Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV29762, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

In the early morning hours of November 10, 2021, Plaintiff was lying on the train tracks adjacent to the overpass on Firestone Boulevard in Norwalk, California. Defendant Union Pacific’s train LOQ25 09 was proceeding along these tracks on a route from West Colton, California to Anaheim, California when it accidentally collided with Plaintiff. On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Complaint alleging causes of action for premises liability and general negligence.

Defendant now moves the Court for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on the following issues: (1) Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims cannot be established because Defendant did not breach any duty in the operation of the train; (2) Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims cannot be established because Defendant had no duty to post warnings or erect fencing; and (3) Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims are barred by the primary assumption of risk doctrine.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

· UPRR train LOQ25 09 was a regular train run that went from West Colton to Anaheim via the same route through the area of the incident.

· On the morning of November 10, 2021, UPRR train LOQ25 09 was being operated by conductor Tracy Williams and engineer Brian Imlay.

· Williams was trained and certified as a train conductor and Imlay trained and certified as a locomotive engineer. Both have more than 30 years of experience in their respective jobs.

· After leaving the Los Nietos train yard, it was about two miles to the area of the incident, where the train hit Plaintiff, when Plaintiff was lying on the track.

· Williams and Imlay were doing their respective jobs, with Williams logging train speed and signal indicators as they passed signals, and Imlay controlling train speed.

· Damaged fencing that was adjacent to the tracks in the area of the incident, which plaintiff claims he passed through on the way to the tracks, was not installed or owned by UPRR.

Defendant argues that it owes no duty of reasonable care to a trespasser and is only obligated to refrain from wanton, willful, or reckless conduct. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 114.) Defendant then analyzes the facts solely under that heightened standard, contending that “the crew on UPRR Train LOQ25 09 did not engage in wanton, willful, or reckless conduct.” However, a showing of lack of wanton, willful, or reckless conduct is insufficient. This approach was explicitly rejected in Rowland, which stated: “An increasing regard for human safety has led to a retreat from this position.” (Id. at p. 114.)

Further, in Beard v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 130, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the traditional rule that limited a landowner’s or occupier’s duty to trespassers. The court held:

“The former gradations of degree in the possessor’s duty of care, which varied with the status of persons on the property, have been superseded by a generic duty owed to all persons on the property based on the reasonable foreseeability of harm to them.” (Id. at p. 137.)

Under Beard and Civil Code § 1714, a railroad may owe a duty of ordinary care to trespassers depending on the foreseeability of harm. While a person's status as a trespasser may still be relevant to the foreseeability analysis, it does not negate the existence of a duty of care absent a showing of willful or reckless conduct. Defendant was required to analyze whether a duty of ordinary care arose under general negligence principles, including foreseeability. It did not. The court cannot sua sponte recast Defendant’s motion as one asserting the absence of ordinary negligence when Defendant itself chose to rely exclusively on the willful or wanton misconduct standard. Having failed to analyze the evidence under the correct legal standard, Defendant has not met its burden on summary adjudication.

It is well established under California law that railroad tracks are inherently dangerous and constitute a self-evident warning. “The presence of railroad tracks is a warning of an open and obvious danger” (Christoff v. Union Pacific R. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126.) As early as Holmes v. South Pac. Coast Ry. Co. (1893) 97 Cal. 161, the California Supreme Court held that “[a] railroad track upon which trains are constantly run is itself a warning to any person who has reached years of discretion, and who is possessed of ordinary intelligence, that it is not safe to walk upon it, or near enough to it to be struck by a passing train.” (Id. at p. 167.) This principle has been consistently reaffirmed. (See Green v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co. (1903) 143 Cal. 31, 36 [the railroad track must itself be regarded as a sign of danger].)

Here, Defendant presented evidence showing that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger posed by the tracks. Plaintiff expressly stated in a video message sent to Nancy Carr that he was waiting on the tracks for a train to come and kill him. (UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff made similar statements to staff at St. Francis Medical Center, further confirming his awareness of the risk. (Id.)

These facts, together with the applicable case law, demonstrate that the danger at issue was open and obvious. Accordingly, Defendant has met its initial burden on summary adjudication as to the duty to warn. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence or argument in opposition to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Under California law, the existence of a duty of care is evaluated under the multi-factor balancing test set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112–113. The Rowland factors include:

Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company (UPRR) has met its burden by showing that, as a matter of law, it owed no duty to Plaintiff to erect fencing along its tracks to prevent trespassing.

First, the presence of active railroad tracks constitutes an open and obvious danger. “[T]he presence of railroad tracks is a warning of an open and obvious danger.” (Christoff v. Union Pacific R. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126.) “Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious.” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.) While Plaintiff did suffer injury, this factor alone is not sufficient to impose a duty where all other Rowland factors weigh against it. (Jacobs, supra, at p. 447.)

There is no close connection between UPRR’s conduct and Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff’s injuries resulted solely from his own intentional conduct in placing himself on active tracks. The harm arose from Plaintiff’s independent, voluntary act, not from any affirmative act or omission by UPRR in failing to erect a fence.

There is no moral blame attributable to UPRR. Courts have declined to impose moral blame in the absence of evidence of intentional harm, recklessness, or bad faith. (Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 270.) Defendant has shown that it did not act recklessly or in bad faith. (UMF Nos. 10–16.)

While preventing injury is a legitimate concern, courts have consistently declined to impose broad duties on railroads to fence their tracks. (Joslin v. Southern Pac. Co. (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 382, 387–388.) Imposing a duty to fence all rail corridors would place an unreasonable burden on railroads and the public. The cost of constructing and maintaining fencing over thousands of miles of track is substantial and likely infeasible, particularly where public grade crossings exist. (UMF Nos. 18–19, 42.) Courts have rejected such burdens as “intolerable” and inconsistent with sound public policy. (Joslin, supra, at p. 388.)

Accordingly, Defendant has met its initial burden to negate any duty to erect fences to prevent Plaintiff from accessing the railroad tracks. Plaintiff did not present any argument or evidence in opposition to this issue and therefore failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

· MSA as to whether Defendant breached any duty in the operation of the train is denied.

· MSJ is denied because Defendant has failed to negate Plaintiff’s theory of recovery based on the alleged negligence in the operation of the train.

· Court will hear argument (and potentially receive additional briefing) on assumption of risk.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court