Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 20STCV03662, Date: 2023-09-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV03662    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: C

VALLES v. INCLUSION SERVICES, LLC

CASE NO.:  20STCV03662

HEARING:  03/07/24

 

#6

 

Defendant TRI-COUNTIES ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED, INC.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is MOOT.

 

Moving Party to give notice.

 

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. (Cal. Ev. Code §452.)

 

This action for premises liability was filed by Plaintiff Gloria Valles against Defendants Inclusion Services, LLC; Inclusion Specialized Supporting Living Services, LLC; and the State of California on January 29, 2020. On June 3, 2021, a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed.

 

The FAC was amended on January 10, 2023 to name Tri-Counties Regional Center (“TCRC”) and Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. (“ELRC”) as defendants.

 

On October 27, 2023, the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed.

 

The SAC alleges that on January 24, 2019, Plaintiff was on the driveway of her residence, and while exiting the driver’s side of her vehicle, she was physically attacked by Doe 1, who was under the care and custody of Defendants Inclusion Services, LLC; Inclusion Specialized Supported Living Services, LLC; TCRC; and ELRC. (SAC ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inclusion Services, LLC; Inclusion Specialized Supported Living Services, LLC; TCRC; and ELRC “were provided extensive documentation in February of 2016 warning said defendants of DOE 1’s history of violent behavior. The documentation advised defendants that DOE 1 required close supervision at all times, that changes in his schedule were upsetting, that DOE 1 had ‘a long history of difficult and dangerous behaviors’ as well as a long history of ‘severe aggression towards others causing injury that required emergency care of the victims on more than one occasion.’ Said defendants were further advised that DOE 1 required 2:1 staff supervision at all times.” (SAC ¶9.)

 

The SAC asserts the following causes of action:

 

1.    Negligence;

2.    Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision;

3.    Premises Liability;

4.    Negligence;

5.    Assault;

6.    Battery;

7.    IIED;

8.    NIED

 

Defendant TCRC now moves for summary judgment/adjudication as to all causes of action asserted against it—the first, second, and third causes of action.  TCRC argues that summary judgment/adjudication is proper because: (1) Gloria Valles cannot establish that TCRC owed her a duty; (2) Gloria Valles cannot establish a breach of any duty to her; (3) Gloria Valles cannot establish that TCRC was a proximate cause of her injuries; and (4) Gloria Valles cannot obtain competent, admissible evidence of her claims.

 

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that triable issues of material fact exist which support that the Subject Incident was the result of TCRC’s breach of duty.

 

The elements for a claim of negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) “An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining and employee who is incompetent or unfit.” (Federico v. Sup. Ct. (Jenny G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213.) “[A]n employer’s duty… is breached only when the employer knows, or should know, facts which would warn a reasonable person that the employee presents an undue risk of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be performed.” (Id. at 1213.)

 

“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence…. [A] legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. [Citations.]” (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1207.)

 

The Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Act, Welf. & Inst. Code §§4500-4845, is a statutory scheme intended by the California Legislature “to provide a ‘pattern of facilities and services… sufficiently complete to meet the needs of each person with developmental disabilities, regardless of age or degree of handicap, and each stage of life.” (Association for Retarded Citizens-California v. Dept. of Developmental Servs., (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384, 388.) “Regional centers have important but limited monitoring responsibilities. A regional center representative is required to monitor the provision of care and services supplied by a provider to ensure they are provided in accordance with the developmentally disabled person’s IPP. [Citations.]…. If conditions constituting an immediate danger to a developmentally disabled person come to the attention of a regional center, the regional center must investigate the situation immediately, and if the immediate danger cannot be corrected within 24 hours of verification, the regional center must take immediate steps to relocate the developmentally disabled person.” (Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 490.)

 

At all times relevant to this action, Doe 1 received supported living services through Defendants Inclusion Services, LLC and Inclusion Specialized Supported Living Services, LLC.  At the time of the Subject Incident, Doe 1 was living at 8340 Coral Lane, Pico Rivera, California 90660 and receiving supported living services through Inclusion. (UMF No. 3.) It is undisputed that TCRC is a regional center that provides support and services for individuals with developmental disabilities. (UMF No. 14.)

 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Inclusion Services, LLC; Inclusion Specialized Supported Living Services, LLC; TCRC; and ELRC “had a duty, mandated by their special relationship with DOE 1, their ability to control DOE 1, and their knowledge of DOE 1’s dangerous, violent, and menacing propensities, to supervise and control DOE 1 and to prevent DOE 1 from escaping from its subject location and attacking, threatening, and/or menacing individuals.” (SAC, ¶ 35.)

 

“A defendant owes a legal duty of care to the plaintiff if (1) the defendant has a “special relationship” with a third party who injures the plaintiff, and (2) that special relationship entails a duty to control the third party's conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff or the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.” (Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 139, 155.) With regard to the second element, a duty to control presupposes an ability to control “such that ‘if exercised, [it] would meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that actually occurred.’” (Ibid.)

 

In Shalgoun, Plaintiff was an administrator of a residential facility which provided services to J.C., a Regional Center client with a known history of violence.  After J.C. was involved in several incidents of violence at the facility, the facility asked the Regional Center to find J.C. another placement.  Before the Regional Center could do so, J.C. attacked and seriously injured Plaintiff.  Plaintiff sued the Regional Center and the Regional Center moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds that it owed Plaintiff no legal duty.  The trial court granted summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. “The undisputed facts establish that the Regional Center does not have the ability to control J.C. and, therefore, no special relationship exists between the Regional Center and J.C. that could give rise to a duty.” (Shalghoun, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 139, 158.) Regional Centers do not themselves directly provide any services or support to consumers. (Morohoshi, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 489.) Instead, they coordinate the provision of services and support by entering into contracts with “direct service providers” – that is, the entities who actually provide residential facilities, counseling or other services and support that the consumers need. (Morohoshi, at p. 488.) Because TCRC did not have the ability to control DOE 1, no special relationship exists between TCRC and DOE 1 that could give rise to a duty of care to Plaintiff. 

 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants, including TCRC, “owed a duty to the public, including Plaintiff, to use reasonable care to ensure the safety, care, wellbeing and health of the public, including Plaintiff, and protect her from harm, like DOE 1, under the care, custody and control of defendants.” (SAC, ¶ 44.) Here, too, Shalgoun is instructive. “[E]ven when a duty arises by virtue of a special relationship, that duty is actionable only if that special relationship gives rise to a legal duty of care for the benefit of—and hence to protect—the plaintiff (or the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs). (Shalghoun, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 139, 159.) “To the extent regional centers have the ability to control consumers, the sole duty that could arise from that control is the duty to benefit—and hence to protect—the consumer. As a general matter, the focus of the [Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act] itself is providing services and support—and, critically, protection—to the developmentally disabled person who is the consumer.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that TCRC owes a duty to anyone other than DOE 1.  Thus, there is no duty under the Act which runs from TCRC to Plaintiff under the facts of this case. 

 

In her Opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that TCRC “was directly negligent in placing DOE 1 in a Supported Living Services living arrangement in spite of DOE 1’s past history of violence and attacking community members in the various communities wherein he resided.” (Opp., p. 9, emphasis in original.) In this regard, Plaintiff argues that TCRC “possessed the ultimate authority regarding whether DOE 1 would receive SLS and where he could reside.” (Opp., p. 22:15:16.) The Shalghoun Court rejected a similar argument by the plaintiff in that case: “[T]he Regional Center does not have the sole (or, as plaintiff states, “ultimate”) ability to control J.C.'s placement among various facilities.” (Shalghoun, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 139, 158.) When it comes to placing a consumer in a residential facility, the regional center suggests or recommends where a consumer may be placed, but it is up to the residential facility whether to accept the consumer as a resident. (Id. at 152.) Because TCRC lacked the ability to unilaterally control DOE 1’s placement, TCRC also lacked the duty to control DOE 1’s placement.  Thus, TCRC cannot be liable to Plaintiff under a direct negligence theory. 

 

Plaintiff argues that TCRC “could have placed DOE 1 in a living arrangement with more structure, such as a group home setting with a behaviorist and nurse that is on staff 24 hours a day.”  (Opp., p. 8.) Yet, Plaintiff acknowledges that the Inclusion Defendants agreed to place DOE 1 under a 2:1 staff supervision ratio as recommended by DOE 1’s Individual Program Plan. (Response to UMF No. 2.) Plaintiff offers no evidence that the recommended 2:1 staff supervision ratio was inadequate or that such a staffing ratio, if properly implemented, would have been ineffective in preventing DOE 1’s assault against Plaintiff.  Because TCRC followed DOE 1’s IPP when placing DOE 1 with the Inclusion Defendants, Plaintiff cannot show that such placement was the cause of DOE 1’s assault against her. 

 

Finally, policy considerations counsel against finding a duty here.  “Whether a defendant has a legal duty to take action to protect [a] plaintiff from injuries caused by a third party” involves a two step inquiry. “First the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 204, 209.) Even if the Court were to find that the Subject Incident was highly foreseeable (due to Doe 1’s disability), the Court does not find that the burden of preventing criminal third party conduct should be placed on a regional center. Allowing liability here would incentivize regional centers to consider risks to third parties such as Plaintiff, and would be at odds with the Act’s focus on what is best for the consumer. (Shalghoun, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 139, 163.)

 

The Court concludes that TCRC has no duty to protect Plaintiff under the facts of this case.  Because this is a question of law, any additional facts Plaintiff could discover if a continuance were granted would not change the outcome. 

 

Summary adjudication of the first through third claims is proper because TCRC owes no legal duty of care to Plaintiff. Since no claims remain against TCRC, summary judgment is GRANTED.

 

TCRC’s Evidentiary Objections

 

Nos. 1-9. OVERRULED.