Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV20270, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV20270    Hearing Date: May 21, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

Plaintiffs De’Andre Isiah Kirkpatrick and De’Jay Nathaniel Kirkpatrick, through Sheila Kirkpatrick Rogers, individually and as successors in interest to Decedent Nathesia Lewis, filed this action against Defendants AMN Services, LLC, AMN Healthcare, Inc., and AMN Healthcare Services, Inc. (collectively, AMN) for negligence, wrongful death, and negligent entrustment.

The claims arise from an August 4, 2022 incident in which Defendant Nicole Linton allegedly left her post at Kaiser Foundation Hospital located at West Los Angeles Medical Center, 6041 Cadillac Avenue, Los Angeles, and caused a motor vehicle collision resulting in the death of Nathesia Lewis.

At the time of the incident, Linton was employed by AMN and assigned to work at West LA Hospital for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., a codefendant in this action. AMN now moves for summary adjudication on the following three issues:

Issue No. 1: AMN is not liable to Plaintiffs for negligence. Linton was outside the scope of her employment with AMN when she allegedly caused the accident that is at issue in this litigation.

Issue No. 2: AMN is not liable to Plaintiffs for wrongful death. Linton was outside the scope of her employment with AMN when she allegedly caused the accident that is at issue in this litigation.

Issue No. 3: AMN is not liable to Plaintiffs for negligent entrustment. The undisputed facts demonstrate that AMN did not own, control, or have access to Linton’s personal vehicle at the time of the accident.

Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

Discussion

        Negligence and Wrongful Death

Defendants AMN has met its initial burden of demonstrating that the negligence and wrongful death causes of action fail as a matter of law because Nicole Linton was acting outside the scope of her employment at the time of the subject incident. The going and coming rule provides that an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee’s conduct while the employee is commuting to or from work, as such conduct is ordinarily outside the scope of employment. (Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, 465–466; Feltham v. Universal Protection Service, LP (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069.)

The undisputed evidence shows that Linton left her post at West LA Hospital during her shift on August 4, 2022, without notifying or receiving permission from her supervisors at either AMN or Kaiser Foundation Health Plan. (SSUF Nos. 13, 18–20, 24–26.) She was not acting under direction of AMN, was not performing any job-related task, and was not assigned to another location. (SSUF Nos. 3–7, 18–20.) Accordingly, AMN has shown that Linton’s actions fall within the scope of the going and coming rule.

AMN has further demonstrated that no exception to the going and coming rule applies. The special errand exception is inapplicable because Linton’s departure was not at the express or implied request of AMN and conferred no benefit to AMN. (SSUF Nos. 18–20, 24–26; Blackman v. Great Am. First Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 598, 602–604.) The required vehicle exception does not apply because Linton was not required to use her personal vehicle for work; she worked at a single location and was free to choose any mode of transportation. (SSUF Nos. 3–11; Savaikie v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 223, 228–233) The special risk exception also does not apply, as Linton’s workload and duties were not inherently hazardous nor causally linked to the collision. (SSUF Nos. 27–30; Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 480,486–487.)

Finally, Defendants have presented undisputed facts that Linton abandoned her work without completing her shift, further supporting the conclusion that she was not acting within the scope of employment. (SSUF Nos. 2–7, 13, 18–26, 30; Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 933.)

Accordingly, Defendants have shifted its burden by establishing that the going and coming rule precludes liability for Plaintiff’s negligence and wrongful death causes of action. Plaintiff did not file an opposition and therefore failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Negligent Entrustment

Under California law, negligent entrustment liability may only be imposed against a defendant who owned, possessed, or controlled the vehicle at issue and entrusted it to a person known to be incompetent or unfit to drive. (Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 709.)

Defendants’ evidence shows that AMN did not own, possess, or control the vehicle Linton was driving at the time of the incident. (SSUF Nos. 15–17.) AMN had no authority to grant or deny Linton access to her personal vehicle and did not provide, assign, or manage the vehicle in any way. (Ibid.) Because AMN was neither the owner nor in possession of the vehicle, it could not have “entrusted” the vehicle to Linton as a matter of law.

Accordingly, Defendants have successfully shifted its initial burden. Plaintiff did not file an opposition and therefore failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Conclusion

Defendants have met their initial burden as to summary adjudication on Issues 1 through 3. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition and therefore did not raise a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication is granted as to all three causes of action.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.