Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 24STCV00134, Date: 2024-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 24STCV00134, Date: 2024-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV00134 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27

DEMURRER

Hearing Date: 8/16/24¿

CASE NO./NAME: 24STCV00134 Elaine Saunders vs. James Hissong et al.

Moving Party: Defendant City of Los Angeles

Responding Party: Plaintiff¿

Notice: Sufficient¿

Ruling: DEMURRER IS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Background

This case concerns an accident that occurred at the intersection of Western Avenue and Franklin Avenue between vehicles driven by Plaintiff Elaine Saunders and Defendant James Hissong. At the time of the incident, the traffic control signals were broken or not functioning. Plaintiff's vehicle was allegedly completely inside the Subject Intersection and had full control of the intersection at the time of the incident. Hissong allegedly failed to yield to Plaintiff's vehicle and collided with Plaintiff's car. In addition to Defendant Hissong, Plaintiff also sued various government entities within the City of Los Angeles for failing to properly maintain the traffic signal. The City of Los Angeles demurs to Plaintiff's third cause of action for dangerous condition of public property.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [internal citations omitted].)

Dangerous condition of public property

“The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.; the Act) ‘is a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets forth the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.’ Section 835 . . . prescribes the conditions under Section 835 provides that a public entity may be held liable for such injuries ‘if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, [and] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.’ In addition, the plaintiff must establish that either: (a) ‘[a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition,’ or (b) ‘[t]he public entity had . . . notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.’ ” (Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1104.)

Gov. Code § 835

Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

(c) Cal. Gov. Code § 835

Discussion

Gov. Code § 830.4.

Defendant argues that the failure to provide traffic lights or non-operational traffic lights cannot form the basis of a dangerous condition of public property claim pursuant to Gov. Code § 830.4. This statute specifies that a condition is not considered dangerous within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings as outlined in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.

In opposition, Plaintiff makes several arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that Cal. Gov. Code § 830.8 provides an exception to Gov. Code § 830.4 where the traffic light was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition that endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care. However, this exception under Gov. Code § 830.8 applies only to signage, sign markings, or devices other than those described in Section 830.4. The complaint states that a traffic light at the intersection was inoperative, and traffic lights fall under the category of regulatory traffic control signals within Gov. Code 830.4. Therefore, the exception under Gov. Code 830.8 is inapplicable.

Plaintiff argues that Gov. Code § 830.4 applies only to situations where a traffic light was not provided, not to situations where a traffic light was inoperative. The Court disagrees. It is true that when a public entity installs traffic signs and invites the public to rely on them, it may be liable for creating a dangerous condition. The type of dangerous condition contemplated by the Court, for example, includes a malfunctioning traffic light that directs motorists to “go” in all four directions of an intersection simultaneously, with predictable results. (See Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1195; Mathews v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 116, 145, [where traffic lights malfunctioned, being stuck on green and red].)

If the government turns off traffic signals entirely to avoid confusion, liability does not attach. “When the [traffic] lights were turned off, their defective condition could no longer mislead or misdirect the injured party.” (Goodman v. Raposa, supra, at p. 835, 312 P.2d 65; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 136 Cal.App.2d at p. 306, 288 P.2d 989.) The same result obtains whether the traffic signals are extinguished by design or by accident. (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1195.) When the signals are extinguished, the City did not invite the public to rely on the signals as a means of controlling the right-of-way at the intersection. The signals did not give a false indication to “go.” Rather, they gave no indication at all, and did not mislead or misdirect motorists. (Id.) Under the circumstances, motorists approaching the intersection were bound not by the City's inoperative light, but by the provisions of the Vehicle Code, which effectively transform an inoperative signal light into a stop sign. (Veh.Code, § 21800.)Once the signals failed, the City could reasonably foresee that motorists using due care would obey the provisions of the Vehicle Code and make a full stop before proceeding when it was safe to do so. The City cannot be charged with foreseeing that a motorist will recklessly disobey traffic laws and speed through an intersection without heed to its inoperative traffic lights any more than it can be charged with foreseeing that irresponsible drivers will race at 100 miles per hour down a highway or drive the wrong way down a one-way street, in violation of the traffic laws. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that Chowdhury is distinguishable because the inoperative traffic signal was caused by an area-wide electronic power outage. However, this misses the point. The essence of Chowdhury is that when traffic lights are turned off, they cannot mislead or misdirect motorists. Whether the traffic signal stopped working due to an area-wide electronic power outage or the alleged neglect of a city employee is irrelevant.

Plaintiff argues that Gov. Code § 830.4 applies when a failure to provide a stop sign or other traffic control signal is the only basis for fixing liability. While this is true, the inoperation of the street light does not constitute an additional element. In Hilts v. County of Solano (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 161, the intersection was considered dangerous not only due to the failure to provide warning or regulatory signs or signals but also due to other factors such as the presence of trees, differences in elevation between the roadway grades and adjoining fields, and the method of striping the intersection. Similarly, in Washington v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1535, additional hazards included metal pillars in the middle of 13th Street and shadows caused by the freeway above, which may obstruct the view of drivers approaching one another. Although Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the street light was inoperative, the failure to specify the time of day or the lighting level at which the incident occurred renders the fact that the street lights were not working irrelevant. However, this additional fact suggests the possibility of a successful amendment. Thus, the Court will GRANT the demurrer with leave to amend, ordering Plaintiff to state with particularity the exact features or conditions of the intersection that render it dangerous. (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795 [cause of action against a public entity must be pled with particularity].)

Defendant contends that even assuming visibility issues due to non-functional street lights and traffic signals, these conditions do not constitute a dangerous condition of public property under Milligan v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th. In Milligan, the court did not find the public entity liable for not installing a suicide barrier on a bridge, reasoning that individuals using the bridge to commit suicide are not utilizing it as the general public exercising ordinary care would. Extending this reasoning, Defendant argues that the absence of a traffic light and street light does not inherently create a substantial risk of injury if the intersection is otherwise used with due care. However, the comparison is not directly analogous. If the incident occurred during the middle of the night, with minimal visibility due to non-functioning street lights, there could be a visibility problem, and therefore a substantial risk of harm, even when the road or intersection is used with due care.

Gov. Code 840.2 and 840.4

Sections 840.2 and 840.4 outline the conditions Plaintiff must meet to hold an employee liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property. The third cause of action is directed solely against government entities and not against any specific employee. Therefore, these statutory sections do not form the basis for holding the city liable for dangerous condition of public property.

Gov. Code 815.2

Government Code section 815.2 states, “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” This statute establishes vicarious liability for public entities for the torts committed by their employees. Claims regarding a dangerous condition of public property are addressed under Government Code 835, not 815.2. Therefore, these statutory sections do not form the basis for holding the city liable for dangerous condition of public property.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at sscdept27@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.