Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV25901, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV25901    Hearing Date: January 2, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background 

On August 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Judicial Council form complaint. The facts alleged are that Plaintiff was walking near 3191 Casitas Avenue when she stepped on a broken, deteriorating, or unsecured manhole cover, causing her to trip and fall, resulting in severe injury and pain. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action: general negligence and premises liability. 

Within the premises liability cause of action, Plaintiff alleges the following: 

1.  Premises Liability (Prem.L-1): Plaintiff, Esther Yeon Kook, claims that the acts of Defendants were the legal (proximate) cause of her damages. Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 11, 2021, she was injured on the identified premises due to a dangerous condition described in an attachment to the complaint. 

The attachment page states: “Defendants negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly owned, maintained, managed, operated, controlled, and safeguarded the premises and/or sidewalk at or near 3191 Casitas Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90039, such that an exposed manhole was allowed to exist and remain in disrepair. Defendants failed to barricade the area and/or warn of the dangerous condition, rendering the area of said premises dangerous and resulting in serious bodily injury to Plaintiff in the following manner: Plaintiff was walking near 3191 Casitas Avenue when she stepped on a broken, deteriorating, and/or unsecured manhole cover, causing her to trip and fall. This incident caused Plaintiff to sustain severe injury and pain. The actions of Defendants and/or their employees fell below the standard of care and were the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. 

This claim is brought pursuant to Government Code Sections 835 and 815.2.” 

2.  Premises Liability (Prem.L-4): Count Three – Dangerous Condition of Public Property: Plaintiff alleges that the dangerous condition existed on public property owned by the following defendants: City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and California Department of Transportation, as well as Does 1 to 50.  

o    The defendant public entities had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to have corrected it before the injury. 

o    The dangerous condition was created by employees of the defendant public entities. 

The complaint does not contain any allegations that explicitly reference Defendant Terraphase by name. Instead, the specific allegations, such as Prem.L-1 and Prem.L-4, are directed at Does 1–50, a group of unnamed defendants. Terraphase was subsequently identified and designated as Doe 1 on September 18, 2024. 

Defendant Terraphase now requests that the Court take judicial notice of its Secretary of State filing, which establishes that it is a private corporation, not a public entity as alleged by Plaintiff. Based on this evidence, Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s allegations that improperly classify it as a public entity, specifically: 

1.  Second Cause of Action – Premises Liability Prem.L-1, which the complaint indicates was brought pursuant to Government Code sections 835 and 815.2; 

2.  Premises Liability Prem.L-4 – Count Three – Dangerous Condition of Public Property. 

Judicial Notice  

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: 

1.  A true and correct copy of TERRAPHASE’s Secretary of State Certificate of Status, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 

2.  A true and correct copy of the State of California Secretary of State Business Search results for TERRAPHASE ENGINEERING INC. (https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business), attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 

3.  A true and correct copy of TERRAPHASE’s Articles of Incorporation obtained from the State of California Secretary of State Business Search results, attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 

4.  A true and correct copy of TERRAPHASE’s Statements of Information obtained from the State of California Secretary of State Business Search results, attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 

Plaintiff's objection to judicial notice is misplaced because Plaintiff has not identified any specific facts in the documents submitted for judicial notice that are genuinely in dispute. Defendant is not requesting the Court to accept the truth of any disputed factual content but merely to acknowledge the existence and legal effect of the records, specifically that Defendant is a private corporation as evidenced by its Secretary of State filings. Judicial notice of such official records is explicitly permitted under Evidence Code sections 452(c) and 452(h), as well as established case law, including C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103-1104, which allows judicial notice of public records at the motion to strike or demurrer stage. 

Discussion 

In the Opposition, Plaintiff presents numerous arguments, all of which the Court finds unpersuasive. The Court first concludes that the motion to strike is procedurally proper because Defendant is not seeking to eliminate the entire cause of action for premises liability, as alleged by Plaintiff. Instead, Defendant seeks to strike portions of the cause of action that improperly characterize Defendant as a public agency. By introducing evidence subject to judicial notice, Defendant has shown that it is not a public agency. As a result, the allegations regarding Defendant’s public agency status are irrelevant or false and subject to being stricken. 

Plaintiff's assertion that a motion to strike is confined to the facts alleged in the complaint and cannot rely on extrinsic facts is contrary to established California law. While a motion to strike typically addresses matters apparent on the face of the challenged pleading, the Court may also consider facts subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) Here, Defendant has properly requested judicial notice of facts demonstrating that it is not a public entity.  

Plaintiff argues that Defendant is "chopping up" and misconstruing the allegations in the complaint or that Defendant's arguments lack standing. This contention is without merit. The complaint explicitly states that Plaintiff is bringing the third cause of action—dangerous condition of public property—and claims under Government Code sections 835 and 815.2 against Does 1-50, which include Doe 1, identified as Defendant Terraphase. These Government Code claims are directly lodged against Doe 1 who is now Terraphase. Defendant cannot reasonably argue that it lacks standing to address these claims or that it is misconstruing the allegations in the complaint. 

Plaintiff argues that at this stage of the case, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to reasonably apprise Defendant of the claims against it, thereby enabling Defendant to investigate and prepare an appropriate response. The complaint is generally taken at face value on a motion to strike and need not provide detailed facts concerning matters "presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring" defendant. (Dumm v. Pacific Valves (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 792, 799.) However, this principle is not absolute. When the Court can take judicial notice of facts that shows the allegations being false, those allegations become legally untenable and subject to being stricken. Plaintiff also argues that pleading alternative theories of liability is permissible. While this is correct in principle, it does not justify allegations that are factually or legally impossible based on facts subject to judicial notice.  

Plaintiff’s argument that it has satisfied the pleading requirements for premises liability conflates general premises liability with the specific statutory claims under Government Code sections 835 and 815.2. Defendant is not seeking to strike the entire second cause of action for premises liability, which alleges that defendants negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the premises, as outlined in Prem.L-2. Instead, Defendant challenges only specific portions of the cause of action based on the erroneous classification of Defendant as a public entity. Specifically, Defendant seeks to strike Prem.L-4 and the portions of the complaint attachment stating that claims against Does 1–50 are brought under Government Code sections 835 and 815.2. 

The Court finds that this issue arises from Plaintiff's decision to include broad allegations against unnamed defendants, encompassing both government entities and private corporations. This approach has led to allegations intended for public entities being improperly directed at Defendant Terraphase, a private corporation. To address this issue, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint within 20 days to clarify her allegations against Defendant Terraphase. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.