Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV24747, Date: 2025-02-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24747    Hearing Date: February 25, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Daphoine Smith.  The Court finds and rules as follows: 

Background

Plaintiffs, minor T.T. and his mother, Daphonine Smith, bring this action alleging that T.T. was sexually assaulted by Defendant Smitha Chandrabose, a special education speech therapist employed by Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). Upon discovering the alleged abuse, Smith reported Defendant to LAUSD, but LAUSD allegedly failed to take any action. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for negligence and negligent supervision against LAUSD. Defendant LAUSD now moves for summary judgment, arguing that Smith's only viable theory of recovery would be for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, Plaintiff Smith cannot establish that she observed the alleged sexual abuse, a required element of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Legal Standard 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Evidentiary Ruling 

The Court does not rule on the Parties’ objections under CCP 437(q).

The Court denies the Request to take Judicial Notice of a ruling made by another Superior Court judge.  Such ruling has no precedential value and provides no other value to the decision to be made in this case.

Undisputed Facts

·        Plaintiff T.T. attended Marina Del Rey Middle School and Performing Arts Magnet during the 2021-22 school year.

·        Defendant Chandrabose is a special education speech therapist at Marina Del Rey Middle School

·        In April 2022, Chandrabose, without Plaintiff Smith’s knowledge or consent, picked up T.T. to take him to his own birthday party.

·        Chandrabose engaged in sexually explicit communications with T.T.

·        Plaintiff Smith contends she discovered that T.T. had been spending the night at Chandrabose’s home, without the mother’s permission or consent, which prompted T.T.’s father to file a “missing police report.”

·        Chandrabose sexually assaulted T.T. off campus.

·        Plaintiff claims that as a result of the District’s negligent acts, she has endured great mental pain and suffering, and prays for general damages in the amount of $20,000,000.

·        The only damages Plaintiff Smith is seeking are for emotional distress.

Discussion

Plaintiff Smith is not the actual victim of the alleged sexual abuse but rather the mother of the victim. As a third party who has not sustained physical injuries, the question arises as to what theory of recovery, if any, is available to her.

In Martin by and Through Martin v. U.S. (1993) 984 F.2d 1033, 1036, the Ninth Circuit addressed this exact issue under California law. In Martin, the victim was a child attending a government-operated daycare center. Due to negligent supervision, the child became separated from the group during an outing, was abducted by a stranger, raped, and later abandoned. The victim’s mother learned of the attack only after the child was brought to the police station.

The court held that the daycare center’s duty of care extended only to the child, not to her mother. The mother could not assert a negligence claim because the alleged negligence, the failure to supervise, was directed at the child, not at the mother. The court emphasized that while the daycare center had a duty to protect the child, that duty did not extend to the mother in a way that would support a general negligence claim. (Id. at 1036, citing Ochoa v. Superior Court, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 (holding that a doctor has no duty to a patient’s parents to provide adequate medical care to the patient); Schwarz v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 149 (holding that a psychotherapist has no duty to a patient’s father regarding therapy provided to the patient)).

Following Martin, the court in Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904, 910) ruled that when parents of a molested student seek to recover for their own emotional distress due to alleged negligent supervision, their only viable claim is for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court explained that in order to recover under this theory, a third-party relative must qualify either as a bystander or a direct victim.

The bystander theory applies only if the plaintiff:

1.  Is closely related to the victim,

2.  Was present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurred and aware that it was causing injury to the victim, and

3.  Suffered emotional distress beyond what would be expected from a disinterested witness.

(Id. at 911.)

The Steven F. court emphasized that to recover under the bystander theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must be present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and must be concomitant, meaning the plaintiff’s awareness of the injury must arise simultaneously with the negligent act, not as a result of learning about it afterward. (Id.)

Here, as in Martin and Steven F., Plaintiff Smith’s only viable theory of recovery is for negligent infliction of emotional distress. California courts have held that a school district’s duty of care extends only to the student, not to the student’s parents. (Martin, 984 F.2d at 1036.) Because Plaintiff is not the victim of the alleged abuse, she cannot maintain a general negligence claim against the district. Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that the only damages she seeks are for emotional distress. (UMF 16.) As a result, her claim must be analyzed under the requirements of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which demand contemporaneous perception of the injury-producing event.

Defendant has met its burden in showing that Plaintiff did not observe the alleged abuse. The allegations in the FAC, along with Plaintiff’s testimony in her deposition, confirm that the abuse occurred outside the parents’ presence. (UMF Nos. 18 and 19.)

The other basis for recovery is if the relative qualifies as a "direct victim." In Martin, the court noted that the California Supreme Court has allowed relatives to recover as direct victims in cases where the negligence was directed at both the injured party and the relative. (See Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868; Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916.) Applying this principle, Martin held that the mother of a six-year-old child could not recover against a negligent daycare center because the alleged negligence, failure to supervise, was directed at the child, not at the mother.

Similarly, here, Plaintiff is not a direct victim because the District’s alleged negligence was related to the supervision of the minor victim, not any duty owed to the parent. (UMF Nos. 18-20.)

Accordingly, Defendant has shown that neither theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress applies, thereby meeting its burden.

Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff argues that LAUSD has not demonstrated the absence of triable issues regarding negligence and negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. Plaintiff asserts that negligent infliction of emotional distress is a form of negligence requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages, and contends that LAUSD has not provided undisputed facts proving Plaintiff cannot establish these elements.

However, Plaintiff’s argument fails to recognize the distinction in negligence claims brought by third parties. As established in Steven F. and Martin, a school district’s duty of care extends to the student, not the student’s parents. Since LAUSD owed no duty to Plaintiff as a parent, her only potential theory of recovery is under Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.  As shown above, Defendant has met its initial burden in demonstrating that the alleged negligence was not directed at Smith and that Smith did not observe the alleged sexual abuse.

Plaintiff cites C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 879, for the proposition that a public school district may be vicariously liable for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising, and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student. However, this case addresses vicarious liability owed to the student, not the parents. The court's holding in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. is based on the special relationship between school personnel and students. As clarified in Martin, no such special relationship exists between parents and school personnel.

1.  Bystander Theory

Plaintiff argues that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether she was present when T.T. was sexually abused. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that because she was present when Defendant dropped T.T. off at Dave and Busters for his birthday and T.T. appeared emotionally detached and distraught, the timeline of the abuse should be extended to include the drop-off.

To support this claim, Plaintiff cites her own deposition testimony regarding the events on T.T.’s birthday and submits a declaration providing additional details about her observations. Relevant portions of Plaintiff’s declaration state:

“In April 2022, I planned a celebration for T.T.’s birthday at Dave and Busters. Without my permission, Defendant picked up T.T. from school. I was supposed to pick up T.T. for his birthday, and I could not find him. Eventually, Defendant brought T.T. to Dave and Busters after taking him somewhere. When I asked, Defendant refused to tell me where she had taken T.T. Further, Defendant attempted to attend T.T.’s birthday without my permission.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 20.)

“When I instructed T.T. to not go around Defendant, T.T. would get mad. He believed that Defendant was his girlfriend. I would observe T.T.’s demeanor, and it would change when he was around Defendant.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 25.)

However, nothing in the evidence establishes that Plaintiff personally observed Defendant sexually abusing T.T. Plaintiff was merely present when Defendant dropped T.T. off at Dave and Busters after the alleged abuse had already occurred. No evidence is presented of any sexual misconduct at the time of the drop off.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that T.T. appeared emotionally detached and distraught at the time of the drop off is unsupported by her own declaration, which contains only a general statement that T.T. would get mad when prevented from seeing Defendant and that his demeanor changed around her. (Smith Decl. ¶ 25.) The declaration does not include any statement that Plaintiff observed T.T. to be in distress at the time of drop-off.

Even assuming that T.T. appeared emotionally detached and distraught at the time of the drop-off, case law does not support the argument that this constitutes concomitant observation of the abuse. In Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, the Court held that a plaintiff must contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event itself, not merely observe its aftermath. In Thing, the mother learned from her daughter that her son had been hit by a car. She rushed to the scene and found him bloody and unconscious. However, because she did not witness the accident itself, the Court held that she could not recover under negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 669.) In Ortiz v. HPM Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 186, the Court distinguished between witnessing an injury as it occurred and arriving after the fact, holding that “while it is common to visit a loved one in a hospital and to be distressed by the loved one’s pain and suffering, it is highly uncommon to witness the apparent neglect of the patient’s immediate medical needs by medical personnel.”

Plaintiff cites Ortiz v. HPM Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 186, Zuniga v. Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 82, and Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified School Dist. 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107 in support of her position. However, in each of these cases, the plaintiff personally witnessed the injury-producing event:

• In Ortiz, the plaintiff observed her husband being trapped in a plastic injection molding machine while the injury was still occurring.
• In Zuniga, the plaintiff observed the fire, which was the injury-producing event.
• In Walsh, the plaintiff was present while the injury-producing event, the decedent’s hanging, was still ongoing.

Here, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that she personally witnessed any sexual abuse occurring in April 2022. Instead, she attempts to extend the timeline of the alleged abuse to include the drop-off at Dave & Buster’s, arguing that T.T. appeared distraught at that time. However, California case law has shown that merely witnessing the aftermath of an injury is not sufficient for an NIED claim. Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that Defendant dropping T.T. off at Dave & Buster’s was the injury-producing event. At the time of the drop-off, Plaintiff did not observe Defendant engaging in any conduct that caused T.T.'s injury. No evidence was presented that Defendant engaged in inappropriate conduct during the drop-off, such as inappropriately touching T.T. in Plaintiff’s presence.

It should be emphasized again that Plaintiff’s declaration does not establish that she observed any physical or emotional signs of injury at the time of T.T.'s drop-off. Instead, Plaintiff relies on a generalized statement that T.T.'s demeanor changed when he was around Defendant. (Smith Decl. ¶ 25.) However, "demeanor change" is undefined and ambiguous, making it unclear what specific behavior Plaintiff is referring to. Moreover, this statement does not indicate any observation made at the time of the drop-off, which is critical for a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

2.  Direct Victim

The "direct victim" theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress arose to distinguish cases where damages for serious emotional distress are sought due to a breach of duty owed specifically to the plaintiff, a duty that is assumed by the defendant, imposed by law, or arises out of a special relationship between the parties. (Burgess v. Superior Court (Gupta) (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076.) However, Burgess does not address direct victim claims in the context of third parties (such as a victim’s parents); rather, it pertains to the victim themselves within a physician-patient relationship. This distinction was made clear in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, where the Court held that a doctor has no duty to a patient’s parents to provide adequate medical care to the patient.

While the California Supreme Court has allowed relatives to recover as direct victims in limited cases, such as Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, and Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916), ach of those cases involved negligence directed at both the injured party and the relative:

·        Christensen involved funeral services, where the primary beneficiaries were the living relatives.

·        Marlene F. involved a psychotherapist treating both a parent and child, thereby creating a direct duty to the parent.

·        Molien involved a doctor who affirmatively instructed the patient’s spouse to undergo medical testing due to a misdiagnosis, directly implicating the spouse.

In the factually similar Martin case discussed above, the court held that the mother of a six-year-old child could not recover under a direct victim theory for negligent supervision by a daycare center. The reason was that negligent supervision was not “directed at” the mother, but rather at the child. There was no special relationship between the daycare and the mother, only a duty towards the child.

Similarly, in Steven F., also discussed above, the court relied heavily on Martin in holding that parents of a child engaged in a sexual relationship with a teacher were not direct victims. The court reasoned:

“Assuming that there was any negligent supervision of the teacher here…it was at most directed at not noticing the rather too-close relationship between the student and the teacher, not directed at the parents.”

Here, Plaintiff relies on school district policies regarding staff-student interaction and transportation procedures, as well as Defendant’s alleged violation of these policies. However, this basis for recovery has been explicitly rejected by the courts. In Steven F., the court held that a school district’s failure to recognize or prevent an inappropriate relationship between a student and a teacher does not create a duty owed to the parents that would support a direct victim theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The duty of supervision is owed exclusively to the student, and any alleged negligence in enforcing school policies does not extend to third parties, including parents.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact that she was a direct victim.

Conclusion

Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact under either theory of recovery for NIED. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

__________________________ 

Hon. Lee S. Arian  

Judge of the Superior Court