Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV29393, Date: 2024-11-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV29393 Hearing Date: November 27, 2024 Dept: 27
Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Hearing Date: 11/27/24
CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV29393 ROBERTO CORONA
vs COMPTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
Moving Party: Defendants Compton Unified
School District and Joseph Davidson
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Notice: Sufficient
Ruling:
Defendant Joseph Davidson’s MSA IS DENIED
Defendant Compton Unified School District’s
MSA IS GRANTED IN PART; COURT TO HEAR FROM PARTIES RE MSJ
Background
Plaintiff Roberto
Corona is a student at Centennial High School, operated by Defendant Compton
Unified School District (“District”). Defendant Joseph Davidson, a custodian
employed by the district and working at the high school at the time of the
incident, allegedly engaged in a verbal altercation with Plaintiff regarding
Plaintiff taking a box from a pallet and thereafter attacking him.
Plaintiff, in his First
Amended Complaint, asserts causes of action for battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants and respondeat superior
and negligent supervision against Defendant District; he also seeks punitive
damages against Defendant Davidson. District now moves the Court for summary
judgment or summary adjudication on all causes of action. Defendant Davidson
separately moves the Court for summary adjudication on the punitive damages
claim.
Legal Standard
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues
framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the
opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated
the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v.
Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)
“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to
make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log
Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving
for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party
fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied.
(See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving
party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion
by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)
To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot
be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not
possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably
obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient
for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must
also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to
support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting
evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 855.)
“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or
denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists,
but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue
of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff
cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro
Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
The
court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of
that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion,
the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a
factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this
manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify
issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are
indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) Further, “the trial court may not
weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is
more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant
summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of
Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for
summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must
instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)
Undisputed Facts
Though
the parties have different versions of the facts that occurred from the time
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Davidson physically attacked him, Defendants agree,
at least for the purposes here, to the following facts:
·
On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff and other
students were having problems with their respective District-issued laptop
during sixth period math class.
·
Plaintiff's math teacher directed
Plaintiff and other students to speak with the librarian; Plaintiff and a group
of students walked directly to the library.
·
While walking from the library back to
his math class, Plaintiff encountered a pallet in the hallway; the pallet was
holding several boxes of unidentified items.
·
Plaintiff took a box without permission.
·
Plaintiff removed the box a couple feet
and then placed it back down.
·
Defendant Davidson, who was working at
the school as a janitor, told Plaintiff to “put the f***ing box back.”
·
Plaintiff did not fully put the box
back.
·
Defendant Davidson walked off as
Plaintiff walked back to class.
·
After this encounter, Defendant Davidson
returned.
·
Defendant Davidson walked 15 or 20 feet up
to Plaintiff and grabbed Plaintiff on his left and right shoulder and
ultimately Plaintiff ended up op on the ground with Plaintiff on top of him.
Discussion
Vicarious Liability
The core issue in Defendant
District’s motion is whether Defendant Davidson acted within the scope of his
employment with the District when he attacked Plaintiff. This motion does not
hinge on factual disputes, as Plaintiff does not contest the facts presented by
Defendant in the separate statement. Instead, the issue is whether, based on
the agreed-upon facts, case law supports a finding that Defendant Davidson
acted within the scope of his employment.
Plaintiff relies on Fields
v. Sanders (1947) 29 Cal.2d 834, asserting that the attack was an outgrowth
of Defendant's employment and custodial duties because the tort was part of a
continuous sequence of events related to Defendant's employment.
In Fields v. Sanders
(1947) 29 Cal.2d 834, the Court held an employer vicariously liable for an
altercation involving its employee.
Specifically, while driving a truck for Krieger Oil Company, the defendant,
Sanders, was involved in a collision with another motorist, Fields, which necessitated
an exchange of information under California law. During that exchange of
information, the parties apparently argued about who was responsible for the
accident and ultimately Sanders hit Fields with a wrench. The Fields
court found that the altercation arose directly from Sanders’ duties as a
driver, as it stemmed from the collision and his efforts to deny liability to
protect his employer. Although the assault on Fields was tortious and
unauthorized, it was part of a continuous sequence of events tied to Sanders’
job-related tasks.
Defendant District, on
the other hand, points to Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981)
123 Cal.App.3d 133 to support its contention that Defendant Davidson was not
acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted Plaintiff. In Alma W., an 11-year-old student at
Lazear Elementary School alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a school
custodian, A.B., on school premises. The incident occurred during school hours
in the janitor's office on a Friday afternoon. The plaintiff argued that the
assault was a foreseeable risk of the educational enterprise because A.B. was
on duty immediately before and after the incident. The court did not find
vicarious liability because the act did not arise out of his job
responsibilities, nor was it intended to further the employer’s interests.
Alma W. specifically
references Fields v. Sanders and distinguishes it on the basis that a
sexual assault by a janitor at a public school is clearly not incidental to the
janitor's duties. The court emphasized that in Fields, a work-related
dispute preceded the assault, thereby connecting the wrongful act to the
employee’s duties. By contrast, in Alma W., the court found that the
acts leading up to the sexual assault bore no relation to the janitor's job
responsibilities, making the assault entirely personal and outside the scope of
employment.
The Court will hear
further argument on this issue.
Negligent Hiring,
Retention and Supervision
When a plaintiff is
injured by an employee directly, an employer is not liable for negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision when the undisputed facts show that there
was nothing in the employee's background, and nothing was made known to the
employer during the employee's tenure, that could be deemed a specific warning
that the employee posed an unreasonable particular risk. (Juarez v. Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc., (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 377, 397.)
The District conducted
a fingerprint and background check, which Davidson passed. (UMF 69.) Since
Davidson’s hire, the District has not been made aware of any incidents
warranting discipline. (UMF 70.) Additionally, the District has no record of
incidents where Davidson used force of any kind. (UMF 71.) The District has met
its initial burden by demonstrating that no information during Davidson's
tenure indicated he posed an unreasonable particular risk. Plaintiff does not
oppose these arguments in the opposition, nor dispute UMF 69-71. Furthermore,
no evidence has been presented to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly,
summary adjudication as to the District’s negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision claim is granted.
Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is
not a standalone cause of action but rather a theory of liability. (Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp. (9th Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 156.) Here, Defendant’s
respondeat superior liability is encompassed within Plaintiff’s causes of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery against
Defendant Davidson and the District, based on vicarious liability for
Davidson’s actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s respondeat superior cause of
action is duplicative and not a standalone claim. Therefore, summary
adjudication on this cause of action is granted.
Davidson’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication as to Punitive Damages
Defendant Davidson
filed a separate motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s punitive
damages claim.
“Malice’ means conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code section
3294 (c)(1).) Under the statute, malice does not require actual intent to harm.
Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the
defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct
and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (Pfeifer v.John
Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) ‘Despicable’ is a powerful
term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (College
Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)¿¿¿
Plaintiff testified
that he had never known Defendant Davidson before the Incident. In other words,
he has no evidence of any pre-existing malice. Any malice would have had to
arise in the course of the Incident itself. As to the Incident itself, Plaintiff testified
that he picked up a box belonging to the school without permission (UMF 3, 4). Defendant
Davidson saw Plaintiff take the box and, using a curse word, demanded its
return. Plaintiff acknowledged understanding Defendant Davidson's position,
although he "felt disrespected" during their exchange (UMF 9). Plaintiff
slipped on dirt during the interaction and fell, landing on his bottom (UMF
18). Defendant argues this negates oppression, fraud or malice; rather, Defendant
Davidson is coming from an understandable position.
The evidence presented
by Defendant Davidson focuses on events preceding the physical altercation but
omits critical details about what transpired afterward. Plaintiff testified
that after a verbal exchange, Defendant Davidson walked 12-15 feet away, then
returned and initiated an unprovoked physical attack. Plaintiff stated that
Defendant Davidson pushed him, causing him to fall. Plaintiff further described
that as he attempted to get up, Defendant Davidson repeatedly slammed him back
to the floor, struck him in the chest, and shook him while looking directly at
him. (Plaintiff’s Depo, 62:3-14; 65:1-25.)
Additionally, Plaintiff
presented evidence that he was wearing a chain beneath his shirt, which became
exposed during the attack. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Davidson grabbed
the chain, yanked it, and choked him with it until the chain snapped.
(Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶ 19.)
Viewing this evidence
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Defendant Davidson acted with intent to cause harm. Thus,
Defendant Davidson’s MSA is DENIED.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
If a party intends to submit on
this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT”
followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and
time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this
tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may
appear at the hearing to argue.
If the parties neither submit nor
appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a
tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.