SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

Background 

On November 16, 2024, Defendant Sampson Transport LLC and Defendant Mark A. Sampson were allegedly served via personal service. On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the corresponding proof of service, which states that “Mark A. Sampson, Age: 35–40 years, Weight: 175 lbs,” was served both individually and as an agent for Sampson Transport LLC at 45 North Ave., Turlock, CA 95382-2409, on November 16, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. 

Defendants now move to quash service on the basis that the person allegedly served was not Mark A. Sampson. 

Legal Standard 

“‘Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.’” (AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 189, 202.) “To establish personal jurisdiction, compliance with statutory procedures for service of process is essential.” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.) A defendant’s knowledge of the action does not dispense with the statutory requirements for service of summons. (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.)¿ 

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow,” may move “to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a)(1).) A defendant has 30 days after the service of the summons to file a responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20(a)(3).)¿ 

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process, ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) Filing of a proof of service that complies with the applicable statutory requirements creates a rebuttable presumption of proper service. (Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.)¿ 

Discussion 

Defendant Mark A. Sampson submitted a declaration stating that the address where he was allegedly personally served is not an address he has ever lived at, resided at, or visited. The address listed in the proof of service belongs to a former employee of Sampson Transport, LLC, who has been deceased for nearly ten years. Additionally, the physical description in the proof of service does not match Defendant, who is 56 years old and does not match the stated height of 5'10" or weight of 175 pounds. 

Plaintiff filed an opposition arguing that Defendant’s challenge to the physical description is vague and does not eliminate the possibility that the process server reasonably served the correct individual. Plaintiff cites Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1442, for the proposition that a mere denial of service is insufficient without corroboration. However, the cited portion of Dill does not support that proposition. In Dill, the Court held that Plaintiff’s service was invalid and that no presumption of valid service arose because the summons and complaint were not directed to an individual authorized to accept service under Code of Civil Procedure section 416.10.  

Here, the Court finds that Defendant has provided clear evidence showing he was not served at the address listed. Sampson’s declaration shows that the physical description does not match, Defendant has never been to the subject location, and the location is associated with a former employee who has been deceased for nearly a decade. Accordingly, the declaration is not a mere conclusory denial of service; it provides detailed facts demonstrating that the wrong individual was served. 

Plaintiff argues that service at the Turlock address would be sufficient if construed as substituted service. However, the Court cannot construe the service as substituted service. Substituted service requires a declaration of due diligence, which was not provided. Moreover, the proof of service affirmatively states that personal service was made. If service is to be construed as substituted service, the proof of service would be technically deficient and fail to strictly comply with statutory requirements. “To establish personal jurisdiction, compliance with statutory procedures for service of process is essential.” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.) A defendant’s knowledge of the action does not dispense with the statutory requirements for service of summons. (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.)  

Accordingly, the motion is granted. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.