Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV09795, Date: 2024-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV09795 Hearing Date: February 26, 2024 Dept: 27
Complaint Filed: 05/02/2023
Hon. Lee Arian
Department 27
Tentative Ruling
Hearing Date: 2/26/2024 at 1:30 p.m.
Case Name: PETE
MARTNEZ, an individual vs. BHUPENDRA SINGH VIRK; UBER USA, LLC; UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; RAISER, LLC; RAISER-CA, LLC; RAISER; PORTIER, LLC; UBER
FREIGHT, LLC; UBER; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
Case No.: 23STCV09795
Motion: DEMURRER
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Moving Party: Defendant
BHUPENDRA SINGH VIRK
Responding Party: Plaintiff
PETE MARTNEZ
Notice: Sufficient
Ruling: DEFENDANT’s MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART
DEFENDANT’s DEMURRER IS GRANTED
BACKGROUND
On
May 2, 2023, Plaintiff Pete Martinez initiated this action against Defendants
Bhupendra Singh Virk ("Virk"), Uber USA, LLC, Uber Technologies,
Inc., Rasier, LLC, Rasier-CA, LLC, Rasier, Portier, LLC, Uber Freight, LLC, and
Uber, for injuries arising from a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff alleges
that, at the time of the collision, Virk was driving for Uber when Virk made an
unsafe left turn and struck Plaintiff’s oncoming vehicle. The initial Complaint
asserts causes of action for (1) Negligence-Motor Vehicle, (2) Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress, (3) Negligence, (4) Negligence Per Se, (5)
Strict Products Liability, and (6) Negligent Hiring, Retention, and
Supervision. A demurrer was filed as to Plaintiff’s 5th cause of action for
strict products liability and was sustained. The complaint was then amended
twice, and Defendant Bhupendra Singh Virk filed the present demurrer and motion
to strike the second amended complaint (SAC) regarding Plaintiff’s second cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants
request judicial notice of Minute Order Re: PETE MARTINEZ vs BHUPENDRA SINGH
VIRK, et al. dated October 3, 2023. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit
A) The unopposed request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).)
DEMURRER
A.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER
A
demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained
only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445,
459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded
but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the
factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which
may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department
of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v.
Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in
the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].)
Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In
construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual
allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory
allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189
Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.) Judicial Council forms are not immune to demurrer. (People
ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
1480, 1486.) A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to
support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
II.
DISCUSSION
The law of
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) in California is typically
analyzed by reference to two "theories" of recovery: the
"bystander" theory and the "direct victim" theory. (Fluharty
v. Fluharty (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 484, 490.) A bystander theory allows for
a Plaintiff to recover emotional damages although they are not otherwise
injured. Typically, in a bystander case, the victim either witnesses a close
family member, or loved one, be seriously injured by the negligent actions of
another and as a result, suffers severe emotional distress. (Thing v. La
Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644.) Here, Plaintiff is not a bystander.
The California
Supreme Court has allowed Plaintiffs to recover damages as “direct victims” in
only three types of factual situations: (1) the negligent mishandling of
corpses (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879.) (2)
the negligent misdiagnosis of a disease that could potentially harm another (Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 923); and (3) the
negligent breach of a duty arising out of a preexisting relationship (Burgess
v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076.) A preexisting relationship
typically consists of relationships like physician-patient and goes beyond the
duty of care owed to the public in general. (Id. at 1075)
Plaintiff alleges
an auto accident claim wherein no special relationship exists, and Defendant
does not owe Plaintiff any duty of care beyond the duty of care owed to the
public at large. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility the 5th cause of
action can be cured by amendment. Consequently, the Court grants Defendant’s
Demurrer to Plaintiff’s claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
without leave to amend as to the Second Amended Complaint (SAC).
MOTION TO
STRIKE
A.
LEGAL STANDARD
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a
pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part
of the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The moving party is
required to meet and confer before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its
discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or
any part of the pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436,
subds. (a) and (b); Stafford v. Schultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)
Grounds for a motion to strike are limited to matters that appear on the face
of the pleading or on any matter of which the court shall or may take judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §437, subd. (a).)
In considering a motion to strike, the court considers the
complaint as a whole and assumes the allegations are true. (Clauson v.
Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Courts do not read allegations in isolation. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117
Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
A.
ANALYSIS
Request To Strike The Entire Fifth Cause Of Action
This request is
moot because the demurrer has been granted as to Plaintiff's fifth cause of
action in the Second Amended Complaint.
Request To
Strike The Phrase “Severe Shock And Injuries To Their Nervous System”
Regarding
Defendant’s request to strike the phrase “severe shock and injuries to their
nervous system” on Page 32, Line 3 of Paragraph 162 of the SAC, it is important
to note the court assumes the truth of the allegations when considering a
motion to strike. It is not the role of the court to assess the veracity of
factual allegations at this stage. Thus, it is improper for the court on a
motion to strike to determine whether Plaintiff suffered severe shock and
injuries to his nervous system or any injuries at all.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s request to strike the phrase “severe shock and injuries to their
nervous system” on Page 32, Line 3 of Paragraph 162 of the SAC is also DENIED.
Request To
Strike The Phrase “Despicable Conduct”
Regarding
the phrase “despicable conduct” on Page 32, Line 3 of Paragraph 159 and Page
32, Line 3 of Paragraph 160, a motion to strike can be
used to attack conclusory
or legal allegations
in a pleading. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before
Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 7:179, pp. 7l–72; Perkins v. Sup.Ct.
(General Tel. Directory Co.) (1981) 117 CA3d 1, 6, 172 CR 427, 430.) The
Second Amended Complaint does not provide factual allegations sufficient to
support the conclusory allegation of "despicable conduct," except for
the claim that Defendant was driving while under the influence of a substance,
which the court has already deemed conclusory in its October 3, 2023 Minute
Order. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike Page 32, Line 3 of Paragraph 159
“(despicable conduct)” and Page 32, Line 3 of Paragraph 160 “(despicable
conduct)” is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Defenant’s motion to strike portions of the
plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as discussed in
detail above. Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.