Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV25649, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV25649, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV25649 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: 27

Complaint: 10/20/2023

Hon. Lee S. Arian¿¿

Department 27¿¿

Tentative Ruling¿

Hearing Date: 3/12/2024 at 1:30 p.m.¿¿¿

Case No./Name.: 23STCV25649 BRIAN MENDOZA, AN INDIVIDUAL vs RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

Motion Name: Motion To Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Ralph’s

Responding Party: Plaintiff

Notice: Sufficient¿¿¿

¿¿¿

Ruling: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

Background

On 10/20/23, Plaintiff filed the present action alleging he was accosted, maced, and assaulted by Ralphs’s security. The complaint was amended once on 1/12/24. On 2/13/24, the defendant moved the court to strike references to and the prayer for punitive damages in the first amended complaint, specifically targeting the following sections:

Page 7, ¶ 51: "Defendant’s conduct in ratifying and failing to prevent this offensive conduct constitutes 'malice' and 'oppression' in that Defendants, internally or with reckless disregard for the safety of Plaintiff, ratified the confinement, assault, and battery of Plaintiff. Defendant ratified this conduct through actions, including, without limitation, the conduct set forth above, and the actions of the Security Guard in assaulting Plaintiff by employing the mentioned employee."

Page 8, Prayer for Relief, ¶ 2: "For punitive and exemplary damages in an amount not less than $2,000,000."

Defendant Ralph’s argues that the First Amended Complaint (FAC) fails to allege sufficient facts that would raise a circumstance of malice or oppression. Furthermore, the FAC does not allege facts showing that a managing agent ratified the alleged wrongful conduct.

Legal Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) “The grounds for a motion to strike are limited to matters appearing on the face of the challenged pleading or matters which must or may be judicially noticed. (§ 437, subd. (a); Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452.).” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 20.) A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54, subd. (c).)¿

Analysis and Conclusion

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)¿ “Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code section 3294 (c)(1).) Under the statute, malice does not require actual intent to harm. Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (Pfeifer v.John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) ‘Despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)¿

A plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.¿ To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.¿ (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)¿ “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)

Moreover, a claim for punitive damages against a corporate employer requires factual allegations that the corporation itself, rather than a given employee, ratified or authorized the malicious and oppressive conduct. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b); Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167; see Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164 [law does not impute every employee' s malice to a corporation].)

Plaintiff contends that his First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges malice by stating that “each and all, negligently, and willfully, intentionally and purposely, targeted Plaintiff, or otherwise allowed the targeting and abuse of Plaintiff to transpire” and by reason of the “wanton, reckless conduct ... of Defendant, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive and exemplary damages.” (Opposition at p.5.) However, these allegations are all filled with legal conclusions. Plaintiff must prove terms such as willfully, intentionally, wanton, and reckless conduct for punitive damages, and facts to support these conclusions must be pled with specificity.

Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that he has pled how a managing agent of the corporation ratified or authorized the malicious conduct Plaintiff points to the portion of the complaint stating that “the businesses were at all relevant times responsible for their employees and invitees, including those who oversaw the security at their property.” (Id.) Plaintiff further pled that “both entities owned, maintained, and controlled the subject property, and it flows therefrom that in that capacity they have trained, supervised, and controlled their representative(s) and agent(s), and third-party agents with respect to not acting in illegal, reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others.” (Id.) Again, these allegations fail to demonstrate with specificity who is the managing agent that ratified the security’s conduct and how he/she ratified the conduct.

It appears that Plaintiff lacks knowledge of the names or identities of any managing agent of the Defendant who ratified the security guard's conduct but hopes to uncover this information during discovery. (Opposition at p.6.) Consequently, granting leave to amend now would not provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to plead facts with specificity in support of its punitive damage claims. Thus, Defendant’s motion to strike is granted without leave to amend. Plaintiff may seek leave to amend at a later time if he uncovers facts through discovery that will support punitive damages.