos Risk. This surveillance footage is responsive to Plaintiff's
Requests for Production Nos. 8 and 11, which seek documents and video footage
depicting Plaintiff. However, Defendant refused to produce the footage, citing
work product protection and listing it on a privilege log.
The parties engaged in meet and confer efforts and participated in
an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC), but the discovery issue remained
unresolved. Plaintiff now moves the Court to compel further responses and for
the production of the sub rosa documents.
Analysis
1.
DISCOVERY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES
“The purpose of the discovery rules is to
enhance the truth-seeking function of the litigation process and eliminate
trial strategies that focus on gamesmanship and surprise. In other words,
the discovery process is designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's
bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent.” (Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 389 [cleaned up].)
Where a party objects, or responds inadequately,
to discovery requests, a motion lies to compel further responses, and that
party has the burden to justify the objections or inadequate responses. (Fairmont
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310, subd. (a) [motion to compel further responses lies “[o]n receipt of a
response to a demand for inspection”].) “A trial court's determination of
a motion to compel discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
However, when the facts asserted in support of and in opposition to the motion
are in conflict, the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior
Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733 [cleaned up].)
2.
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The attorney work product doctrine is codified
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2018.010, et seq.
It is the policy of the state to do both of the following:
(a) Preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial
with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases
thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable
aspects of those cases.
(b) Prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their
adversary's industry and efforts.
(a) A writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any
circumstances.
(b) The work product of an attorney, other than a writing described
in subdivision (a), is not discoverable unless the court determines that denial
of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing
that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2018.020, 2018.030.)
“Absolute protection is afforded to writings
that reflect ‘an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
research or theories.’ All other work product receives qualified protection;
such material ‘is not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of
discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that
party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice.’ ” (Coito v.
Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 485, citations omitted (hereafter, Coito).)
In Coito, the California Supreme Court
decided “[w]hat work product protection, if any, should be accorded two items:
first, recordings of witness interviews conducted by investigators employed by
defendant's counsel, and second, information concerning the identity of
witnesses from whom defendant's counsel has obtained statements.” (Coito,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at 485.) With respect to both items, the Coito
court opined:
[W]e hold that the recorded witness statements are entitled as a
matter of law to at least qualified work product protection. The witness
statements may be entitled to absolute protection if defendant can show that
disclosure would reveal its attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal research or theories. If not, then the items may be subject to
discovery if plaintiff can show that denial of discovery will unfairly
prejudice [her] in preparing [her] claim or will result in an injustice.
As to the identity of witnesses from whom defendant's counsel has
obtained statements, we hold that such information is not automatically
entitled as a matter of law to absolute or qualified work product protection.
In order to invoke the privilege, defendant must persuade the trial court that
disclosure would reveal the attorney's tactics, impressions, or evaluation of
the case (absolute privilege) or would result in opposing counsel taking undue
advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts (qualified privilege). (Id. at p. 486 [cleaned up].)
Attorneys are the holders of the “work product
privilege.” (See Curtis v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
453, 468 [“The work product privilege is held by the attorney, not the
client”].) And the party that seeks the production of an attorney’s “work
product,” other than a writing, “has the burden of establishing that denial of
disclosure will unfairly prejudice the party in preparing its claim or defense
or will result in injustice.” (Id. at p. 469.)1
Here, Plaintiff seeks the production of surveillance of Plaintiff on April 23, 2024, by Ethos Risk. Plaintiff contends that good cause exists for the
production to protect against surprise. In opposition, Defendant contends that
the sub rosa evidence is the work product of counsel for Defendant and
consequently protected from disclosure under the attorney work product
doctrine.
In short, the question before the Court is
whether the attorney work product doctrine precludes the production of the sub rosa
Evidence.
Plaintiff relies primarily on Suezaki v.
Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 166 for the proposition that the attorney
work product doctrine does not protect the sub rosa evidence from being
produced. Plaintiff’s reliance is faulty. First, the California
Supreme Court held that the motion pictures of the plaintiff taken by an
investigator hired by the defendant’s attorney is not protected by the
attorney-client privilege. (Id. at p. 172.) Second, the
California Supreme Court noted that the motion pictures were the work product
of the defendant’s attorney. (Id. at p. 177.) As such, the Suezaki
Court stated as follows:
[I]n California the fact that the material sought to be discovered
is the ‘work product’ of the attorney is one factor to be used by the trial
court in the exercise of its discretion in determining whether or not discovery
should be granted. It does not mean that, simply because the material involved
is the ‘work product’ of the attorney, it can or should deny discovery.
Something more must exist. The trial court must consider all the relevant
factors involved and then determine whether, under all the circumstances,
discovery would or would not be fair and equitable.
(Id. at p. 178.)
Against the backdrop of both parties’
positions, the Court finds Fisher v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(S.D. Ind. 1993) 152 F.R.D. 145, 147 to be instructive. In that case, the
defendant obtained through an investigator surveillance of the plaintiff’s
activities inconsistent with his claimed injuries which would be used to
impeach the plaintiff at trial. The defendant objected to the production of the
surveillance evidence before the plaintiff’s deposition based in part on the
attorney work product doctrine. Following the plaintiff’s deposition, the
defendant produced a single surveillance video taken of the plaintiff that the
defendant intended to use as evidence at trial. The plaintiff
nevertheless sought the production of all of the surveillance video
evidence. (Id. at 148.)
The issue before the Fisher court was
“Whether surveillance tapes of a Plaintiff which Defendant does not intend to
introduce at trial, but which it possesses, are discoverable by the Plaintiff
prior to trial.” (Id. at 150.) In answering that
question and finding that the plaintiff did not meet his burden to compel the
production of the surveillance evidence, the Fisher court stated:
Deciding if a party has demonstrated the requisite “substantial
need” to justify discovery of work product involves a balancing of the value of
broad discovery as an accurate method of arriving at a full resolution of each
dispute with the corresponding need to prevent undue intrusion into the
attorney's preparation of her case. Striking this balance is, at best, a
discretionary decision of the court in the factual context of the presented
case. However, in exercising this discretion, relevant considerations
include, among others, the importance of the protected materials to the party
seeking discovery; the degree to which the protected material reflects the
thoughts and mental impressions of an attorney but yet remains outside of that
absolutely protected category of materials; the impeachment value of the
material sought; and whether the party seeking discovery knows, or is merely
surmising, that the materials sought contain impeaching material.
(Id. at pp. 151–152 [cleaned
up].) Further, the court noted:
Concluding that Plaintiff failed to make the showing required to
invade work product is not meant to refute the notion that surveillance tapes
prepared by a defendant to impeach a plaintiff may contain substantive
evidence, rather than merely impeachment evidence. To the contrary, the
current weight of authority suggests that representations contained in
videotapes are indeed substantive evidence, and retreats from the previously
held belief that evidence used for impeachment is of a kind different and distinguishable
from evidence used to prove a case. Nor is it questioned that the videotapes
may be relevant to the issue of damages or harm suffered by plaintiff.
However, . . . not all relevant, substantive evidence is discoverable,
especially if that evidence is protected attorney work product. Once conceded
that work product protection extends to the disputed materials, a different
inquiry altogether is warranted, one which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate
substantial need for the protected materials. Merely claiming that surveillance
tapes prepared in anticipation of litigation might contain substantive
evidence, especially when an alternative source for that evidence exists, does
not provide “substantial need” to invade attorney work product.
(Id. at 153.)
a.
Work Product
The sub rosa evidence was developed at the
behest of counsel for Defendant and such evidence exists because of the efforts
of defense counsel. (See, e.g., Coito, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 495
[“witness statement is in part the product of the attorney’s work. The
witness statement would not exist but for the attorney’s initiative, decision,
and effort to obtain it”].)
As such, the Court finds that the photographs and films contained
in the Ethos Report constitute the work product of defense counsel, which is
entitled to qualified protection. Defendant argues that the Ethos Report not
only includes photographs and films of Plaintiff but also contains comments and
writings that reflect Defendant’s counsel’s impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories regarding Plaintiff’s claims of liability and damages.
The Court finds it appropriate to conduct an in-camera inspection
of the Ethos Report to review the comments and writings that are claimed to
contain mental impressions or legal theories. “In camera inspection is the
proper procedure to evaluate the applicability of the work product doctrine to
specific documents, and categorize whether each document should be given
qualified or absolute protection” from disclosure. (Wellpoint Health
Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 121.) As attorneys
hold the “work product privilege” (Curtis v. Superior Court (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 453, 468), and defense counsel has consented to the Court’s
in-camera inspection, this procedure is appropriate.
b.
Good Cause for Production
Plaintiff claims that the production of the
sub rosa evidence will prevent unfair surprise whether pre-trial or at
trial. That fear is material provided that the sub rosa evidence is
utilized by Defendant pre-trial or at trial for any purpose including
impeachment. But whether the sub rosa evidence has any probative value
will depend on what Plaintiff discloses during the discovery process including
her deposition. Specifically, if Plaintiff discloses information which is
consistent with the sub rosa evidence, then such evidence loses its potential
impeachment quality and may not be utilized by Defendant. At this
juncture, Plaintiff is in the best position to determine whether any
surveillance of her would be consistent with her alleged injuries, and to
present evidence through her own testimony regarding the extent of her injuries
which may or may not affect her life activities.
The Court grants, in part, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further
responses to the Demand for Production under Code of Civil Procedure section
2031.310. The Court will first conduct an in-camera inspection of the Ethos
Report to determine whether any of the writings and comments reflect defense
counsel’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal research, or theories, and
whether any portion of the report is entitled to absolute privilege. For parts
of the report, such as photographs, films, and writings (that the Court
determines after in-camera inspection to be subject to only qualified privilege),
the Court will order the production of those portions of the Ethos Report, after Plaintiff’s deposition, provided
that Defendant intends to use such evidence, pre-trial or at
trial. To that end, Defendant shall notify Plaintiff in writing if
Defendant intends to use the sub rosa evidence during any stage of the action
(including non-expert and expert discovery phases) and produce the Sub Rosa
Evidence within 5 days of that written notice.
The Court finds the imposition of monetary
sanctions to be unwarranted. The parties had a legitimate dispute as to
whether the sub rosa evidence should be produced notwithstanding the protection
afforded under the attorney work product doctrine.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:¿
If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to
the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT”
followed by the case number.¿ The body of the email must include the hearing date
and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party
submitting.
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the
parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral
argument.¿ You should assume that others may appear at the
hearing to argue.
If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing,
the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the
order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the
Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.