Furthermore, Section 17(a) of the Terms provides the following: 

YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, as set forth below. This agreement to arbitrate ("Arbitration Agreement") is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA'') … All disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be decided by the arbitrator, except as expressly provided below. (Def’s Ex. 2 ¶ 17(a) 

Plaintiff does not dispute having assented to the Terms of Service or deny the existence of the arbitration agreement.¿Rather, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is unconscionable. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Lyft has proven the existence of the arbitration agreement. 

C. Arbitrability 

There often are three separate contracts for a court to consider in deciding whether to compel arbitration: the underlying contract, the arbitration agreement, and the delegation clause.¿A delegation clause purports to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator.¿The arbitration agreement and delegation clause are often found within the underlying contract itself. 

Arbitration “is a matter of contract between the parties.”¿First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, (“First Options”) (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 943.¿Where the parties have agreed to arbitration, challenges to the validity of the underlying contract are for the arbitrator to decide.¿Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1108 (citations omitted).¿However, challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause itself are generally resolved by the court in the first instance.¿Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, (“Rent-A-Center”) (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 71. 

In First Options, the United States Supreme Court explained that the question of who should decide what is arbitrable (arbitrability) in an arbitration agreement is fairly simple and turns on the parties’ agreement.¿514 U.S. at 943.¿If the parties agreed to submit the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator, then he or she should decide.¿Id. If the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question to the arbitrator, then the court should decide arbitrability.¿Id.¿This rule is based on the practical reason that a party who has not agreed to arbitrate should normally have a right to a court’s decision on the merits of a dispute.¿Id. at 942-43.¿Given that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate unless it has agreed to do so, the courts should be hesitant to interpret an arbitration provision’s silence or ambiguity on the who should decide arbitrability issue as giving the arbitrator that power.¿Id. at 945.¿Therefore, courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability without clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.¿Id. at 944. 

In Rent-A-Center, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of who rules on the enforceability of a delegation clause: the court or the arbitrator?¿Id. at 67-76.¿The high court held that a delegation clause within an arbitration agreement must be viewed as an independent contract.¿Id.¿ As with any independent contract, the courts must resolve specific challenges to the delegation clause that are proper under Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) section 2, which includes any generally applicable contract defenses.¿561 U.S. at 68, 71.¿This rule requiring judicial consideration of contract defenses to the enforceability of the delegation clause only exists where the challenge is made to that clause.¿Id. at 71 (challenge to enforcement of arbitration agreement is insufficient to challenge delegation clause).¿See also Nielsen, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 1108 (discussion Rent-A-Center’s holding). 

Thus, the issue of arbitrability “is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably provided otherwise.”¿Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 83.¿Parties may agree to have the arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute, but also gateway questions of arbitrability such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.¿ The default presumption – “and it is a ‘strong’ one” – is that the parties intend the courts, not the arbitrator, to decide arbitrability.¿Clayton Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc., (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 386.¿Where the parties have delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator through a clear and unmistakable delegation clause, a court may not override the contract to decide any issue of arbitrability.¿See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., (“Henry Schein”) (2019) 139 S.Ct. 524, 529 (arbitrator, not court, must decide argument that the argument for arbitration is “wholly groundless”). 

Plaintiff contends that it is up to the court to decide the validity of the delegation clause within the arbitration agreement, Yet disregarding the clear and unmistakable evidence that the Parties agreed to arbitration would determine the arbitrability of the agreement. The clear language in the Terms of Service states, "All disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability, or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be decided by the arbitrator" (Def’s Ex. 2, Section 17(a)). Plaintiff did not present any evidence or argument to rebut this; the bulk of Plaintiff’s opposition focuses on the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement itself, not the delegation clause. For example, Plaintiff does not show how lack of mutuality or lack of a jury trial has any relevance to the enforceability of the delegation clause. A challenge to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement is insufficient to contest the delegation clause. (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 71.) Delegation clause within an arbitration agreement must be treated as an independent contract (Id. at 67-76). 

Furthermore, even if the Court is to interpret Plaintiff's arguments against the arbitration itself as pertaining to the delegation clause, the Court remains unconvinced that it is unconscionable. Plaintiff's assertion that the Terms of Service are one-sided and presented in a "take it or leave it" manner does not hold. The attempt to highlight a power imbalance between Lyft and Plaintiff overlooks the fact that this is not an employment scenario where an offer is conditional upon agreeing to arbitrate claims against an employer. Here, Plaintiff had the option to use or not use the Lyft platform. He could easily have chosen to seek transportation from various other network companies competing with Lyft or utilized different methods of transit to reach his destination. The risk of coercion in this context is minimal, and Plaintiff has not presented evidence to suggest otherwise. 

The Court is also not convinced by Plaintiff’s substantial unconscionability argument. First, arbitration is such a common means of dispute resolution that it may be considered within the “reasonable expectations” of consumers (Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1665). Over the years, arbitration has become a standard clause in many types of consumer agreements, including those for credit cards, cell phone services, online purchases, and various ridesharing services. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that consumers using these services are aware of and anticipate the use of arbitration in resolving disputes. Second, Plaintiff argues a lack of mutuality, claiming that the arbitration agreement requires consumers to arbitrate their claims while exempting from arbitration all possible claims that the Lyft Defendant might want to assert. However, Plaintiff did not cite any specific portion of the agreement to support this argument. Upon review, section 17(a) of the agreement clearly states: "BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATION, YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND LYFT ARE WAIVING THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL FOR ALL CLAIMS, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT." This language suggests that both Lyft and the customer mutually waive their right to sue in court. The court will also note that unlike the procedural unconscionability arguments, the substantial unconscionability arguments put forth by the Plaintiff are more directly related to the arbitration agreement itself rather than the delegation clause.  

Additionally, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to the present agreement, a point not contested in the opposition. Therefore, the third-party litigation exception under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.2(c) is preempted. (Dias v. Burberry Ltd. (S.D.Cal. June 9, 2021) 2021 WL 2349730, at *18 [holding that Section 1281.2 was inapplicable because FAA governs the Agreement.]) 

Accordingly, the issue of arbitrability is up to the arbitrator to decide and therefore the present motion is GRANTED.