Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: BC674980, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

STATUS CONFERENCE RE: WHETHER DEFAULT JUDGMENT CAN BE ENTERED AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR DEADLINE

On September 6, 2017, Luisa Leal (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Daniel Demoz dba Danny D Transportation (“Demoz”), Nader Djazayeri (“Djazayeri”), Black Tide MGMT Inc., Black Tide Management Inc., Black Tide Management Inc. dba Got LAX Limo Inc., and Got LAX Limo and Does 1 to 50 inclusive (collectively, “Defendants”) for injuries arising from Djazayeri’s a motor vehicle collision on September 13, 2015.

Since entry of default against Defendants, Plaintiff filed, and the Court reviewed and denied, five default judgment applications.

At an OSC hearing on September 12, 2023, the Court noted that this case was filed more than five years ago. The Court directed Plaintiff’s Counsel to submit authority addressing if the court can enter a default judgment given this procedural posture.

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a brief regarding the Court’s authority to enter default judgment in this matter. Plaintiff also filed another default judgment application.[1]

On October 24, 2023, the Court continued the matter to allow Plaintiff’s Counsel to address the relevant issues raised in Hughes and to dismiss the Doe defendants. The hearing was continued to 12/08/2023 at 1:30. Moreover, Counsel was required to file a responsive brief at least 7 court days before the hearing.

On November 29, 2023, which was at least 7 court days before the hearing, Plaintiff’s Counsel filed a responsive brief addressing the relevant issues in Hughes. Although Plaintiff acknowledged the Court’s requirement to dismiss the Doe defendants, she failed to dismiss the Doe defendants.

Default Judgment should be denied because Plaintiff’s application is still deficient. Plaintiff included the relevant case law from Hughes and provided evidence showing the impracticability in obtaining a default judgment within the five years of commencing this action. (Hamed Yazdanpanah’s Declartion, ¶¶ 6, 13-17.) For instance, Plaintiff claims that (1) once the request to enter default is submitted, it is ‘impractical’ to do anything further to bring the case to trial, and thus the time between entry of default and rejection of same is excluded from the 5-year period to bring the case to trial and (2) Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in moving this case toward a default judgment. Although Plaintiff added relevant case law from Hughes, the Court also instructed Plaintiff to dismiss the Doe defendants. However, she has failed to do so.

Because Plaintiff’s Counsel failed to dismiss Doe defendants, the Court continues the matter to allow Counsel to dismiss the Doe defendants. The hearing is continued to ________________ at 1:30. At that time, the Court will determine whether,, in fact, it can enter default judgment despite the fact that it has been more than 5 years since filing.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

[1] The September 18, 2023, application (the sixth application) was still deficient as counsel did not dismiss the Doe defendants. Otherwise, the default application is in proper form.