Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV22025, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22025    Hearing Date: April 17, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

Plaintiff, who was a witness to a crime that Defendant Tina Nissinen allegedly committed, alleges that Defendant threatened her wellbeing, kicked in her door, attacked her, and trashed her living area. Plaintiff alleges numerous causes of action, including assault and battery, and seeks punitive damages. Plaintiff now moves the Court for pretrial discovery of Defendant’s financial condition pursuant to Civil Code section 3295.

Legal Standard

Civil Code Section 3295 prevents pre-trial discovery of a party’s financial condition relevant to a Section 3294 claim for punitive damages. However, subsection (c) enables a plaintiff to move for a court order allowing the discovery “if the court finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294.” (Civ. Code, § 3295(c).) “Such order shall not be considered to be a determination on the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at trial.” (Ibid.) “‘In this context, a “substantial probability” of prevailing on a claim for punitive damages means that it is “very likely” that the plaintiff will prevail on such a claim or there is a “‘strong likelihood’” that the plaintiff will prevail on such a claim.’ [Citation.]” (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 283.)

Punitive Damage

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)¿

“Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code section 3294 (c)(1).) Under the statute, malice does not require actual intent to harm. Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (Pfeifer v.John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) ‘Despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

Discussion

Plaintiff submitted a declaration, police report, and photographs to evidence the circumstances surrounding Defendant's alleged attack of her, her injuries, damage to her property, and the weapon used in the attack. (Exhibit A-C.)

Plaintiff declares that on September 29, 2022, Defendant threatened Plaintiff’s daughter in the hallway, stating that Plaintiff would be destroyed. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant then forcibly entered Plaintiff’s residence, screamed profanities, and physically assaulted her with a candelabra, a dining chair, and other objects, causing injuries to Plaintiff’s shoulder, neck, and head. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states that Defendant struck her multiple times, pinned her against a wall using a chair’s exposed metal leg, and ignored Plaintiff’s repeated pleas to stop, even after Plaintiff screamed that she had small children. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further describes the attack as hysterical and deliberate, resulting in severe physical injuries and emotional trauma, including post-concussion syndrome, alopecia, PTSD, and neurocognitive disorder. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiff also declares that Defendant had previously threatened her and her daughter and violated a criminal protective order by approaching her in a threatening manner in September 2024. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶¶ 4, 8.)

The police report corroborates Plaintiff’s declaration. “At 0930 hours, the Suspect kicked in the door to the apartment... The Suspect took the phone from [the Victim] … stated, ‘I'm gonna die! I'm gonna take you with me!’ Based on the history... the Victim was in fear for her life and believed this to be a ‘murder suicide.’” (Police Report, Continuation Sheet, pg. 2.) The report further states: “The Suspect struck the Victim in her left shoulder/neck area approximately three times with the exposed sharp metal prong of the candle stick and threw the candle stick at her... The Victim believed that the Suspect was trying to hit her in the head and was in fear for her life that the Suspect was indeed trying to kill her.” (Police Report, Continuation Sheet, pg. 3.) Furthermore, Plaintiff submitted photographs of the weapon used in the attack, her injuries, and the damage to her property. (Exhibit A and C.)

The evidence supports a finding that Defendant acted with intent to cause injury or at the very least with disregard for safety of another.

Defendant disputes that Plaintiff can prevail on a claim for punitive damages. However, the evidence Defendant presents primarily concerns Plaintiff’s medical treatment, her effectiveness as a witness in a prior criminal matter where Defendant allegedly threw another person off a balcony, and speculation that the current criminal case may be reduced or dismissed. Much of Defendant’s evidence is irrelevant to the question of punitive damages. To the extent Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s credibility, such argument is unpersuasive given the corroborating police report, photographs of Plaintiff’s injuries, and images showing the damage to her property, all of which are consistent with her declaration.

Defendant did not present any testimony, declaration, photographs, or video evidence to counter Plaintiff’s declaration regarding the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The only relevant argument raised by Defendant is that she was under the influence of heavy medication and alcohol and argues that she could hardly speak or comprehend what she was doing or what happened. Despite this claim, Plaintiff submitted evidence that Defendant shouted, “I'm gonna die! I'm gonna take you with me!” during the incident. Additionally, before kicking in the door, Defendant stated that Plaintiff would be destroyed. (Letuchaya Decl., ¶ 4.) The police report and Plaintiff’s declaration make clear that Defendant committed the attack with intent to injure. Defendant’s claim that she was medicated does not negate her intent or, at the very least, her conscious disregard for the safety of another. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

Defendant’s Requests No. 1

Defendant requests that, if the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 3295(c), any order should be limited to permitting discovery into Defendant’s financial condition, rather than compelling the production of specific documents listed in Plaintiff’s notice.

 Defendant points out that Plaintiff has not previously served formal discovery requests for those specific items and that many of them may be objectionable. Accordingly, Defendant asks that any order is limited to authorize appropriate discovery into financial condition, consistent with section 3295,

Civil Code section 3295(c) authorizes pretrial discovery into a defendant’s financial condition only after the Court finds that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on a punitive damages claim under Civil Code section 3294. The statute does not require the production of any specific documents. Instead, it lifts the prohibition on such discovery, allowing Plaintiff to serve formal discovery requests concerning the defendant’s profits or financial condition.

Accordingly, Defendant’s first request is consistent with the language of Civil Code section 3295 and therefore granted.

Defendant’s Request No. 2

Defendant argues that if the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion under Civil Code section 3295(c), any discovery into Defendant’s financial condition should be limited and delayed until just before trial. Defendant contends that financial information is only relevant if Plaintiff succeeds on the intentional tort claims and that early disclosure could be used improperly for leverage. However, Civil Code section 3295(c) contains no provision limiting pretrial discovery to a time just before trial. As to Defendant’s argument that such information is only relevant if Plaintiff prevails on the underlying tort, that is precisely why the statute requires a showing of a substantial probability of success on the claim for punitive damages. If Plaintiff satisfies that standard, it necessarily has a substantial likelihood of success on the underlying battery claim, as punitive damages require a higher threshold of proof. Accordingly, Defendant’s second request is denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.