Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case 21STCV24604 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 21STCV24604, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV24604 Hearing Date: April 4, 2023 Dept: C

SOLARES v. CITY OF NORWALK, et al.

CASE NO.: 21STCV24604 consolidated with 21STCV39337 and 21STCV14685

HEARING: 4/4/23 @ 10:30 AM

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Herman Weissker Power, Inc. [and Defendant Granados and Defendant Southern California Edison, by joinder]’s motion to oppose defendant Adriana Serrano’s application for determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED.

Moving Party HWP to give NOTICE.

Defendant Herman Weissker Power, Inc. [and Defendant Granados and Defendant Southern California Edison, by joinder] moves to challenge Defendant Serrano’s application for good faith determination pursuant to CCP § 877.6.

Procedural History

This is a consolidated action involving: 1) Carina Solares v. Lexie
Granados, et al. (Case No. 21STCV4604 – LEAD case); 2) Adriana Serrano v. Lexie Granados, et al. (Case No. 21STCV39337); and 3) Lexie Granados v. Adriana Serrano (Case No. 21STCV14685).

Plaintiff Solares was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Defendant Adriana Serrano when their vehicle collided with Defendant Lexie Granados at an intersection.

Plaintiff Solares’s original Complaint, filed on July 2, 2021, alleged that “[a]t approximately 11:08 p.m. on October 16, 2020, the traffic signals and surrounding street lights were suddenly shut off and failed to operate,” causing the collision.

On January 18, 2022, this court sustained Defendant City of Norwalk’s demurrer with leave to amend, ruling that the allegations fail to allege a dangerous condition. Plaintiff Solares argued extensively during that demurrer hearing that the City should be liable for shutting off the street lights. Not so. The Vehicle Code mandates that when approaching an intersection with no operative traffic lights, drivers are to treat it as a four-way stop:

The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection which has official traffic control signals that are inoperative shall stop at the intersection, and may proceed with caution when it is safe to do so. (Veh. Code § 21800(d)(1).)

Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187 explained, “A public entity does not create a dangerous condition on its property ‘merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs…’ If, on the other hand, the government installs traffic signals and invites the public to justifiably rely on them, liability will attach if the signals malfunction, confusing or misleading motorists, and causing an accident to occur. The reasoning behind this rule is that the government creates a dangerous condition and a trap when it operates traffic signals that, for example, direct motorists to "go" in all four directions of an intersection simultaneously, with predictable results… If a government turns off traffic signals entirely to avoid confusion, liability does not attach. ‘When the traffic lights are turned off, their defective condition can no longer mislead or misdirect the injured party.’ The same result obtains whether the traffic signals are extinguished by design or by accident.” (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1195.) “[W]hen the signals were extinguished during the power outage, the City did not invite the public to rely on the signals as a means of controlling the right-of-way at the intersection. The signals did not give a false indication to "go Rather, they gave no indication at all, and did not mislead or misdirect motorists. (Ibid.) The court continued, “motorists approaching the intersection were bound not by the City’s inoperative light, but by the provisions of the Vehicle Code, which effectively transform an inoperative signal light into a stop sign.” (Id.)

Plaintiff Solares then filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging for the first time that the vehicle that she was a passenger in (driven by Defendant Adriana Serrano), had entered the intersection on a green light, when suddenly the lights turned off, resulting in a collision. (FAC, ¶ 3.)

On July 5, 2022, this court again sustained Defendant City of Norwalk’s demurrer, ruling that the allegation that Plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection on a green light (FAC,¶ 3) was uncertain. “If Plaintiff is alleging that only her light was green and Granados’s light was red, then this theory fails. If Plaintiff was in the middle of the intersection on a green light, then Granados should have been stopped at the intersection on her red light. If the traffic signals suddenly shut off at the precise moment Plaintiff was in the middle of the intersection, then Granados, whose vehicle should have been stopped at a red light, “shall stop at the intersection, and may proceed with caution when it is safe to do so.” (Veh. Code § 21800(d)(1); see Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1348 - “Third party conduct, by itself, unrelated to the condition of the property, does not constitute a dangerous condition for which a public entity may be held liable.”) Such a scenario does not create a dangerous condition for which City is liable, and Plaintiff failed to cite any case authorities supporting this theory. Plaintiff’s claim therefore lies with Granados, and not the City.” The court granted leave to amend because Plaintiff argued in her opposition that “both Plaintiff and Ms. Granado’s vehicles had a green light, and those lights suddenly turned off.” (Opposition, 10:17-18.) “Based solely on the theory that the lights were malfunctioning by simultaneously lighting green for both drivers, a claim may lie against the City.” (7/5/22 Minute Order.)

On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, alleging that on October 16, 2020, at around 11:08 p.m., “Plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection of Alondra Boulevard and Pioneer Boulevard on a green light. At the same time, Granados’ vehicle entered the same intersection also on a green light.” (SAC, ¶ 1, 3.) “While both Plaintiff’s vehicle and Granados’ vehicle were in the intersection, the traffic signals and street lights at the intersection suddenly turned off, and a collision occurred between Plaintiff’s and Granados’ vehicle.” (Id., ¶ 4.) “The traffic signals and streetlights came back on around 11:38 p.m.” (Id., ¶ 5.) Based thereon, the SAC asserts causes of action for:

1. Negligence

2. Dangerous Condition

Good Faith Settlement

Plaintiff Solares was a passenger in Defendant Serrano’s vehicle. Solares has now settled with Defendant Serrano for $20,000.00, and seeks the court’s determination of good faith.

Defendants Herman Weissker Power, Inc. (“HWP”), Southern California Edison (“SCE”), and Lexie Granados oppose the settlement.

Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt may seek a judicial determination that a settlement was made in good faith; such a determination bars any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (CCP § 877.6 (a), (c)-(d).)

The intent and policies underlying § 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 498-501.)

Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. A defendant's settlement figure must not be “grossly disproportionate” to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof and should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a settlement made in good faith within the terms of CCP 877.6. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 498-501.)

A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (CCP § 877.6(c).)

As an initial matter, it is unclear to this court what Plaintiff Solares’s claim of damages are. Therefore, this court is unable to determine whether the $20,000 settlement is within the settling Defendant’s “ballpark” liability.

Further, this court ruled at the prior demurrer hearing that this action is only allowed to proceed against the City on the theory that the street lights were simultaneously green for both vehicles at the intersection. (7/5/22 Minute Order.) This theory also applies to newly added Defendants Herman Weissker Power, Inc. and Southern California Edison.

Plaintiff Solares (the passenger) and Defendant Serrano (the driver) testified that their vehicle entered the intersection on a green light, and the lights turned off when they were in the middle of the intersection. (Mendoza Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A, 28-30, 34-35, 50-51; Ex. B, 87-89, 91.)

The settling parties offer no evidence that both vehicles entered the intersection at a green light (i.e., the only theory that could hold City, HWP, and SCE liable), as alleged in the SAC at ¶ 3. If there was no malfunctioning light, then the collision was caused by driver error (either by Defendant Serrano or Defendant Granados, or both).

Contrary to Solare’s and Serrano’s testimonies, the traffic light was not green when Serrano entered the intersection at 11:08 pm. Moving Defendants submit documentary evidence of a report made at 10:30 pm - before any collision - that the lights were blinking red. (Dominguez Decl., Ex. 5, City of Norwalk’s Emergency Response Team Work Report, dated 10/16/20.) Then, the lights turned off completely at 11:05 pm. (Saiz and Yates Decls., ¶¶ 5-6, respectively; Dominguez Decl., Ex. 9, SCE meter readings.) Under either the Solares/Serrano scenario or the moving Defendants’ conflicting scenario, there is absolutely no evidence that the traffic lights were simultaneously green on both sides. (Police Report, pg. 7; Saiz and Yates Decls., ¶ 5 & 6, respectively; Dominguez Decl., Ex. 8, Granados responses to HWP’s Form Interrogatories, dated March 24, 2023.) Based on the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiff’s theory that the lights were simultaneously green at the time of the collision, City, HWP, and SCE’s proportionate liability are minimal.

By contrast, the settling parties’ proportionate liability is great. Plaintiff Solares was the only individual who was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the collision, and is the only party claiming injury. Neither Serrano nor Granados (the drivers of the vehicles) are claiming any injury in connection with this accident, and both drivers were wearing seatbelts. (Sur-Reply, 5:9-12.) Plaintiff Solares testified that she did not wear a seatbelt because she was busy conversing with Defendant Serrano. (Dominguez Decl., Ex. 4, 27:24-25, 28:1-2.) Thus, Plaintiff Solares’s proportionate liability is great, while City, HWP, and SCE’s proportionate liabilities are minimal.

Moreover, if the traffic light was blinking red or was completely turned off (and was not green as Solares/Serrano contends), then both Serrano and Granado should treat the intersection as a four-way stop. (Veh. Code § 21800(d)(1).) “When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at the same time, and the official traffic control signals for the intersection are inoperative, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on his or her immediate right.” (Veh. Code § 21800(d)(2).) It is undisputed that Serrano was traveling Eastbound on Alondra, and Granado was traveling Northbound on Pioneer. (Dominguez Decl., Ex. 1.) Serrano, as the driver on the left, should have yielded to Granado, the driver on the right. Therefore, under this scenario, Granado’s proportionate liability is minimal, and Serrano’s proportionate liability is great.

In addition, there is sufficient evidence before the court of the settlors’ collusion, at the expense of the other Defendants. Solares acknowledged that Serrano was “one of my close friends.” (Id., Ex. 4, 29:1-9.) Solares testified under oath that Serrano did NOT eat or drank anything while at Frida’s Restaurant and Buffalo Wild Wings. (Id., Ex. 4, 98:21-25, 99:1-3, 99:18-21, 107:25-108:1-3, 109:14-17.) However, Serrano contradicted Solares by stating that she arrived at Frida’s after work starving and consumed 8 oz Margarita (“drank the whole thing”) there at 6:30 p.m.; she further testified that she also ate at Buffalo Wild Wings again because she was hungry. (Id., Ex. 6, Serrano Resp. to FROGS 2.13, Ex. 3, Serrano Deposition, 14:16-18, 63:12-21, 17:22-25, 18:1-5.) Therefore, Serrano and Solares’ testimonies are inconsistent. Serrano’s testimony is also inconsistent with what she told the hospital staff after the collision when she refused to get blood tested. Serrano told the hospital staff that she “denies alcohol use. [Patient] now states that she is not want any testing, and would like to be discharged.” (Id., Ex. 10, Serrano Response to Norwalk RFP, pgs. 43-44.) However, Serrano admitted that she drank the “whole” 8 oz. margarita on the night of the incident.

Accordingly, based on the current evidence before the court, the court cannot find that the settlement was made in good faith.

Motion opposing the settlement is GRANTED.