Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 20STCV41511, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 20STCV41511, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV41511 Hearing Date: May 11, 2023 Dept: C

DE LEON v. LAKEWOOD PARK MANOR

CASE NO.: 20STCV41511

HEARING: 05/11/23

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant LAKEWOOD RESIDENTIAL CARE LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

Moving Party to give Notice.

The instant Motion constitutes Defendant/Moving Party LAKEWOOD RESIDENTIAL CARE, LLC’s (“Defendant”) second attempt to compel arbitration. Defendant indicates that it’s renewed Motion is properly before this Court because the initial Motion was denied without prejudice on August 2, 2022. This Court agrees, and will proceed on the merits.

The Agreement containing the subject Arbitration Clause was executed by Decedent and a Representative for the Defendant., and states: “By signing below, you agree that any and all claims and disputes arising from or related to this Agreement or to your residence, care or services at Lakewood Park Manor…including, without limitation, personal injury or wrongful death claims shall be resolved by submission to neutral to binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act….” (Ari Decl., Ex. A.) Defendant proffers the Declaration of Lakewood Park Manor’s Assistant Administrator, Cynthia Flores. Ms. Flores declares that “[o]n September 24, 2019, [she] met with [Decedent]. During [their] conversation [she] explained the arbitration clause contained in the Admission Agreement… and informed [her] should she choose to initial the arbitration clause, she had the right to withdraw her decision withing thirty (30) days in writing.” (Flores Decl., ¶4.) Ms. Flores further indicates that Decedent “acknowledged her understanding of the arbitration clause and initialed the arbitration clause before [Ms. Flores].” (Id. ¶5.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the initials appearing throughout the document bear no resemblance to the Decedent’s actual handwriting and that the Decedent was mentally incapacitated at the time the Arbitration Agreement was purportedly signed.

Except for specifically enumerated exceptions, the court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate a controversy if the court finds that a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (See CCP §1281.2.) “In California, [g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420.) “A petition to compel arbitration or stay proceedings pursuant to CCP §§1281.1 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (C.R.C. Rule 3.1330.)

The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Engalia v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The Purchase agreement clearly calls for arbitration as the appropriate procedure for resolving any disputes over the contract. Rick De La Cera, a surviving child of the Decedent is not a handwriting expert.

Plaintiff also contends that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

The party seeking the defense of unconscionability bears the burden of proof. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 911. “[T]he doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” (Id. at 910.) “Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, and surprise occurs where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.) “The procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.)

“[Procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. [Citation]…. The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts [ ] do not impose terms that have been variously described as ‘overly harsh,’ [citation], ‘unduly oppressive,’ [citation], ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience,’ [citation] or ‘unfairly one-sided.’ [citation]. All of these formulations point to the central idea that unconscionability doctrine is [ ] concerned [ ] with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.’ (Sanchez, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 910-911.) If the Court finds that an agreement to arbitrate or any clause of such an agreement is unconscionable, the Court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (Cal. Civ. Code §1670.5(a).)

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Indeed, the Agreement appears to be a contract of adhesion in that it is, on its face, a form agreement drafted by the Defendant. Plaintiff argues that Decedent had no other choice but to sign it as it was, and was not actually allowed to negotiate its terms. This is sufficient to indicate that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion. (See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corporation (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 721-722; Fittante v. Palms Springs Motors Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 708, 721; Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114-115.) A finding that an agreement is a contract of adhesion is normally sufficient to establish procedural unconscionability. (See, e.g., Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 854 [“A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability. [Citation.]”].)

Notwithstanding, Plaintiff fails to make any showing that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. The terms of the Arbitration Agreement appear on its face to be bilateral, reasonable, and not unfairly favorable to either party. As a result, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement lacks the “one-sidedness” necessary to be deemed substantively unconscionable. (See e.g., Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 816, 825-826.) The Court does not find that the Agreement is so one-sided as to shock the conscience or that it “unfairly limits discovery”.

The motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the Motion, and order arbitration of the dispute. The entire case will be STAYED until conclusion of arbitration. The Arbitrator will determine the arbitrability of Plaintiff’s claims.