Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV33792, Date: 2025-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33792    Hearing Date: March 7, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

On March 15, 2022, Defendant Rane was involved in a car-to-car collision with a Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) bus. On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff Taylor, a passenger on the bus, filed a personal injury lawsuit against LACMTA and Rane. Defendant Rane, in the consolidated case 22STCV37815, also filed suit against LACMTA for the subject incident. On November 18, 2024, a global mediation facilitated by mediator Troy Roe took place. During the mediation, Rane and Taylor reached a mutually acceptable settlement agreement for $100,000.00. Defendant Rane now moves the Court for a determination of good faith settlement. Defendant LACMTA (“Defendant”) opposes.

Legal Standard 

In a case involving two or more alleged joint tortfeasors, a party may seek a court order under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 determining that a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more of the alleged tortfeasors is in good faith. A judicial determination of good faith “bar[s] any other joint tortfeasor … from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor … for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).)

In evaluating whether a settlement has been made in good faith, courts consider the following factors, as set forth by the California Supreme Court in the landmark case Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488:

1) “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery”; 

        2) “the settlor’s proportionate liability”; 

3) “the amount paid in settlement”; 

        4) “the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs”; 

5) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial”; 

        6) the settling party's “financial conditions and insurance policy limits”; 

7) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” 

(Id. at 499.)

“Practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.) 

The “good faith” concept in Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good faith” within the terms of section 877.6. (Ibid.)  

The Supreme Court explained that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:  

1) encouragement of settlements; and  

2) equitable allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors.   

(Ibid.)

Those policies would not be served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Ibid.) Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589.) Or, as the California Supreme Court has stated, a “defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.) 

When a motion seeking a determination under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is not opposed, the burden on the moving parties to show that the settlement was made in good faith is slight. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 [holding that a “barebones motion” including a declaration setting forth “a brief background of the case is sufficient”].)  

When a good faith motion is contested, however, the moving parties have the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the requested good faith determination. (Id. at pp. 1261-1262.) “Section 877.6 and Tech-Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” (Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1351.) “Substantial evidence” is required. (Id. at p. 1352.) A declaration from a settling defendant’s attorney that states, in conclusory fashion, that the client has little, or no share of the liability may not be sufficient. (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834-35; see also 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.)   

The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party opposing the good faith determination.  The “party asserting a lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(d); see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:875.)  

Discussion

The settling parties, Taylor and Rane, adequately discussed the Tech-Bilt factors. Rane is paying Taylor $100,000, which constitutes the full limit of her insurance policy, to settle her case. Taylor’s current medical specials are approximately $100,000, with an additional $50,000 in future medical specials, plus general damages. Rane alleges minimal liability, citing evidence that at the time of impact, the bus driver was unlawfully driving in a center divider, swerving around traffic, and violating traffic laws. There is no evidence of collusion, as this settlement resulted from a global mediation with Tory Roe.

Defendant LACMTA argues that Rane’s liability is not minimal, citing Officer Hester’s deposition, where he testified that a left-turning driver has a duty to ensure that all lanes, including the median, are clear before executing the turn. Defendant contends that Rane failed to do so and is substantially liable. However, this does not negate the fact that the bus driver was unlawfully driving in the center divider and violating traffic laws, which LACMTA does not dispute in the opposition. Even if Rane’s liability is not minimal, defendant has not presented any evidence that Rane was primarily responsible for the incident. A conservative estimate of Rane’s liability based on the evidence presented by the parties falls at about 20-40%.

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s total damages amount to approximately $150,000 in special damages. Applying a typical multiplier of 3 for general damages, the estimated case value reaches $600,000. Rane’s $100,000 settlement of about 17% of a $600,000 is sufficiently close to the low end of the 20-40% liability range.  At the same time, Tech-Bilt explicitly recognizes that a settling defendant should pay less in settlement than if found liable at trial because of the certainty and benefits of early resolution. This principle exists because damages are speculative, and liability is often uncertain or remote (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499).  Moreover, courts have found settlements to be in good faith with significantly lower settlement to value ratio than the present case.  See, e.g., Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 969-970 ($25,000 settlement on a $40 million estimated value.); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1028 (finding a $30,000 settlement reasonable in a litigation involving a claim for $1 million in damages); Horton v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 727 (value of the case was estimated to be $320,000; judge determined the case was worth less than $150,000 and a $50,000 settlement was not "out of the ballpark.”); Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 328) (trial court properly found a settlement of $6,000 from each joint tortfeasor to be in good faith even though plaintiffs sought $500,000 in general damages from all defendants; amounts paid not grossly disproportionate to what the trial court might have considered the probable recovery).

Here, Rane’s settlement is not grossly disproportionate to her estimated liability. Given that courts have approved settlements where defendants paid less than 10% of their estimated liability, Rane’s settlement amount is clearly within the ballpark and is considered to be made in good faith.

Furthermore, in evaluating the amount of the settlement, the Court is to take into account insurance policy limits.  Rane is paying her insurance policy limit.

Defendant argues that Rane is expected to receive some funds as a plaintiff in her case against LAMTA, thereby increasing her ability to pay beyond her policy limit. However, this would only occur if she prevails in her claim against Defendant, which would, in turn, weaken Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was significantly liable for causing the accident. Additionally, there is no need to consider Plaintiff’s ability to pay when the settlement amount is within the reasonable range. A settling party’s ability to pay only becomes relevant when the settlement amount is substantially lower than their estimated liability and when there is no other way for them to contribute. Here, that is not the case, as the settlement amount is within the ballpark.

Defendant also argues that the settlement resulted from collusion, but the only evidence cited is the fact that both Taylor and Rane are plaintiffs in this case. This is pure speculation without any supporting evidence. On the contrary, the settlement was reached during a global mediation, and the amount of the settlement does not indicate any sign of collusion. The court does not find indication of collusion.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.