Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV10816, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10816    Hearing Date: March 6, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

RAMIRO GUTIERREZ AYALA,

            Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

JUN LIANG, et al.,

 

 

 

            Defendants.

 

 

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    CASE NO.: 23STCV10816

 

[TENTATIVE RULING] MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 6, 2025


Background

This matter arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on September 16, 2021, at approximately 2:30 p.m. on S. Bonnie Beach Place near the 4200 block of Bandini Boulevard in Vernon, California. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained personal injuries when his vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer operated by Mr. Liang in the course and scope of his employment with BTI. After the collision, Plaintiff and Mr. Liang allegedly reached an agreement to settle Plaintiff's claims in exchange for a payment of $1,500. Mr. Liang paid Plaintiff $600 in cash at the scene of the accident and subsequently sent Plaintiff a check for $900.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint, asserting the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.

Legal Standard

T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

Accord and Satisfaction

An accord and satisfaction is the substitution of a new agreement for and in satisfaction of a preexisting agreement between the same parties, typically to settle a claim for a lesser amount. (Civ. Code §§ 1521, 1523; In re Marriage of Thompson (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058–1059.) The essential elements of an accord and satisfaction are:

1.  A bona fide dispute between the parties;

2.  The debtor tenders a certain sum on the express condition that acceptance of it will constitute full payment; and

3.  The creditor understands and accepts the sum with knowledge of the condition. (In re Marriage of Thompson, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at 1058–1059.)

Whether a transaction constitutes an accord and satisfaction depends on the intent of the parties, which is determined from the surrounding circumstances, including the conduct and statements of the parties and any notations on the instrument itself. (Id.) Generally, the intent to effect a final settlement is a question of fact. (Id.)

In Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, the court found an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law, affirming summary judgment for the defendant. The court held that Williams made a clear offer to settle a disputed claim by offering $114,000 on a "take it or leave it" basis. Thompson’s response, “Fine, I’d like to pick up the money now”, demonstrated an unequivocal understanding and acceptance of the condition.

Discussion

The evidence presented regarding the alleged settlement consists of Mr. Liang’s testimony, in which he states that he and Plaintiff agreed to settle the claim for $1,500—comprising $600 in cash and $900 by check. Mr. Liang testified that he initially gave Plaintiff $600 in cash because it was all he had available at the time and later sent Plaintiff a check for $900. (Liang Depo. 55:1-4, 55:19-25, 56:9-12.)

However, Plaintiff disputes the existence of any settlement agreement. Plaintiff testified that there was no agreement to resolve all claims for $1,500. (Plaintiff’s Depo. 73:14-23.) Plaintiff further stated that the $600 cash was solely for towing expenses, not as part of any settlement. (Plaintiff’s Depo. 74:23-26.)

Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that the $900 check contained any notation stating that it was for "full satisfaction" or "full payment" of Plaintiff’s claims. Courts have typically found accord and satisfaction when there is a clear and explicit notation or accompanying communication stating that the payment is offered in full satisfaction of the disputed claim. For example:

Here, there is no evidence that Defendant’s $900 check contained such a notation indicating that it was for full payment or full satisfaction, nor is there any indication that an accompanying communication was made to that effect.

Accordingly, Plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant even made an offer to settle the case in the first place. Plaintiff testified unequivocally that Defendant gave him $600 solely to tow his truck and that no discussion of a settlement for damages ever took place. Given the conflicting testimony between Plaintiff and Mr. Liang, and the absence of any written or explicit statement that the payment was conditioned on full satisfaction, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that there was no valid accord and satisfaction.

Defendant then argues that by retaining the check, although not cashing it, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s offer. However, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the check was for full satisfaction, as Defendant has presented no evidence that the check contained any notation indicating it was for full satisfaction. Additionally, there are conflicting accounts from the parties regarding the nature of the offer.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment is denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court