Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV30304, Date: 2024-10-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV30304 Hearing Date: October 14, 2024 Dept: 27
Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27
Demurrer and Motion to Strike
Hearing Date: 10/14/24
CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV30304 VERNON STRATTON
vs DAVID RICHARD PULLMAN
Moving Party: Defendant David Pullman
Responding Party: Unopposed
Notice: Sufficient
Ruling:
·
The demurrer to the battery cause of action is
overruled.
·
The demurrer to the false imprisonment cause
of action is sustained
without leave to amend.
·
The motion to strike is granted with leave to
amend.
Background
On September 16, 2022,
Plaintiff filed the present automobile accident lawsuit, alleging negligence,
battery, and false imprisonment and seeking punitive damages. Defendant David
Richard Pullman now demurs to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for battery,
fourth cause of action for false imprisonment, and moves to strike Plaintiff’s
prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that they are insufficiently pled.
Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
Legal Standard
Demurrer
A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿
(Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿
(Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d
716, 720-21.)¿In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice.¿(Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleading alone,
and not on the evidence or facts alleged.”
(E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly
pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer
is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) Before filing a demurrer,
demurring party is also required to meet and confer with the party who filed
the pleading demurred to for the purposes of determining whether an agreement
can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the
objections to be raised in the demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.)
¿ Motion to Strike
The court may, upon a
motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper,
strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any
pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court
rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a
motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper
matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. §
436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading
or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)¿
Discussion
Defendant has satisfied
the meet and confer requirement prior to filing the present motion. The motion
will be heard on its merits.
Battery
In the complaint,
Plaintiff alleges the following:
On
[September 18, 2020], Defendant battered Plaintiff, caused his car to come into
physical contact with or caused physical contact with Plaintiff without
justification. Plaintiff was leaving his home when the Defendants jealously
struck him and with Defendant's car physically struck him. Defendant came into
physical injurious contact with Plaintiff and caused physical injurious contact
upon Plaintiff and his property. Defendant acted in a manner that is
alternatively alleged, since he was arrested and prosecuted for assault with a
deadly weapon, so caused the damages to Plaintiff and intentionally struck
and/or intended to instill fear into Plaintiff with his car and otherwise
causing him to be injured.
(Complaint, pg. 6.)
Defendant contends that
an intentional tort must be pled with particularity. Defendant cites Roberts
v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109
(fraud); Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d
780, 795 (statutory violations); and Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp.
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 614 (environmental sexual harassment). Defendant
argues that the complaint lacks specific facts to support that Defendant acted
with the purpose of striking Plaintiff or with knowledge that striking
Plaintiff was a substantial certainty. Therefore, Plaintiff's allegation of
intentionality is insufficient, and that merely using the term
"intentionally" does not meet the requirement for pleading an
intentional tort with particularity.
The Court is not
persuaded by Defendant's argument, as the cases cited by Defendant involve
either fraud or statutory causes of action, which are distinct from the
intentional tort of battery. Roberts concerns fraud, which is required
to be pled with particularity. The heightened pleading requirement for fraud is
necessary to ensure fairness, providing the defendant with the fullest possible
details to prepare a defense. (Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn.
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 903–904.) This requirement for specificity is unique
to the nature of fraud and does not apply to other intentional torts, such as
battery.
Similarly, Lopez
and Fisher address statutory causes of action; is well-established such
causes of action must be pled with particularity. (Lopez, 40 Cal.3d at
795.) Specifically, Lopez deals with the Governments Claims Act and Fisher
deals with harassment claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. These
statutory causes of action and are inapplicable to the present claim for
battery, which is a common law tort not subject to the same heightened pleading
standard.
Even if a cause of
action must be pled with particularity, the doctrine of "less
particularity" applies. Under this doctrine, less specificity is required
in pleading matters within the defendant's superior knowledge. A plaintiff need
not particularize matters presumptively within the knowledge of the defendant. So
long as the complaint provides sufficient notice of the issues to enable the
preparation of a defense, it will be upheld. (Thomas v. Regents of
University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 611.)
Here, Plaintiff has
alleged that Defendant intentionally struck and/or intended to instill fear
into Plaintiff. The Court finds this sufficient, as it gives notice of the
issues adequate to enable Defendant to prepare a defense. Thus, Defendant’s Demurrer
to the third cause of action for battery is overruled.
False Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges that:
Defendant
falsely imprisoned Plaintiff, caused his car to come into physical contact with
or caused physical contact with Plaintiff without justification and drove his
car with Plaintiff on the hood of Defendant's car falsely imprisoning him.
Plaintiff was leaving his home when the Defendant jealously struck him, causing
him to land on the hood of the car. Defendant thus came into physical injurious
contact with Plaintiff, thereby restricting Plaintiff’s freedom of movement and
causing injury to Plaintiff. Defendant acted in a manner that is alternatively
alleged, since he was arrested and prosecuted for assault with a deadly weapon,
so caused the damages to Plaintiff and intentionally struck and/or intended to
instill fear into Plaintiff with his car, the use of his car, and otherwise
causing him to be injured.
(Complaint, pg. 7.)
“The elements of a tortious claim of false
imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person,
(2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time,
however brief.” (Jon Davler, Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co. (2014) 29 Cal.App.4th
1025, 1034.) “Confinement” means restraining a person from leaving a particular
place by threat of force or arrest, physical barriers, or means of unreasonable
duress. (Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d
297, 303; Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715.)
The complaint fails to
allege sufficient facts to establish the elements required for false
imprisonment for the following reasons:
First, there is no
clear allegation that Defendant intended to confine Plaintiff. False
imprisonment requires an intentional act to confine a person, but Plaintiff’s
allegations focus primarily on physical contact and striking, rather than any
intent by Defendant to restrict Plaintiff’s freedom of movement.
Second, the complaint
does not adequately establish that Plaintiff was confined or restricted from
leaving a particular place. While Plaintiff alleges that he ended up on the
hood of Defendant’s car, this does not demonstrate confinement within a defined
area as required for false imprisonment. There are no allegations of barriers,
force, or other means that would have prevented Plaintiff from leaving.
Finally, the complaint
lacks allegations that Defendant used threats, force, or unreasonable duress to
confine Plaintiff. There is no suggestion that Defendant acted with the intent
to imprison Plaintiff or that he employed any form of coercion to restrict
Plaintiff's movements.
Based on what is
alleged, namely, that Plaintiff intentionally struck Defendant with his car,
and what is not alleged, any type of confinement or threat of confinement, the
Court has significant doubts that Plaintiff can allege facts to establish false
imprisonment. Accordingly, the Court
sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.
Punitive Damage
Punitive damages may be
imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)¿
Clear and convincing evidence requires proof making the existence of a fact
highly probable— falls between the “more likely than not” standard commonly
referred to as a preponderance of the evidence and the more rigorous standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 995.)
“Malice’ means conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code section
3294 (c)(1).) Under the statute, malice does not require actual intent to harm.
Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the
defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct
and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (Pfeifer v.John
Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) ‘Despicable’ is a powerful
term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (College
Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)¿¿¿
A plaintiff must assert
facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice. To wit, there
is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.
(Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.).)
“The mere allegation an
intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of
punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or
malice, but facts must be alleged to support such a claim.” (Grieves v.
Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
Plaintiff’s allegations
do not support a claim for punitive damages. While Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant intentionally struck him, there are no specific allegations of
malice, oppression, or fraud, which are required under Civil Code section 3294.
The mere allegation of an intentional tort is not enough for punitive damages.
(Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
To show malice under
Civil Code section 3294, Plaintiff must allege conduct intended to cause injury
or despicable conduct carried out with a willful and conscious disregard for
the safety of others or with an intent to cause injury. Simply stating that
Defendant intentionally struck Plaintiff does not meet this standard. Moreover,
the heightened pleading standard for punitive damages requires specific facts
demonstrating malice, oppression, or fraud. General or conclusory statements
are insufficient. The complaint lacks specific allegations showing that
Defendant acted with the intent to cause injury or with conscious disregard for
Plaintiff’s safety (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033,
1041-1042).
Given the allegations
of intentional tort, there is a possibility for a successful amendment.
Therefore, the motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
If a party intends to submit on
this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT”
followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and
time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this
tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or
in person for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may appear at the hearing
to argue.
If the parties neither submit nor
appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a
tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.