Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 23STCV05863, Date: 2025-06-11 Tentative Ruling

This action for personal injuries arises from a fall that occurred when Plaintiff Lucina Lau stepped short of the front door platform of a Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority bus on March 24, 2022. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges three causes of action against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA” or “Defendant”): motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “stopped and/or parked said bus at an unsafe distance from the curb” (first and second causes of action), and that Plaintiff “tripped on an unknown object and/or substance and/or liquid” (third cause of action). Trial is set for July 2, 2025.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority now moves for summary adjudication on the following issues:

· Issue 1—Metro’s bus was positioned a reasonable and safe distance from the curb when Plaintiff fell while entering the bus.

· Issue 2—This court can rule that Plaintiff has no evidence that Metro’s bus was positioned at an unsafe or unreasonable distance from the curb.

· Issue 4—Plaintiff’s premises liability cause of action fails as a matter of law.

· Issue 6—Plaintiff’s motor vehicle negligence cause of action fails as a matter of law.

· Issue 7—Plaintiff’s complaint fails as a matter of law and Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objections 1-8. The Parties did not make any other objections to evidence that were material to the Court’s ruling. (CCP § 437c(q).)

As a preliminary matter, a party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Issue 1, whether Metro’s bus was positioned a reasonable and safe distance from the curb when Plaintiff fell while entering the bus, and Issue 2, whether Plaintiff has no evidence that Metro’s bus was positioned at an unsafe or unreasonable distance from the curb—are improper because neither issue seeks adjudication of a legally dispositive cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. Instead, both issues raise factual disputes that, even if resolved in Defendant’s favor, would not eliminate a cause of action, defense, or duty from the case. Moreover, as discussed below, the Court is unable to conclude based on the evidence presented that, as matter of law the bus was positioned a reasonable and safe distance from the curb. Accordingly, summary adjudication on issues one and two is denied.

As to Plaintiff’s motor vehicle negligence and general negligence causes of action, Defendant has met its burden of showing that it acted reasonably under the circumstances. The bus DVR footage (Exhibit A) shows that the bus was positioned within 6 to 8 inches of the curb. The bus operator, Max Castillo, also confirmed that he positioned the bus within 8 inches of the curb. (Exhibit L.)

Defendant’s bus safety expert, Gregory Hanson, reviewed the video and concluded that the bus was positioned within 6 to 8 inches of the curb. (Hanson Decl., ¶ 5.) He further opined that the bus was operated well within the heightened duty of care owed to passengers as a common carrier, that the bus operator did not violate any applicable industry standards, MTA rules, and that the bus was safely and properly positioned. (Hanson Decl., ¶ 5.) Hanson also explained that as Ms. Lau attempted to board the bus, she failed to firmly place her left foot on the bus platform, causing her foot to slip into the street and her momentum to carry her onto the bus floor. (Hanson Decl., ¶ 14.)

Defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Swathi Kode, independently measured the distance between the front doors of the bus and the curb from the DVR footage and determined the distance to be approximately 7.3 inches. (Kode Decl., ¶ 12.) Dr. Kode further opined that this 7.3-inch distance was a safe and reasonable curb gap that would allow an average person to board and exit the bus safely, based on the average step length of an individual. (Kode Decl., ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff, in opposition, introduced the Metro Bus Operator Rulebook and Standard Operating Procedures, including Rule 3.37, which states: “Operators must service all authorized bus zones along the route. Unless obstructions or hazards make it unsafe, the bus must be spotted 12 to 18 inches (24 inches if using wheelchair lift/ramp) from and parallel to the curb, with the doors free and clear of obstructions.” (SOPs 3.129–3.137.)

There is no dispute between the parties that the bus was parked approximately 8 inches from the curb. The core issue is whether that distance is permissible under applicable standards. Both the operator, Max Castillo, and Defendant’s expert, Gregory Hanson, testified that a bus parked within 18 inches of the curb is considered safe. (Castillo Depo. 17:23–22:4; Hanson Decl., ¶ 8.) However, the MTA’s own written standard does not state that any distance “within 18 inches” is acceptable. Rather, it affirmatively requires that buses be spotted between 12 and 18 inches from the curb, with no indication that parking closer than 12 inches is permitted. Defendant has not identified any internal policy or official guideline within MTA’s standard operating procedures that authorizes or excuses positioning the bus outside of that defined range.

While internal policies may not establish negligence per se, they are admissible as evidence of the standard of care that the employer itself deems appropriate. As the court explained in Davis v. Johnson (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 466, 472:

“‘[R]egulations adopted by an employer for the conduct of a factory or a transportation system, may be some evidence of his belief as to the standard of care required, and thus of the negligent nature of an act violating those rules… It is well settled that such rules are admissible in evidence and their violation is a circumstance to be considered in determining negligence.’”

Here, the MTA’s own guideline expressly requires that buses be spotted a minimum of 12 inches from the curb. Defendant has not identified any exception to this requirement that would apply under the circumstances presented. Accordingly, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant failed to comply with its own stated safety procedures and was therefore negligent.

Defendant, in its reply, argues that Plaintiff would have fallen regardless of the bus’s positioning because she would have stepped into the gap even if the driver had observed the 12-inch minimum requirement. This argument regarding causation was not raised in the moving papers. In any event, if the bus was positioned close to the curb but not flush against it, the presence of a hazardous gap may not have been apparent. Had the bus been parked further out, between 12 and 18 inches as required, the gap may have been more visible to Plaintiff and allowed her to take appropriate caution. This may reflect the underlying policy rationale behind the 12 to 18-inch requirement in MTA’s guidelines.

Summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s motor vehicle negligence and general negligence causes of action is therefore denied.

As to the premises liability cause of action, the basis for this claim in Plaintiff’s complaint is the allegation that she “tripped on an unknown object and/or substance and/or liquid”. However, based on the bus video footage, the expert declarations, and the deposition testimonies, there is no indication that any liquid or substance caused the fall. The evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff’s left leg stepped into the gap between the curb and the bus, which caused her to fall; there is no evidence of slippage due to any substance or liquid. Plaintiff’s opposition and supporting evidence focus entirely on her negligence theory regarding the distance between the curb and the bus. She has not presented any evidence supporting the existence of a substance or liquid. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact and Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to the premises liability cause of action is granted.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issues 3 and 4, relating to Plaintiff’s premises liability cause of action, is granted, and Plaintiff’s premises liability claim is dismissed.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issues 5 and 6, relating to Plaintiff’s negligence-based causes of action, is denied.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue 7, which seeks adjudication of the entire complaint, is also denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court