Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV28197, Date: 2024-12-16 Tentative Ruling

This matter stems from an automobile accident that occurred on October 13, 2020, where Christian Lopez (Lopez) an on-duty police officer was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Cacheris Washington (Cacheris) and owned by Tanequia Washington (hereinafter, the Washington Defendants). Lopez filed suit against the Washington Defendants and the suit was settled on February 9, 2021 for $15,000.00. Subsequently, the County of Los Angeles (the County) filed a Complaint against the Washington Defendants for compensatory damages and workers’ compensation benefits paid to Lopez. A Cross-Complaint and then Amended Cross-Complaint in Interpleader was filed by the Washington Defendants. Lopez then filed an answer to the Amended Cross-Complaint in Interpleader, alleging that the County’s claims were junior to Lopez’s claims.

The motion now before the Court is the County’s Motion to Quash Lopez’s Subpoena on Sedgwick Claims Management Services. Lopez opposes the Motion; the County filed a reply. The Court notes the Motion to Quash is untimely under Code Civ. Proc. §1985.3(g), however California has a strong public policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, especially if the opposing party has suffered no prejudice. (Oliveros¿v. County of Los Angeles¿(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1398-1399. Also see Code Civ. Proc.§ 583.130.)

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (Code Civ. Proc.§ 1987.1.)

In their moving papers, the County asserts several arguments in support of quashing Lopez’s subpoena to the County’s third-party claims administrator, Sedgwick Claims Management Services (Sedwick). The three primary arguments are: (1) the scope of the subpoena is overly broad, (2) the information requested is protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product doctrine, and (3) because Lopez is requesting records of a peace officer, the County must deny the request as a violation of Pen. Code §832.7. As explained below, the Court disagrees that Pen. Code §832.7 bars release of the requested documents; however the subpoena must be narrowed and the information requested falls within the scope of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine, therefore the County’s Motion to Quash is granted.

The Court will briefly address the County’s third argument first. The County contends the records Lopez is requesting are part of his personnel file as a peace officer employed by the County. Under Pen. Code §832.7(b) “the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers…or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.” Pen. Code §832.5 defines a personnel file as “the file maintained by the agency containing the primary records specific to each peace or custodial officer's employment, including evaluations, assignments, status changes, and imposed discipline.” The entirety of Lopez’s requests surround his workers’ compensation claim. The County fails to explain how the documents requested fall under the categories of employment, evaluations, assignments, status changes, or imposed discipline.

The County’s second contention argues that the subpoena is impermissibly overbroad and should be narrowed. The Court agrees. Both parties agree the main issue is which party is entitled to the $15,000.00 deposited with the Court. The subpoena contains the following nine requests:

1. All DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and CHRISTIAN LOPEZ from October 13, 2020, until the present.

2. All claim file notes PERTAINING TO Claim No. 121-01617-A RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and CHRISTIAN LOPEZ from October 13, 2020, until the present.

3. All COMMUNICATIONS between CHRISTIAN LOPEZ and YOU PERTAINING TO Claim No. 121-01617-A.

4. All COMMUNICATIONS between CHRISTIAN LOPEZ's counsel and YOU from October 13, 2020, until the present.

5. All DOCUMENTS REFLECTING names of PERSON(S) at SEDGWICK that worked on Claim No. 121-01617-A.

6. All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and DEFENDANTS from October 13, 2020, until the present REGARDING the INCIDENT

7. All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and DEFENDANTS from October 13, 2020, until the present REGARDING Claim No. 121-01617-A.

8. All claim file notes PERTAINING TO Claim No. 121-01617-A RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS from CHRISTIAN LOPEZ from October 13, 2020, until the present.

9. All claim file notes PERTAINING TO Claim No. 121-01617-A RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS from DEFENDANTS from October 13, 2020, until the present.

Although there are clearly time and subject scopes within the majority of requests, Request No. 5 asks for all documents reflecting names of persons at Sedgwick that worked on the claim. It is unclear why all the names of individuals who worked on the claim are necessary if Lopez is simply attempting to show that the County knew of the settlement. Request No. 6 asks for all communications between Sedgwick and the Washington Defendants; it is unclear why all communications between Sedgwick and the Washington Defendants are necessary and not just the communications referencing the settlement of the claims. Request No. 8 asks for all claim file notes relating to the claim and communications between Sedgwick and Lopez. Not only does Request No. 8 seem duplicative of Request No. 1, but there may also very well be file notes wholly unrelated to the primary issue of the settlement amount. The County argues this much in their moving papers, and contrary to Lopez’s contention, the County has sufficiently carried their burden of substantiating their objections based on over breadth.

The privileges asserted by the County are well-known. “The attorney-client privilege, set forth at Evidence Code section 954, confers a privilege on the client ‘to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer....’” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, (2009) 47 Cal.4^th 725, 740.)

“Work produced by an attorney's agents and consultants, as well as the attorney's own work product, is protected by the attorney work-product doctrine.” (Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court, (2013) 217 Cal.App.4^th 889, 911.)

In their moving papers, the County argues that Sedgwick, their third-party claims administrator, made all communications and claim file notes at the direction of the County in anticipation of litigation for both the workers’ compensation case and the subrogation case. (Moving Papers, p.11, lines 5-10.) The County analogizes this case to Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003), 109 Cal.App.4^th 529 (Scripps). In Scripps the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the defendant hospital; when a motion for disclosure of hospital records was granted, the hospital appealed arguing attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the hospital. In Scripps the hospital required employees to make reports. The Court of Appeal explained that the dominant purpose of the reports subject to the motion was for transmittal to an attorney in the course of the professional attorney-client relationship. (Id. at 534.) Therefore, the documents were subject to attorney-client privilege. The similarities of Scripps to the case at bar are evident.

The County contends Sedgwick and its agents incorporate communications and notes from the County’s attorneys into claim file notes and throughout an entire file. Moreover, after Lopez began receiving workers’ compensation payments in October of 2020, the County anticipated Lopez’s workers’ compensation claim would be litigated. Lopez filed his notice of application for adjudication of his workers’ compensation claim on June 10, 2021. Therefore, many of the documents requested will fall under attorney-client privilege. Similarly, internal documents discussing the underlying incident may fall under the work-product doctrine because of the communication or direction provided by an attorney.

Although many of the documents requested are privileged, not all of them will be. For example, communications directly between Sedgwick and Lopez may not be protected by the attorney-client privilege because the privilege is waived when the client communicates voluntarily to a third-party. Accordingly, the County will need to provide a privilege log pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §2031.240(c)(1).

The County’s Motion to Quash is GRANTED. If Lopez chooses to reissue a narrower subpoena, Lopez may do so. If the County chooses to assert privileges in its response to the new subpoena, it shall provide a privilege log in doing so.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at

the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court