Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 21STCV11698, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV11698    Hearing Date: November 6, 2024    Dept: C

John G.Z. Doe #1, et al. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.

CASE NO.:  21STCV11698

HEARING:  11/06/24

 

#2

TENTATIVE ORDER

 

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Pitchess Motion is CONTINUED to April 1, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C as set forth below. 

 

Moving party to give notice.

 

This action arises out of childhood sexual abuse claims under the California Child Victims Act.

 

The facts, as alleged, are as follows: In the mid-1980s, John G.Z. Doe #1 (John G.Z.) and John R.Z. Doe #2 (John R.Z.), (collectively Plaintiffs), were students at Gage Middle School. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.) Eriberto “Eddie” Garcia (Garcia) was their dance teacher at Gage Middle School. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.) Garcia “groomed” Plaintiffs in order to gain Plaintiffs’ trust and friendship which resulted in Garcia sexually abusing Plaintiffs. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.)

 

Shortly after Garcia sexually abused John G.Z., John G.Z reported Garcia to a school counselor, Mr. Barcelo, and the school’s female dance coordinator. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Neither Mr. Barcelo nor the female dance teacher did anything to address John G.Z.’s report, and John G.Z. was told he was not believed. (Ibid.) Garcia continued to work for Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (the District) for at least another year. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Garcia abused “at least three other young boys that were a part of the dance group at Gage Middle School.” (Compl., ¶ 18.) John G.Z., John R.Z., and one other victim reported Garcia to the Huntington Park Police Department in the mid/late 1980s. (Ibid.) Thereafter, Garcia was arrested and charged. (Ibid.)

 

While the abuse occurred, teachers, staff, and administration at Los Angeles Unified School District chose to look the other way and allow Garcia to abuse Plaintiffs and other young boys. (Compl., ¶ 19.) Despite many red flags and complaints, Los Angeles Unified School District never reported Garcia to the police even though they were mandated reporters. (Ibid.)

 

          Procedural Background

 

Plaintiffs filed this action on March 26, 2021. At the time of filing this action, John G.Z. was 48 years old and John R.Z. was 50 years old. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-2.)

 

On May 18, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) naming Roe #1 (Los Angeles Unified School District) and Roe #2 (Edilberto “Eddie” Garcia).

 

On May 21, 2024, the District filed a Pitchess motion seeking disclosure of documents regarding John G.Z.’s employment and termination from the Los Angeles Police Department.

 

On October 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Pitchess Motion.

 

On October 30, 2024, the District filed a reply.

 

Legal Standard

 

A motion to discover a law enforcement officer’s personnel file or other police agency record that contains relevant information is called a Pitchess motion. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-540.) The statutory scheme governing Pitchess motions is outlined in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1047 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 (Mooc).) These statutes provide the exclusive means of discovery of such records in both criminal and civil proceedings. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1609-1610.) 

 

In general, the personnel records of peace officers are protected from discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. The exclusive means for obtaining these materials is through a Pitchess motion. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal. App. 3d 1605, 1611.) A Pitchess motion shall (1) identify the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the record, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard, (2) describe the type of records or information sought, and (3) present affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019; Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)

 

If the court finds “good cause” under Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b), section 1045 requires the court to examine the information in chambers to determine relevance. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b).)¿¿ 

 

 

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Pitchess Motion

 

Motion Requirements

 

As stated above, a Pitchess motion must identify the proceeding, the party seeking disclosure, the peace officer, the governmental agency having custody of the records, the time and place where the motion for disclosure will be heard, and a description of the type of records or information sought. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (b)(1)-(2).)

 

Here, Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s (the District) motion identifies the proceeding. (Notice of Motion, pp. 1-3.) The motion also identifies the party seeking the disclosure: the District. (Notice of Motion, p. 1.) The motion also identifies the governmental agency having custody of the records: City of Los Angeles Police Department (the LAPD). (Notice of Motion, p. 2.) The motion provides the time and place for the hearing. (Notice of Motion, p. 1.) Finally, the motion describes the type of records or information sought:

 

1.    Documents contained in the City of Los Angeles Police Department personnel file of John G.Z., including any interview transcripts, exhibits, and identification of witnesses.

2.    All records concerning disciplinary action taken against Plaintiff G.Z. for any reason that is retained in John G.Z.’s performance management/personnel file; and

3.    All documents concerning John G.Z.’s psychological evaluation.

4.    All documents concerning John G.Z.’s reasons for terminating his employment with LAPD.

 

(Notice of Motion, p. 2.)

 

Accordingly, the District’s motion has satisfied the requirements of section 1043, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2).

 

Good Cause

 

A Pitchess motion must be supported by affidavits showing good cause for the discovery. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)

 

Good cause is shown “first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the records or information at issue.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 [quoting Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).].)

 

          (1) Reasonable Belief

 

The affidavits of support must contain a “reasonable belief” that “the governmental agency has the ‘type’ of information sought.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 92.) “[A] showing of ‘reasonable belief’ does not require personal knowledge but may be premised upon a rational inference from known or reasonably assumed facts.” (Id. at p. 90.)

 

Here, the District’s counsel states that John G.Z.’s personnel file relating to his employment with the LAPD is “maintained by the city.” (Declaration of Elisa D’Egidio, Esq. [D’Egidio Decl.], ¶ 4.)

 

The Court finds the statement satisfies the “reasonable belief” requirement.

 

          (2) Materiality

 

“To determine whether the defendant has established good cause for in-chambers review of an officer’s personnel records, the trial court looks to whether the defendant has established the materiality of the requested information to the pending litigation.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) 

 

A sufficient threshold showing is established if the party seeking records demonstrates through affidavits a “plausible factual foundation” for how the records are material to the subject matter of the pending litigation. (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 655 [citing Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027.].) A plausible scenario is one that might or could have occurred. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1026.) In assessing the showing, “[t]he affiant’s credibility is not at issue; the trial court determines whether a plausible factual foundation has been established; it does not determine whether the moving party’s version of events is credible or persuasive.” (Riske, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.)

 

“The court does that through the following inquiry: [1] Has the defense shown a logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense? [2] Is the defense request for Pitchess discovery factually specific and tailored to support its claim of officer misconduct? [3] Will the requested Pitchess discovery support the proposed defense, or is it likely to lead to information that would support the proposed defense? [4] Under what theory would the requested information be admissible at trial? If defense counsel’s affidavit in support of the Pitchess motion adequately responds to these questions, and states upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records’ (§ 1043, subd. (b) (3)), then the defendant has shown good cause for discovery and in-chambers review of potentially relevant personnel records of the police officer accused of misconduct against the defendant.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027.) 

 

Here, the District argues that John Z.G.’s psychological evaluation and his reasons for leaving his position with the LAPD are essential to the District’s affirmative defenses including whether the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claims. (D’Egidio Decl., ¶ 4.) Additionally, the personnel records, psychological evaluation, and other employment documents are essential to determining with reasonable certainty Plaintiffs’ alleged damages for past and future loss of earnings and Plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate damages. (D’Egidio Decl., ¶ 5.) The District also states that the documents regarding the reasons behind John G.Z.’s choice to leave employment bear directly on John G.Z.’s credibility.  (D’Egidio Decl., ¶ 4.) Finally, the District states it will be prejudiced if the Court does not grant its motion because Defendant will be unable to properly defend itself. (Pitchess Motion, p. 9.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the grounds on which the District seeks these documents are invalid and irrelevant. First, Plaintiffs note that Civil Procedure Code section 340.1 expressly extends the statute of limitations to for filing childhood sexual abuse claims to three years after January 1, 2020. Because Plaintiffs filed this action in March 2021, these documents would not help the District’s statute of limitations defense. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the District really seeks these documents to find ways to attack John G.Z.’s character at trial which is not allowed under Evidence Code section 1101. Plaintiffs also argue that because the records the District seeks are over 20 years old, they should bear little weight on John Z.G.’s character. (Opposition, p. 5. [citing cf. People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 134 (holding under a prior version of Evidence Code § 1045 that a “court may not disclose complaints over five years old, conclusions drawn during an investigation, or facts so remote or irrelevant that their disclosure would be of little benefit”).].) Third, Plaintiffs argue the District’s document request is overbroad because the District seeks John G.Z.’s entire personnel file rather than just seeking documents relating to John G.Z.’s earnings or the cases involving the incidents that triggered John G.Z.’s memories. Finally, the District has not shown that the information sought is not readily obtainable from other means such as written interrogatories. (See Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 73.)

 

On this record, the Court finds that the District has failed to demonstrate good cause for in-chambers review of John G.Z.’s confidential LAPD personnel records.  The statements contained within the Declaration of Elisa D’Egidio are conclusory and lack factual support.  The declaration states, “[a]s set forth above and further outlined below, there is good cause for the production and use of the LAPD’s personnel file, psychological evaluation, and disciplinary records of G.A. and related documents in this matter.” (D’Egidio Decl., ¶4.) But no good cause is “set forth above” or “outlined below” in the declaration.  The District argues in Reply that “the crux” of its arguments is that “Plaintiff specifically testified that his career as a police officer came to an end because of the alleged wrongdoing underlying this action”. (Reply, p. 2:2-4.) However, this assertion is nowhere to be found in the Declaration of Elisa D’Egidio.  The declaration does not summarize the relevant portions of John G.Z.’s deposition testimony or include excerpts from it.  As such, the District has failed to demonstrate through affidavits a “plausible factual foundation” for how the records are material to the subject matter of the pending litigation. (Riske v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 655.)

 

In the exercise of discretion, the Court grants leave to the District to file and serve a Supplemental Declaration which sets forth a plausible factual foundation for the discovery sought.  The Pitchess Motion is CONTINUED to April 1, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C.  The District may file and serve a supplemental declaration/brief no later than nine court days before the new hearing date, and Plaintiff may file a supplemental opposition no later than five court days before the new hearing date.