Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 20STCV42299, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 20STCV42299, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV42299 Hearing Date: December 6, 2023 Dept: C

MICHELLE PROVOST-SIERKS v. PRN AMBULANCE, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.: 20STCV42299

HEARING: 12/6/23

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the Third Cause of Action for Violation of Ralphs Civil Rights Act is DENIED.

Moving party(s) to give notice.

On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff Michelle Provost-Sierks filed an action against Defendants PRN Ambulance, LLC and Fidel Mojica alleging (1) sexual battery in violation of Civil Code section 1708.5; (2) gender violence in violation of Civil Code section 52.4; (3) violation of Ralphs Civil Rights Act; (4) assault; (5) battery; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent hiring, supervision, retention.

Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually assaulted by an EMT in an ambulance when she required transported from one hospital to another on November 10, 2018.

Discussion

Defendants seek an order granting summary adjudication of the following issues:

ISSUE 1: That Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Ralph Civil Rights Act (Violation of Civil Code Section 51.7) against these Defendants was untimely filed and thus lacks merit and fails to present any triable issues of material fact.

ISSUE 2: That Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Ralph Civil Rights Act (Violation of Civil Code Section 51.7) against these Defendants fails to state a viable cause of action and thus lacks merit and fails to present any triable issues of material fact.

Timeliness

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Ralph Civil Rights Act (Violation of Civil Code Section 51.7) is subject to the one-year statute of limitations, and is now barred as the incident occurred on November 10, 2018 and Plaintiff filed the action on November 4, 2020.

Defendants rely on Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744 to argue that the statute of limitations period is one year for claims brought under the Ralph Act. Defendants state: “While Gatto dealt with consideration of determining the statute of limitations for an Unruh claim, the Court identified the Ralph Act to carry the same one-year as the Unruh Act.” (Mot. p. 4:24-26.) Defendants also cite West Shield Investigations and Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal App. 4th 935, where the court held that Unruh Civil Rights Act Claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations, without regard to the nature of the liability sought to be imposed under that Act, such that the one-year personal injury statute was deemed to be the applicable statute of limitations. Gatto relied on West Shield which applied the one-year statute of limitations to causes of action “that evolved from the common law” and “the three-year statute … to others.” (Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Defendants argue that the consensus in California is that the deadline to file a Complaint under the Ralph Act is one year after the “hate crime” victim learns of the perpetrator’s identity, as long as it is no more than three years after the victim was injured. Defendants assert that the cause of action is rooted in common law as an anti-discrimination law, similar to the principle of the Unruh Act.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action under Civil Code section 51.7 is two years pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, which took effect on January 1, 2003 and extended the limitations period for personal injury suits to two years. Plaintiff claims that Gatto does not apply because it was decided before section 335.1 was enacted. Since she filed her complaint on November 4, 2020, two years after her sexual assault on November 10, 2018, she claims her claim is timely.

In reply, Defendants argue that the two-year statute of limitations does not apply because this cause of action under Civil Code section 51.7 falls under a hate crime and is distinguishable from assaults, batteries, or injuries or death caused by wrongful acts or negligence that would normally fall within the two-year statute of limitations. Defendants point to the Directions for Use of CACI Jury Instruction 3063 Acts of Violence – Ralph Act – Essential Factual Elements Civil Code Section 51.7 which describes acts of violence in response to a perceived protected class: “Under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive…”

First, the Court finds that Defendants misstate Gatto’s application of defining the statute of limitations to claims brought under the Ralph Act. Defendants fail to point out where “the Court identified the Ralph Act to carry the same one-year as the Unruh Act.” (Mot. p. 4:24-26.) In fact, this interpretation is unsupported as explained by another court: “ Although the Gatto court does not unequivocally hold that sections 51.7 and 52.1 are not part of the Unruh Act, we are not so reserved: We conclude neither section is part of a properly denominated Unruh Act.” (Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1451.) “Although the Ralph Act and the Unruh Act are codified near each other in the Civ.Code, and both share the same remedy statute, Civ.Code, § 52, there are significant differences between them. The Ralph Act focuses on violence or intimidation by threat of violence, while those concepts are absent in the Unruh Act. The Unruh Act, Civ.Code, § 51, is a public accommodations statute that focuses on discriminatory behavior by business establishments, while the Ralph Act has nothing to do with public accommodations or business establishments.” (Id. at 1452.) Thus, Gatto fails to establish the statutory time frame for bringing claims under the Ralph Act.

Second, although Defendants attempt to distinguish this claim from personal injury suits with two-year statute of limitations, Defendants fail to prove that the one-year statute of limitations would apply. Defendants only rely on cases which contemplated whether “a one-year (personal injuries) or three-year (liability founded on a statute) statute of limitations applied to claims under [the Unruh Act].” (Stamps, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1453; see also WestShield Investigations and Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court (2002) 82 Cal.App.4th 935; Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 744.) Since Defendants claim that the Ralph Act carries the same one-year limitations as the Unruh Act, their argument hinges on the following: “ ‘[t]he Unruh [Civil Rights] Act seeks to protect against personal injury. Thus a one-year statute of limitations period must be applied to plaintiff's Unruh [Civil Rights] Act claim.’ [Citation.]” (Gatto, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 755.) Even though Gatto does not specifically apply to Ralph Act claims, for purposes of determining the limitations period, the Court finds that the limitations period may be determined by the statutory time frame for personal injury suits. The alternative would be the three year statute of limitations, which would still make this claim timely. Further, Defendants fail to adequately explain how the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, which extended the limitations period for personal injury suits does not change the holding in Gatto. Thus, the Court finds that the third cause of action is timely.

Sufficiency

Defendants argue that there are insufficient facts to support a cause of action under the Ralph Civil Rights Act. In the case at hand, Plaintiff testified under oath in her deposition as to the details of the events that transpired from the moment she first met Defendant Mojica at the time she was being picked up from the hospital for medical transport until the time she was effectively transported to the receiving hospital and she last saw Mojica. (See Provost-Sierks Depo.) Plaintiff testified that Mojica assisted her onto the gurney and not the ambulance; Defendant was seated next to her in the back of the ambulance; Mojica told her that he was studying to be a nurse and that he liked his job; Mojica inquired of her as to her recent history of hives; Mojica examined her and wrote notes onto his clipboard; Mojica asked her to bend her legs at the knee; Mojica inserted a finger into her vagina; Mojica removed his finger and used it to rub her clitoris; Mojica did not say anything during this alleged assault; Mojica remained seated at all times during the alleged assault; Plaintiff closed her legs and Mojica stopped the activity; Mojica advised Plaintiff that they were arriving soon to the receiving hospital; Plaintiff was removed from the ambulance by Mojica and wheeled by way of the gurney into the receiving hospital; thereafter Mojica left. Defendants argue that these facts fail to show that there was a violent act of threat or harm or a discriminatory nature that was the driving force of the alleged act of Mojica.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the evidence shows that Plaintiff was sexually violated by Mojica, which supports a cause of action under the Ralph Act. Plaintiff argues that her allegations constitute an act of violence because he used physical force as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. Plaintiff states “the unwanted penetration of a woman's vagina amounts to a much more severe act than a simple slap. There was some physical force necessary to penetrate Ms. Sierks' vagina. The unwanted act caused emotional injury and damage and constituted abuse.” (Opp. p. 4:22-26.)

In reply, Defendants argue that the Ralph Act was created as an “anti hate” statute to protect against violence against persons based upon discriminatory attitudes, and that the evidence does not support such a cause of action in this case.

Civil Code section 51.7 states, "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics." (Civ. Code, § 51.7(a).) Section 51 characteristics include sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status. (Id., § 51(a).) To plead a claim for violation of section 51.7, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff's protected characteristic; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. (See Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 880-81.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations and deposition testimony are sufficient to show that Mojica committed violence against Plaintiff on account of her sex. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-36, Provost-Sierks Depo.) Defendants fail to satisfy their burden in showing that no reasonable person would feel that Mojica committed violence or threatened violence standing in Plaintiff’s shoes.

Thus, the Court DENIES summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for Violation of Ralph Civil Rights Act.