Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV30167, Date: 2024-02-22 Tentative Ruling

On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff Clifford Tran (“Plaintiff”) filed this action.

On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Rose Mehr (“Mehr”) and Does 1 to 50, asserting one cause of action for motor vehicle negligence.

The Attachments to the Complaint do not give much information other than to state that the motor vehicle accident giving rise to this action took place on October 5, 2021, at or near the intersection of Missouri Ave. and S. Bentley Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90025.

On October 26, 2023, Mehr filed her Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Chloe Rogers-Brown (“Cross-Defendant”) and Roes 1 to 50, inclusive, asserting causes of action for (1) equitable indemnity, (2) partial indemnity, (3) contribution, and (4) declaratory relief.

The Cross-Complaint alleges the following, among other things: While Mehr denies the allegations in the FAC, if Plaintiff prevails on the FAC against Mehr, Plaintiff’s recovery will be because each of the cross-defendants “engaged in such activities, and/or negligently and carelessly conducted themselves in such a manner as to precipitate the alleged injuries to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the liability and/or negligence, if any, of Cross-Defendants is primary and direct, and that the liability and/or negligence, if any, of Cross-Complainant, is secondary, imputed, and derivative only.” (Cross-Complaint, pp. 2:23-3:1.)

On January 16, 2024, Cross-Defendant filed a demurrer to Mehr’s Cross-Complaint.

On January 18, 2024. Cross-Defendant filed an amended demurrer (the “Demurrer”).

A party may demurer a pleading on several statutory grounds, including, as Cross-Defendant argues here, “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties” and “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (d) and (e).)

“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)

“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

As an initial matter, the Court grants the Cross-Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the complaint Plaintiff filed in another case titled Tran v Rogers-Brown, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number 22STCV30495 (the “Second Action”). (Amended Request for Judicial Notice, filed January 18, 2024, pp. 1:22-2:2; Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [stating that a court may take judicial notice of court records].)

The Court also finds that Cross-Defendant has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Demurrer, Declaration of Christina K. Cloud, ¶¶ 2-3; Code Civ Proc, § 430.41, subd. (a) [requiring the demurring party to meet and confer with the party that filed the pleading before filing the demurrer].)

Cross-Defendant demurs to all causes of action in Mehr’s Cross-Complaint, arguing that it has a defect of parties and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action since (1) this action and the Second Action involve two different accidents, (2) specifically, the accident underlying this action happened between Plaintiff and Mehr, while the accident underlying the Second Action happened on a different day and between Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, and (3) therefore, Mehr’s pleading is not a proper cross-complaint because (a) Cross-Defendant has not filed any pleading against Mehr and (b) the Cross-Complaint does not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions of occurrences as the cause brought against Mehr in this action. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 428.10 [“A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following: ¶ (a) Any cause of action he has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him. … ¶ (b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him”].)

In opposition, Mehr argues, among other things, that apportionment of liability is a major issue in both cases since Plaintiff allegedly sustained indivisible injuries to his neck and back in both accidents.

First, as stated above, a demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the facts alleged. Indeed, “‘“[a] demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.”’ [Citation.]” (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 709.) Here, the Demurrer challenges the facts and merits (not the sufficiency) of the Cross-Complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds the Demurrer improper.

Second, there is some merit to Mehr’s implied argument that a party can file a cross-complaint against a co-tortfeasor asserting indemnity claims arising from indivisible injuries.

“Under the law, a tortfeasor generally is liable for all damages proximately caused by his tortious conduct. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.) Where multiple tortfeasors are responsible for an indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for those damages and thus may be held individually liable to the injured plaintiff for the entirety of such damages.” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass’n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139 [emphasis added] (“Expressions”).) “Thus, the joint and several liability doctrine ensures that the injured party receives adequate compensation for its injuries, even if one or more of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources to pay for their share of the liability.” (Ibid.)

“The right to indemnity flows from payment of a joint legal obligation on another’s behalf. (Civ. Code, § 1432; [citation].) The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is contractually or equitably responsible.” (Expressions, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 [italics removed].)

“Equitable indemnity principles govern the allocation of loss or damages among multiple tortfeasors whose liability for the underlying injury is joint and several.” (Expressions, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.)

“Such principles are designed, generally, to do equity among defendants who are legally responsible for an indivisible injury by providing a basis on which liability for damage will be borne by each joint tortfeasor ‘“in direct proportion to [its] respective fault.”’ [Citations.]” (Expressions, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [emphasis added].) “Under comparative indemnity principles, a full range of allocations is possible, from no indemnity to complete indemnity for the amounts paid by the indemnitee.” (Ibid.)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court