Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 23STCV31569, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 23STCV31569, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31569 Hearing Date: November 6, 2024 Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Hearing Date: 11/6/24

CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV31569 ERIC SMITH vs LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.

Moving Party: Defendant City of Los Angeles

Responding Party: Plaintiff

Notice: Sufficient

Ruling: Granted

Background

On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint. On August 16, 2023, Plaintiff amended his complaint, alleging four causes of action: (1) assault and battery, (2) negligence, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) malicious prosecution, against the Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los Angeles. Paragraphs 25–28 of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) state that the requirements of the Government Claims Act have been satisfied. Plaintiff also attached a letter from a captain of the Los Angeles Police Department acknowledging receipt of his complaint and indicating that an investigation was conducted (Exhibit A to the FAC).

On May 17, 2024, Defendant City filed a Demurrer to the FAC, relying on the declarations of Deputy Clerk Michael Valdivia and Deputy City Attorney Emily Cohen to confirm that Plaintiff never filed a claim for damages with the City. On June 18, 2024, the Demurrer was heard by the court and overruled, as it relied on extrinsic evidence without a request for judicial notice of the absence of a damages claim.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings. This time, Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of the declaration of Michael Valdivia, Deputy City Clerk for the City of Los Angeles, which states that the City Clerk’s office has not received any claim for damages from Plaintiff for an incident occurring in 2022.

Legal Standard¿¿

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time to demur has expired and an answer has been filed. (CCP § 438(f).) A motion by a defendant may be made on the grounds that (1) the court “lacks jurisdiction of the subject of one or more of the causes of action alleged” or (2) the complaint or cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (CCP § 438(c).)¿¿

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to a general demurrer; it tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action.” (Wise v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738.)¿¿

In a demurrer, a court generally confines itself to the pleading but, as appropriate, may extend its consideration to matters subject to judicial notice. “[W]hen the allegations of the complaint contradict or are inconsistent with such facts, we accept the latter and reject the former. We give the same precedence to facts evident from exhibits attached to the pleading. (Hill v. Roll Internat. Corp. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1300.) Furthermore, any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken will be treated as a nullity. (Interinsurance Exchange v. Narula (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143; Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955.)

Discussion

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the complaint was sent to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). (FAC ¶ 28.) This is supported by the letter from LAPD and undisputed by the parties. The issue, therefore, is whether submitting a claim to LAPD satisfies the requirements of the Government Claims Act—specifically, whether LAPD is the correct entity to receive Plaintiff’s claim and whether a letter to LAPD substantially complies with the Act’s claim presentation requirements.

First, L.A.M.C. Section 350(a) provides that no suit may be brought on any claim for money or damages against the City, or any officer or board of the City, until a claim has been filed with the City Clerk and rejected in whole or in part. Thus, it is the City Clerk, not LAPD, that is designated as the responsible officer to receive and act upon claims for damages made against the City of Los Angeles.

Second, while "[t]he Government Claims Act requires only substantial compliance with the claims presentation requirement” (Westcon Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramento (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 183, 200), substantial compliance requires that a misdirected claim be "actually received" by the appropriate officer or board. Knapp v. Palisades Charter High School explains that "[i]f a public employee has failed to fulfill a duty to forward a misdirected claim to the appropriate party, such claim cannot be in substantial compliance because it was not ‘actually received’ by the appropriate party.” (141 Cal.App.4th 780, 790 (2006).) Additionally, Jamison v. State of California clarifies that "where a claim is filed with the proper entity, although with the wrong statutory official thereof, the doctrine of substantial compliance will save the claim if the claim was actually received by the statutory officer. [Citations.] But where there is a complete failure to serve any responsible officer of the entity, the doctrine does not apply." (31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 (1973).)

Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC, along with the attached letter, confirm that the complaint was sent to the LAPD, not to the City Clerk’s office—the responsible department for handling such claims. Further, as indicated in the Valdivia declaration, the City Clerk’s office did not receive any claims from Plaintiff in 2022. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint was not forwarded to the appropriate statutory officer. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not substantially complied with the Government Claims Act’s presentation requirement.

Plaintiff filed an opposition but does not dispute the substance of the motion, specifically that he did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements of the Government Claims Act. Instead, Plaintiff argues that motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 438, which only conditionally allows for such motions on the same grounds after a demurrer has been overruled, per section 438(g)(1). However, this section is not applicable here because the demurrer was not overruled on the merits but rather due to a technicality—namely, the lack of a request for judicial notice, which the Defendant has now addressed in the current motion.

Plaintiff also contends that the court cannot take judicial notice of the city clerk’s declaration. However, under Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1752, judicial notice is permitted regarding the absence of a Government Claims Act filing, as attested by a knowledgeable state employee. While the court may take judicial notice of the existence or non-existence of a record, it cannot take notice of the truth of its contents (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565). Here, the court is solely taking judicial notice of the existence or absence of Plaintiff's claims in the City Clerk’s records, as attested to by Deputy City Clerk Michael Valdivia’s declaration.

Plaintiff alleges that the incident in question occurred on April 20, 2022, making the deadline for filing a government claim under California Government Code section 911.2(a) October 20, 2022 (six months after the alleged incident). According to Government Code section 911.2(a), a claim for personal injury or property damage against a public entity must be presented within six months of the accrual of the cause of action.

Further, while California law allows for a "late claim" application within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, Plaintiff did not file such an application within the necessary timeframe. This one-year limit, mandated under Government Code section 911.4(b), establishes that the late claim request must be presented within one year from the date of the incident.

After one year, no further relief is available, as the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief on untimely claims. This principle is well-established under Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 488, where the court held that the failure to file a timely claim or application for a late claim under the Government Claims Act irrevocably bars the plaintiff from pursuing their claim, as the court has no jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6.

Here, Plaintiff’s claim was neither presented within the six-month statutory period nor accompanied by an application for late filing within one year of the incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to meet these statutory requirements means that the claim is time-barred, and the court lacks jurisdiction to grant any relief from these deadlines. Thus, the motion is granted.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.