Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV29036, Date: 2024-08-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV29036    Hearing Date: August 5, 2024    Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT¿ 

Hearing Date: 8/5/24

CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV29036 BLANCA PENATE vs. RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY

Moving Party: Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company

Responding Party: Plaintiff¿ 

Notice: Sufficient¿ 

Ruling: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED

Background

Plaintiff brought this action based on her contention that she tripped and fell in the produce section of Ralphs on November 3, 2020, around 2:13 pm. Prior to her fall, she inquired of a Defendant's employee about the location of a particular produce. The worker pointed to the wet rack behind Plaintiff. As Plaintiff turned and walked toward the wet rack, she tripped and fell over a trolley or U-boat (hereinafter “trolley”) positioned behind her. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that the trolley was open and obvious and that the risk posed by the trolley was trivial.

Legal Standard 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)¿ 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.) 

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)¿ 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)¿ 

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

Evidentiary Ruling¿¿¿ 

The Parties did not make any objections to evidence that were material to the Court’s ruling. (CCP § 437c(q).) 

Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff was shopping at a Ralphs store in Los Angeles at approximately 2:15 P.M. on November 3, 2020. She was in the produce section of the store, which consists of produce aisles and wet racks positioned against the wall. This area features a narrow walkway, allowing room for approximately 2-3 people between the produce aisle and the wet racks. While searching for produce, Plaintiff approached a store clerk at 2:13 P.M. near one of the aisles and inquired about the location of certain produce. The employee pointed toward the wet rack located directly behind Plaintiff, but also in the direction of a trolley. Plaintiff then walked in the direction indicated by the employee and tripped over the trolley.

Trivial Defect

Size of the Obstacle

A property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property." (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927.)  A court's analysis of a trivial defect involves the following: "the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If the preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court must proceed to consider evidence of additional factors, such as weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff's knowledge of the area." (Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567- 568.) If the factors do not demonstrate that the defect was "sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person," then the court "should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law and grant judgment for the landowner." (Id. at 567.)

The trivial defect doctrine primarily addresses issues such as sidewalk displacement, with Defendant's cited cases, including Stathoulis, falling within this typical context. In this instance, if analyzed under the framework of a displacement or an obstacle causing plaintiff to fall, the bottom of the trolley stands at approximately 6 inches high, well beyond the 1.5-inch high-end of the range that courts have traditionally considered minor or trivial. (Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 112.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff is familiar with the surroundings, having walked past the trolley several times. However, as Plaintiff has argued, a trolley, unlike a fixed sidewalk defect, is inherently movable. Its location can change frequently, making any prior knowledge of its position unreliable.

While the court adopts a more "holistic" approach where the court assess additional factors in addition to the size of the defect, the size or the height nevertheless remains the primary determinant of triviality. (Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110.) A 6-inch displacement far exceeds the bounds established for trivial defects, and such a significant deviation cannot be overlooked merely because Plaintiff previously navigated around the trolley without incident.

Davis and Dobbs

In addition to the trivial defect doctrine typically applied to sidewalks, Defendant references Davis v. City of Pasadena (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 701 and Dobbs v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 159 to assert that "triviality" also pertains to obvious conditions, which are trivial in the sense that they can be easily avoided. However, this interpretation stretches beyond the findings in Davis and Dobbs. In Dobbs, the court did not even analyze the facts under the trivial defect doctrine; rather, it examined whether there was substantial evidence of the reasonableness of the public entity’s approval of the design as part of a design immunity defense.

In Davis, the issue involved two sets of stairs: one where the handrail was parallel to the steps and another where the handrail was angled, causing a person descending the stairs at an oblique angle to encounter difficulties. The court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the combination of converging stairs and handrail "invites" a person to descend at that location and constitutes a dangerous condition, stating “If a person is not willing or able to employ the care necessary to descend stairs safely at an oblique angle, the stairs can be descended perpendicularly to the steps, can be descended along other perpendicular handrails which are available nearby, or can be bypassed completely in favor of other available means of entry.” (Davis, 42 Cal.App.4th at 704-705.)

The Court further reasoned that if the diagonal nature of the route of descent chosen by Mrs. Davis could alone be sufficient to support a finding of dangerous condition, it would follow that the existence of a spiral staircase would also be sufficient to constitute a dangerous condition.

This case differs notably from Davis. First, there are no alternative paths as in Davis. Video evidence shows the trolley stationed centrally at the intersection of various pathways. Reasonable minds can differ if such a placement created a substantial risk of harm. Unlike the choice between two staircases offering different methods of descent in Davis, the trolley here presented an unavoidable obstacle that had to be navigated around.

Furthermore, the primary reason the court in Davis deemed the stairs trivial was their similarity to common spiral staircases, which necessitate a similar angular gait for descent. The Court in Davis found that stairs of this design pose at most "minor," "trivial" or "insignificant" risk. (42 Cal.App.4th 701, 705.) If the staircase issue involved additional complications, such as cracks, jagged edges, slippery substances, obstructions to visibility, or abnormalities or damage to the structure (Id. at 703.), the court likely would have reached a different conclusion, even if the alleged condition was obvious and could have been easily avoided. Therefore, the court disagrees that Davis supports Defendant’s expansive interpretation of the trivial defect doctrine to include conditions that are easily avoided simply by paying attention. Such an expansion by the Defendant could erroneously classify most sidewalks with significant displacements as trivial, as these displacements would have been obvious and easily avoided.  Accordingly, the Court find Defendant to not have met its initial burden as to the issue of trivial defect.

Open and Obvious

“Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.”  (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.)  However, this is not always the case.  (Ibid.)  “[T]he obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse the potential duty of a landowner, not simply to warn of the condition but to rectify it.”  (Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184.)  The obviousness of a danger “may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,” but if “if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g, when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability . . .”  (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.)  

The court may determine a condition is open and obvious where “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition.¿ (Martinez, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.)¿ In examining photographs, the court should consider: (1) the photograph’s subject (i.e., its focal point); (2) the view of the subject (e.g., close-up, distant isolated, in context); (3) the photograph’s perspective (e.g., eye-level, overhead, ground-level); (4) the use of any plain-view altering devices (e.g., camera color filter, fish-eye lens, computer-manipulation); (5) the characteristics of the photograph (e.g., sharp and clear, blurry, grainy, color or black and white); (6) whether the photograph was taken under identical or substantially similar conditions (e.g., timing, lighting, weather); and (7) any other relevant circumstances (e.g., addition of extrinsic aids, such as a ruler or pointer).¿ (Kasparian, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at

Here, the security footage suggests that the trolley was open and obvious as it was located right next to Plaintiff. However, it is unclear whether from Plaintiff’s perspective she had a sight of the part of the trolley that caused her to fall. The footage shows the clerk appearing to direct Plaintiff to the wet rack through a gap between the metal frames of the trolley and Plaintiff, who was looking through this gap, reasonably might not have noticed the bottom part of the trolley that caused her fall as she walked toward the wet racks. Therefore, it is not clear that the trolley was open and obvious to a reasonable person in her circumstances.  Given that on summary judgment, the Court must give every evidentiary benefit to the non-moving party, the Court cannot, based on the surveillance video, find the trolley to be open and obvious in this particular instance.

Moreover, in the opposition, Plaintiff cited Chance v. Lawry's, Inc. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 368, 374, where the jury found that although the planter box in the foyer of the restaurant measured approximately 30 inches in width, 6 feet in length, and 18 inches in depth, its visibility was compromised. To alleviate congestion and allow passage, both Humphrey and Mrs. Chance stepped backward; Humphrey then bumped into the planter box and momentarily lost his balance. The jury concluded that, given the narrowness of the foyer and the crowdedness of the restaurant, the planter box, despite its size, was not so obvious that Plaintiff should have seen it. The court found that in such crowded and constrained environments, Plaintiff cannot be expected to maintain the same level of observance as a pedestrian on an open street. Similar circumstances exist as the video shows narrow lanes packed with customers. Defendant did not distinguish this case in their reply nor argue against the reduced level of observance expected of Plaintiff under these circumstances.

Also, an exception to the general rule regarding open and obvious dangers exists when "it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it)." [Citation.] In other words, while the obviousness of a condition and its inherent danger might typically negate a landowner's duty to remedy or warn of the condition in some situations, this obviousness does not eliminate a duty of care when it is foreseeable that, due to necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition. (Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 447). Although Defendant addressed foreseeability in their moving papers, they seemed to sidestep the issue of practical necessity. The video evidence shows that the trolley was located in the middle of the intersection, directly in Plaintiff's path to the wet racks. This placement shows that Plaintiff was required to encounter the trolley while walking toward the wet racks. Defendant argues that Plaintiff could have navigated around the trolley, but the very fact that Plaintiff needed to navigate around it signifies the necessity of requiring persons to encounter it. Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden as to the alleged dangerous condition being open and obvious.

While based on the surveillance tape, this case would appear to have little appeal to a trier of fact, that same surveillance tape provides a basis for it to be decided by that trier of fact as opposed to determined as a matter of law. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.