Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 20NWCV00592, Date: 2023-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20NWCV00592    Hearing Date: December 5, 2023    Dept: C

JOSE MENDOZA, et al. vs CITY OF MAYWOOD, et al

Case No. 20NWCV00592

Hearing Date: 12/05/23 @ 9:30am

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Tentative Ruling

The Court GRANTS Individual Defendants Herber Marquez and Ricardo Lara’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,838.13.  The $3,838.13 will be incorporated into the Judgment entered in favor of Defendants against Plaintiff.  

No opposition filed as of December 1, 2023.

Defendants to give notice.  

BACKGROUND

On September 3, 2018, Plaintiff Mendoza visited the Maywood City Hall to speak with the Building and Planning Department to determine the zoning on 4000 East Slauson Avenue property (hereinafter “property”) for the proposed use of a Cannabis Testing Laboratory for his business LA Labs, Inc. (SAC, ¶ 9.) The Cannabis Testing Laboratory, LA Labs, Inc., only would consist of a testing laboratory and was not intended, nor would provide retail for customers. (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was informed by a code officer that the property qualified for the proposed use. (Id., ¶ 11.) Since the application process requires an applicant to have a location prior to submitting the application, Plaintiff signed for a lease. (Id., ¶ 13.)

After securing the lease, Plaintiff met with the Mayor and other officials who demonstrated excitement about the project and allegedly indicated support. (Id., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff contends the Planning Commission then spread lies about the business and tried to get community members to come speak against the company. (Id., ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff alleges that people later approached him asking for $350,000 to let the project continue at the behest of the Mayor. (Id., ¶ 31.) Later the Planning Commission delivered a resolution of denial. (Id., ¶ 38.)  

Due to defendant’s pre-textual denial, Mendoza has lost a considerable amount of money and time, and his name was tarnished throughout the City of Maywood due to the false representation made by defendants about Mendoza, his character, and his business. Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserted causes of action for: (1) Civil RICO; (2) Attempted Civil Extortion; (3) Defamation, Slander Per Se; (4) IIED.

Defendants moved under CCP § 425.16 to strike the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action.  On April 18, 2023, the court struck only the Third Cause of Action.  The court found that Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Defamation arose from protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing a probability of success on that cause of action. (Nguy Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c), a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the motion. Under CRC 3.1702 and CRC 8.104, a request for attorneys’ fees must be made within 60 days of service of the notice of entry of judgment. A defendant may only recover fees and costs related to the motion to strike. (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383.) This includes fees associated with bringing the motion for fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 (“an award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.”).) Additionally, “[a]ny fee award must also include those incurred on appeal. [Citation.]” (Trapp v. Naiman¿(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 113, 122.)¿ 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants Hebert Marquez and Ricardo Lara seek attorney fees in the amount of $3,83.13, one-third of the total amount of $11,514.40 they incurred for bringing the Anti-SLAPP Motion.   

Hourly Rate 

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.” (Id.)¿ 

The billing rate of defense counsel on this matter is $285.00 per hour. (Nguy Decl., ¶ 8.)

The Court finds that the hourly rate requested by the individual Defendants’ Counsel is reasonable.  

Reasonable Hours Incurred 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”¿ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)¿ 

Defense counsel spent 38.9 hours in work preparing, filing, and arguing the Anti-SLAPP Motion. (Nguy Decl., ¶ 5.) A summary of the billing and the relevant invoices are attached as Exhibits 2.  Counsel billed 38.9 hours billed at a rate of $285.00 per hour. In total, fees expended on the Anti-SLAPP motion were $11,514.40. (Nguy Decl., ¶ 5.)  Because the court struck only one of the three causes of action at issue in their motion, Defendants’ request for attorney fees is limited to $3,838.13, or one-third of their total fees.

The Court finds that the hours spent on the Anti-SLAPP motion are reasonable.

Accordingly, the Court awards $3,838.13 in attorney’s fees.