Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 21NWCV00144, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 21NWCV00144, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21NWCV00144 Hearing Date: March 26, 2024 Dept: C

Henry Aguila vs Joseph Shabani, et al.

Case No.: 21NWCV00144

Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 @ 10:30 AM

Tentative Ruling

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is MOOT.

Defendants to give notice.

Background

Plaintiff Henry Aguila (“Aguila”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants Joseph Shabani, Kamyar D. Shabani, Mercury Bowl, LLC, Green Rivera LLC, Optimus Properties, LLC and Pico Rivera Holdings LVT, LLC (“Defendants”). The operative Second Amended Complaint alleged: 1) Interference with Prospective Advantage, 2) Negligence, 3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 4) Breach of Contract. Defendants’ demurrer to the first and third causes of action were sustained without leave to amend. All that remains is the second cause of action for Negligence and the fourth cause of action for Breach of Contract.

It is undisputed that on February 13, 2006, Pico Rivera Plaza Co., LP and Thee Aguila, Inc. (“TAI”) entered into a reciprocal easement agreement (“REA”). (SS, ¶1.) The two properties subject to the REA are commonly known as 8825 Washington Boulevard in Pico Rivera, California (the “Property”) and 8909-8917 Washington Boulevard in Pico Rivera, California. (SS, ¶2.) TAI defaulted on its loan secured by a deed of trust on the Property and its lender, Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP, ("Pico Rivera") foreclosed on the Property in 2017. (SS, ¶3.) Pico Rivera subsequently sold the Property to Defendants Mercury Bowl, LLC, and Green Rivera, LLC with the grant deed transferring the Property to Mercury Bowl, LLC and Green Rivera, LLC recorded on November 20, 2019. (SS, ¶4.) Plaintiff disputes the validity of the sale and contends that on June 1, 2020, Plaintiff Henry Aguila entered into a 50-year lease for the Property listing TAI as Landlord and Plaintiff as the tenant. (SSO, ¶5.) Defendants contend that as of June 1, 2020, TAI did not own the Property. (SS ¶6.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue, among other grounds.

Evidentiary Objections and Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice:

The Court rules on Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice as follows:

A. Reciprocal Easement Agreement dated February 13, 2006 and recorded on October 16, 2007 is GRANTED.

B. Notice of Default, recorded on August 7, 2017; Los Angeles Recorders’ Office, Document No. 20170887852 is GRANTED.

C. Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded on December 7, 2017; Los Angeles Recorders’ Office, Document No. 20171421322 is GRANTED.

D. Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (Correction) recorded on January 10, 2018; Los Angeles Recorders’ Office, Document No. 20180030074 is GRANTED.

E. Grant Deed recorded on November 20, 2019; Los Angeles Recorders’ Office, Document No. 20191268709 is GRANTED.

F. The Court of Appeal, State of California, Second District, Division Six unpublished decision in Aguila v. Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP, 2d Civ. No. B323391 (October 16, 2023) is GRANTED.

G. The Order designating Henry Aguila as a vexatious litigant in Aguila v. Shabani, Los Angeles Superior Court, Southeast District/Norwalk Court, Case No. 21NWCV00144 (July 25, 2023); Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP’s Prefiling Order – Vexatious Litigant, Aguila v. First American Title Ins. Co., Santa Barbara Superior Court, Anacapa Division, Case No. 23CV00204 (July 5, 2023). is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections:

The Court rules as follows to Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections. Objection No. 1 is SUSTAINED. Objection No. 2 is SUSTAINED.

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections:

The Court rules as follows to Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections. Objection Regarding Paragraphs 4, 7, 9 are SUSTAINED. Objections Regarding Paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 are OVERRULED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Discussion

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit because he was not a party to the 2006 reciprocal easement agreement which Plaintiff accuses Defendants of violating. “Someone who is not a party to [a] contract has no standing to enforce the contract.” (Gantman v. United Pac. Ins. Co., (1991) 232 Cal. App. 3d 1560, 1566.) “Because a corporation exists as a separate legal entity, the shareholders have no direct cause of action or right of recovery against those who have harmed it.” (Grosset v. Wenaas, (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1100, 1108 (2008).) This is true even where the injured shareholder is the sole shareholder. (Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1811, 1815.) It is undisputed that the REA was between Pico Rivera Plaza Co., LP and TAI. (SS, ¶1.) As such, Defendants have made a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that on June 1, 2020, he acquired a leasehold interest in the Property by entering into a 50-year lease with TAI, intending to run the Property as an entertainment venue, and thus binding him to the terms of the REA. However, it is undisputed that TAI defaulted on its loan and the lender foreclosed on the Property in 2017, three years before Plaintiff claims he entered into a 50-year lease with TAI. (SS, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff further argues that the sale of the property to Defendants was conducted in violation of a Bankruptcy Court stay. However, this argument has already been rejected by the Court of Appeal. (Aguila v. Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP, 2d Civ. No. B323391, Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. F, pp. 5-6, 12-14). Since TAI was incapable of providing lease rights to Plaintiff in 2020, the lease could not bind Plaintiff to the terms of the REA. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to make a valid claim against Defendants.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.