Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV17866, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV17866    Hearing Date: January 8, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the present case, alleging injuries arising from a motor vehicle incident on May 27, 2022, on East Telegraph Road, west of Gage Road, in Montebello, California. At the time of the incident, Defendant Youstina Galy was driving a Ford Econoline E350 ambulance during the course of her employment with Defendant Falck Mobile Health Care Co. and was involved in a collision with Plaintiff. Defendant Galy was allegedly responding to an emergency in Code 3 mode, with lights and sirens activated, at the time of the incident. Trial is scheduled for April 21, 2025. Defendants Falck Mobile Health Corp. and Youstina Galy now move the Court for summary judgment.

Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Discussion

In the moving papers, Defendants argue that they are exempt from liability under California Health and Safety Code § 1799.107 and California Vehicle Code § 21055.

Health and Safety Code § 1799.107

California Health and Safety Code § 1799.107 provides that:

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that a threat to the public health and safety exists whenever there is a need for emergency services and that public entities and emergency rescue personnel should be encouraged to provide emergency services. To that end, a qualified immunity from liability shall be provided for public entities and emergency rescue personnel providing emergency services.

(b) Except as provided in Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code, neither a public entity nor emergency rescue personnel shall be liable for any injury caused by an action taken by the emergency rescue personnel acting within the scope of their employment to provide emergency services, unless the action taken was performed in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner.

         (c) For purposes of this section, it shall be presumed that the action taken when providing emergency services was performed in good faith and without gross negligence. This presumption shall be one affecting the burden of proof.

        (d) For purposes of this section, “emergency rescue personnel” means any person who is an officer, employee, or member of a fire department or fire protection or firefighting agency of the federal government, the State of California, a city, county, city and county, district, or other public or municipal corporation or political subdivision of this state, or of a private fire department, whether that person is a volunteer or partly paid or fully paid, while he or she is actually engaged in providing emergency services as defined by subdivision (e).

(e) For purposes of this section, “emergency services” includes, but is not limited to, first aid and medical services, rescue procedures and transportation, or other related activities necessary to insure the health or safety of a person in imminent peril.

Under § 1799.107, qualified immunity from liability is provided to public entities and emergency rescue personnel rendering emergency services. However, Defendants failed to demonstrate that Falck Mobile Health Corp is a public entity or that Youstina Galy falls under the definition of “emergency rescue personnel”, which requires that the individual be “an officer, employee, or member of a fire department or fire protection or firefighting agency of the federal government, the State of California, a city, county, city and county, district, or other public or municipal corporation or political subdivision of this state, or of a private fire department, whether that person is a volunteer or partly paid or fully paid.” (Health & Saf. Code § 1799.107(e).) Without such evidence, Defendants failed to show that the immunity provided under § 1799.107 applies to Defendants.

Similarly, Vehicle Code § 17004 provides that “a public employee is not liable for civil damages on account of personal injury, death, or property damage resulting from the operation, in the line of duty, of an authorized emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call…” Defendants did not provide any evidence demonstrating that Youstina Galy is a public employee or that Falck Mobile Health Corp qualifies as a public entity.

California Vehicle Code 21055

California Vehicle Code 21055 states:

The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is exempt from Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 21350), Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 21650), Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 21800), Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 21950), Chapter 6 (commencing with 22100), Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 22348), Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 22450), Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 22500), and Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 22650) of this division, and Article 3 (commencing with Section 38305) and Article 4 (commencing with Section 38312) of Chapter 5 of Division 16.5, under all of the following conditions:

        (a) If the vehicle is being driven in response to an emergency call or while engaged in rescue operations or is being used in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or is responding to, but not returning from, a fire alarm, except that fire department vehicles are exempt whether directly responding to an emergency call or operated from one place to another as rendered desirable or necessary by reason of an emergency call and operated to the scene of the emergency or operated from one fire station to another or to some other location by reason of the emergency call.

        (b) If the driver of the vehicle sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary and the vehicle displays a lighted red lamp visible from the front as a warning to other drivers and pedestrians.

Defendants appear to overextend the exemption provided under California Vehicle Code § 21055. Although § 21055 exempts the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from compliance with specific traffic regulations, such as speed limits, traffic signals, and right-of-way, the statute does not provide a blanket shield against civil liability for personal injuries or property damage resulting from negligent or reckless actions during emergency services. Notably, § 21055 addresses exemptions from traffic laws, not the general duty of care owed by drivers. Therefore, Defendants’ reliance on § 21055 as a complete defense against liability for injuries caused by emergency rescue personnel acting within the scope of their employment is unsupported by the statutory language.

Moreover, the Vehicle Code explicitly limits the scope of the exemption under § 21055. California Vehicle Code § 21056 states, “Section 21055 does not relieve the driver of a vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor protect him from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted in that section.” Defendants have failed to present any evidence showing that the vehicle was operated with due regard for safety or that Defendants’ actions were free from negligence, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Accordingly, Defendants have not established a complete defense to Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Even assuming § 21055 applies, Defendants have not identified which specific sections of the Vehicle Code purportedly exempt them from liability or explained how those sections relate to Plaintiff’s negligence claim. As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of clearly demonstrating how the exemption applies, and it is not the Court’s responsibility to construct arguments or fill in the gaps on their behalf.

The Court reviewed the complaint, which does allege that Defendants were operating the vehicle at an unreasonable speed,  conduct that might fall within the exemptions provided by § 21055. However, this allegation is not the primary basis of Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff primarily alleges that Defendants failed to maintain reasonable control of the vehicle, failed to keep a proper lookout, and were otherwise inattentive. These allegations relate to general duties of care, not specific traffic law violations exempted under § 21055.

Authorized Emergency Vehicle

Plaintiff correctly points out in opposition to Defendants’ motion that California Vehicle Code § 21055 applies only to authorized emergency vehicles. An “authorized emergency vehicle” is defined under Vehicle Code § 165 as

(a) Any publicly owned and operated ambulance, lifeguard, or lifesaving equipment, or any privately owned or operated ambulance licensed by the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol to operate in response to emergency calls.

(b) Any publicly owned vehicle operated by federal, state, or local agencies employing peace officers, or any public fire or forestry department.

(c) Any vehicle owned by the state or bridge and highway districts, used for fire response, towing, servicing, or medical assistance.

(d) Any state-owned vehicle used for emergency fire, rescue, or communication calls, operated by the Office of Emergency Services or an assigned public agency.

(e) Vehicles owned or operated by federally recognized Indian tribes or the U.S. government, used in emergency responses or law enforcement.

(f) Any vehicle for which an authorized emergency vehicle permit has been issued by the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol.

Defendants have not provided any evidence showing that Falck Mobile Health Corp is a public entity, or that any vehicle involved was issued an authorized emergency vehicle permit by the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol under § 165(f).

Under California law, “the burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense is [different] than the burden to show [that] one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established. Instead of merely submitting evidence to negate a single element of the plaintiff's cause of action, or offering evidence such as vague or insufficient discovery responses that the plaintiff does not have evidence to create an issue of fact as to one or more elements of his or her case . . . the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense . . . . If the defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied." (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare, (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467-68 ) Without evidence establishing that the subject vehicle qualifies as an authorized emergency vehicle under § 21055, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden in asserting this defense. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Conclusion

Defendants failed to provide evidence demonstrating that California Vehicle Code § 21055 and Health and Safety Code § 1799.107 are applicable in this instance. Additionally, California Vehicle Code § 21055 does not offer a complete defense to Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Accordingly, the present motion is denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

__________________________ 

Hon. Lee S. Arian  

Judge of the Superior Court