Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 20STCV13393, Date: 2023-07-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV13393 Hearing Date: July 11, 2023 Dept: C
CASE NO.: 20STCV13393
HEARING: 7/11/23
#9
TENTATIVE
RULING
Defendant
The Salvation Army’s motion to stay is GRANTED. The action is
STAYED pending the outcome of the Boy Scout Bankruptcy Action.
Moving Party to give NOTICE.
Defendant The
Salvation Army moves for a stay of proceedings until the Plaintiffs' claims
submitted in the Boy Scouts of America action pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 20-10343 have been
resolved, pursuant to CCP § 128(a)(8).
Plaintiff's John Doe and John Doe
OQ are brothers who filed two separate actions, which were subsequently
consolidated against Defendant The Salvation Army alleging sexual abuse by Paul
Fanning, a former officer in The Salvation Army, between 1991 and 1995. At the time Plaintiffs interacted with
Fanning, he was also the leader of their Boy Scout troop. In this consolidated action, Plaintiffs are
pursuing damages for injuries allegedly resulting from Fanning's activities
as both a Salvation Army officer and as their Boy Scout troop leader.
Plaintiffs’
claims are based upon the same alleged abuse. They remain pending and undetermined due to
the continuing dispute over the settlement of the Boy Scouts Bankruptcy Action. Plaintiffs
did not name the Boy Scouts as a defendant in this matter.
“Every court has the inherent power to regulate the proceedings of
matters before it and to effect an orderly disposition of the issues
presented.” (Cottle v. Superior Court
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378.) “[T]he
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”
(Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254.) Trial courts have the "inherent
authority" to stay actions pending resolution of other litigation. (See e.g., Adams v. Paul (1995) 11
Cal.4th 583, 593 - "trial courts have inherent authority to stay . . .
suits, holding them in abeyance pending the resolution of underlying
litigation"; Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6
Cal.4th 287, 301 - stay granted to "eliminate the risk of inconsistent
factual determinations"; Rosenthal v. Wilner (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d
1327, 1333-1334 - action stayed pending appeal of underlying suit.) One of the
primary purposes of stays are to prevent problems of simultaneous litigation. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 762.)
In opposition,
Plaintiffs argue that the claims are separate and unrelated because the assaults
in this case are not related to scout activities. The sexual abuse of
Plaintiffs occurred at the house provided and paid for by the Salvation Army to
Fanning as a
minister of the church.
However,
Plaintiffs cite no evidence for this contention. The pleadings in both actions demonstrate
that the claims are overlapping. In the
Boy Scout Bankruptcy Action, Plaintiffs LQ and OQ seek emotional distress damages
from the abuse. (Cope Decl., Exs. C-D, bates
numbers "PLAINTIFF 00001029" and "PLAINTIFF 00001030", "PLAINTIFF
OQ 0001026" and "PLAINTIFF OQ 00001027"). In this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek the same
emotional distress damages. (LQ Complaint,
¶¶ 54, 61, 68, 71 and 74; OQ FAC, ¶¶ 53, 60, 67, 74 and 81.) Further, Plaintiffs' claims submitted in the Boy
Scout Bankruptcy Action explicitly seek to recover for alleged abuse at Fanning's
house. (Id., Ex. C, bates number
"PLAINTIFF 00001028" and Ex. D, bates number "PLAINTIFF OQ
0001025".)
The court
finds that a stay is necessary due to overlapping claims. Plaintiffs are suing two separate entities
for vicarious liability for sexual abuse committed by Fanning in the same
house. Once liability of the Boy Scouts matter is determined,
Defendant may set off any comparable fault claims against the Boy Scouts.
Further, if
this court does not stay the action, Defendant will be forced to file a
cross-complaint, naming the Boy Scouts, and a stay would be necessary
regardless.
Finally,
Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction argument is irrelevant and was not a basis
for the motion.
Accordingly,
the motion is GRANTED. The action is
STAYED pending the outcome of the Boy Scout Bankruptcy Action.