Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 23STCV18878, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Kimberly Jones ("Plaintiff") initiated this action for premises liability and negligence against Defendants IH4 Property West, L.P. (“Defendant IH4”) and Christian Ramirez for injuries she sustained from a slip and fall while descending the front stairs of the subject property located at 1946 W. 42nd Street, Los Angeles, CA 90062 (the “Subject Property”). Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on the grounds that they had no duty to provide hand railings on each side of the stairs, had no notice of any dangerous condition, Plaintiff signed a waiver in the lease agreement and Defendant Ramirez did not own, control or manage the Subject Property. As to summary adjudication, Defendants move on the following four issues:

Issue One: Plaintiff’s first cause of action for premises liability fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements.
Issue Two: Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements.
Issue Three: Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action fail based on the language of the contractual rental agreement.
Issue Four: Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action against Defendant Christian Ramirez fail because he did not own, lease, occupy, or control the Subject Property.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

· Defendant IH4 purchased the Subject Property on July 31, 2014, and was the owner of the Subject Property at the time of the incident.

· Defendant IH4 leased the Subject Property to three (3) tenants prior to entering a lease with Plaintiff.

· Prior to Plaintiff's tenancy, there were no reports of incidents, falls, or complaints related to the front porch stairs (the “Subject Stairs”).

· Defendant IH4 has not modified the Subject Stairs in any way since its ownership.

· Plaintiff leased the property located at 1946 West 42nd Street, Los Angeles on or around October 28, 2021, from Defendant IH4.

· The rental agreement includes Paragraph 25, which states that Defendant IH4 would not be liable for any damages, injuries, or losses related to or caused by any defective condition of the Subject Property.

· On or about March 19, 2022, Plaintiff slipped and fell on the Subject Stairs.

· Plaintiff did not feel anything slippery about the Subject Stairs earlier in the day.

· Plaintiff realized a step on the Subject Stairs was slippery after she had fallen.

· Prior to the fall, Plaintiff never asked to repair the Subject Stairs where she fell.

· Plaintiff used the Subject Stairs as her main pathway to get into the house and to exit the house every day and at various times of the day.

Defendants argue that they did not have a duty to install handrails on the Subject Stairway in front of the house. Defendants contend they had no obligation to modify the stairs, including placing slip guards or providing hand railings on each side, absent a law or code requiring them to do so. Defendants assert they are unaware of any code or statute requiring slip guards or handrails for the Subject Stairs, but the only evidence cited is that Defendant has not modified the stairs since acquiring the property. (Declaration of Christian Ramirez, ¿8.) This assertion is insufficient to establish that no applicable law or code exists. Defendants provide no analysis of relevant building codes, safety regulations, or industry standards to support their position. Without referencing the applicable codes and an analysis of the potentially applicable section, the Court cannot accept Defendants’ conclusory statement that no code or statue requiring handrails for the Subject Stairs.

Moreover, even if no specific statute or regulation mandates slip guards or handrails, that does not eliminate Defendant’s general duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. A property owner may still be found negligent if the condition of the premises creates an unreasonable risk of harm, regardless of code compliance. There are circumstances where a condition may be obviously dangerous even if it does not violate a specific code. Defendants have not addressed this principle or explained why, under the general duty of care, they were not required to install handrails on the Subject Stairs. Accordingly, Defendants failed to meet their burden.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Defendants have met their burden, Plaintiff, in the opposition, cites the 1923 Los Angeles Builder’s Guide Section 46, which requires stairways greater than five feet in width to have a handrail on each side. The subject stairway measures at least six feet three and three-eighths inches wide, meaning that under Section 46 of the Los Angeles Builder’s Guide a handrail was required on both sides. Plaintiff also contends that similar requirements remain in the modern code. The 2013 Los Angeles Building Code (LABC) Section 1009.15 states: “Stairways shall have handrails on each side and shall comply with Section 1012.” Exceptions apply to stairways with fewer than four risers, such as “[a] continuous run of treads or flight of stairs with less than four risers” or “[c]hanges in room elevations of three or fewer risers within dwelling units and sleeping units in Groups R-2 and R-3.” Here, photographs show that the stairway consists of four steps.

In their reply, Defendants argue that the house was built in 1921 and therefore the 1923 requirements do not apply. However, the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Portal lists an “effective year” of 1925 for the subject property, which may indicate a substantial remodel or a code compliance trigger. The Court cannot determine the significance of this notation to a degree that it can find as a matter of law that a triable issue regarding the handrail requirement exists.

Moreover, even if Defendants did not technically violate a building code in effect at the time of construction, the fact that the current building code requires handrails on stairways is highly relevant to whether Defendants breached their general duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. A property owner’s duty under common law is not limited to compliance with the codes in effect at the time of construction but includes an ongoing obligation to exercise reasonable care to protect against foreseeable hazards. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119.) The absence of handrails on a multi-step stairway, when such safety measures are required under current code standards, is evidence that the condition might pose an unreasonable risk of harm. This evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants had a duty to install handrails to meet their obligation to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment or adjudication on the basis of this issue is denied.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived her right to bring a lawsuit against Defendant pursuant to Section 25 of the lease agreement Plaintiff signed.

25. LIABILITY. To the full extent permitted by Applicable Law, (a) Landlord and Resident agree that Landlord will not be liable for any damages, injuries, or losses to any person or property related to or caused by any defective condition of the Residence, other residents or persons, theft, burglary, vandalism, or other crimes; (b) Landlord shall have no duty to furnish alarms of any kind, security guards, or additional locks, and latches and Resident shall not make any changes or additions to the existing locks for any reason without Landlord's prior written consent; and (c) Resident shall indemnify and hold Landlord and Landlord’s agents, employees, lenders, and affiliates harmless from and against any and all claims, liabilities, damages, injuries, costs, or expenses that arise from or are related to Resident’s or any Resident Party’s use or occupancy of the Residence except to the extent solely caused by the intentional neglect or willful misconduct of Landlord, its agents, contractors, or employees. Landlord’s liability under this Lease will be limited to Landlord’s unencumbered interest in the Residence. Neither Landlord nor any of its partners, members, officers, directors, agents, employees, shareholders, successors, assigns, or pledges, including without limitation, any management company or the individual signing this Lease on Landlord's behalf, will in any way be personally liable under this Lease.”

This clause is unenforceable to the extent it seeks to exculpate the landlord from liability for negligence or violations of law. Civil Code section 1668 provides that “[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own ... violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” This includes attempts to limit liability for unsafe conditions in violation of applicable health and safety standards or the landlord’s statutory duties.

Additionally, Civil Code section 1953 voids any lease provision that attempts to waive or modify a landlord’s legal duty “to prevent personal injury or property damage where that duty is imposed by law.” (Civ. Code § 1953(a)(4).) The indemnity and liability disclaimer in Section 25 impermissibly shifts the burden for injuries caused by potentially unlawful or negligent conditions on the premises to the tenant, directly conflicting with statutory protections. The portion of the provision stating that the landlord will not be liable for any damages caused by any defective condition of the residence attempts to waive Plaintiff’s right to have the landlord exercise a duty of care to prevent personal injury.

Because Section 25 of the lease violates both Civil Code sections 1668 and 1953, it is void as against public policy. Defendant did not file a reply on this issue. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment or adjudication on the basis of this issue is denied.

A property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests.¿(Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205.) The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability.¿ (Hall v. Rockcliff Realtors (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-40.) The jury instruction on ”Constructive Notice Regarding Dangerous Conditions on Property” states: “In determining whether [a defendant] should have known of the condition that created the risk of harm, [the jury] must decide whether, under all the circumstances, the condition was of such a nature and existed long enough that [the defendant] had sufficient time to discover it and, using reasonable care: (1) repair the condition; or (2) protect against harm from the condition; or adequately warn of the condition. A defendant must make reasonable inspections of the property to discover unsafe conditions. If an inspection was not made within a reasonable time before the accident, this may show that the condition existed long enough so that [store] using reasonable care would have discovered it.” (CACI No. 1011.) It is generally a question of fact for the jury as to whether, under all the circumstances, a defective condition existed long enough such that a reasonable person, exercising reasonable care, would have discovered it. (Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 124, 128-129 (Hale).)

In Girvetz v. Boys’ Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829 (Girvetz), the Court of Appeal stated:

The defendant market owner was not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, but owed them the duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises safe for his invitees. To impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to the defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises. His negligence in such cases is founded upon his failure to exercise ordinary care in remedying the defect after he has discovered it. Whether, under all the circumstances, the defective condition had existed long enough so that a reasonable man exercising reasonable care would have discovered it, is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the jury. The fact alone that a dangerous condition existed at the time the accident occurred will not warrant an inference that the defendant was negligent. There must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the condition had existed long enough for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it.

Here, Plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant had constructive notice of the hazardous condition posed by the Subject Stairs. The absence of handrails was not a latent defect. It was open and obvious on a stairway that measured over six feet in width and had four risers in the front porch. Evidence shows the condition was longstanding and was visible during the orientation walk with Plaintiff, but nonetheless Defendants did not find it dangerous. Defendants may argue that the condition of stairway does not constitute a dangerous condition. However, compliance with building codes is a relevant factor in determining whether a condition is reasonably safe. The applicable building code requires stairways to have handrails on the subject stairway, then the absence of handrails, in violation of this requirement, creates a triable issue of fact that the stairs could be a dangerous condition.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s expert declares that Defendants could have eliminated or significantly mitigated the hazard presented by the stairway prior to Plaintiff’s fall at minimal cost and effort when compared to the risk of harm it posed to the public. Had Defendant IH4 conducted a proper inspection prior to leasing the property to Plaintiff, the hazard posed by the visually distracting tread pattern, absence of a handrail, and damaged tiles could have been identified and repaired. The expert further explains that applying friction strips would have mitigated the visual confusion caused by the mosaic tile pattern by creating a clear visual cue marking the edge of each step, while also increasing traction in a critical location where pedestrians are most likely to step when descending. Friction strips are readily available at a cost of approximately $22 for a 60-foot roll. These low-cost remedial measures would have substantially reduced the likelihood of a fall and likely would have prevented Plaintiff’s incident and injuries.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to the issue of constructive notice. Summary judgment is denied on this basis.

Defendant Christian Ramirez argues that he did not own, lease, or personally control or manage the Subject Property and therefore cannot be held liable for negligence or premises liability. Ramirez cites to Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 23–24 in support of this contention. However, the evidence submitted only establishes that Ramirez does not own the Subject Property and does not control or manage it outside the scope of his employment. In his declaration, Ramirez states that he has “no control or management duties related to the Subject Property outside of [his] scope of employment with Invitation Homes Inc.” (Ramirez Decl., ¶¶ 3–5.) It is silent as to whether Ramirez exercised control or management over the Subject Property within the scope of his employment. Defendant in the moving papers also failed to provide any legal authority or explanation regarding the significance of the distinction between control or management duties performed outside versus within the scope of employment. Accordingly, he has not met his initial burden to show that he did not control or manage the Subject Property.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court