Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00413, Date: 2023-03-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22NWCV00413 Hearing Date: March 9, 2023 Dept: C
SANDOVAL v. SANDOVAL
CASE NO.: 22HWCV00413
HEARING: 03/09/23
#10
TENTATIVE ORDER
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant MARIA SANDOVAL’s demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant
GLORIA SANDOVAL’s Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED
in part and SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend in part.
Moving Party to give notice.
This action for quiet title was filed by
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Maria Sandoval (“Cross-Defendant”) on May 26, 2022.
On September 9, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Gloria Sandoval (“Cross-Complainant”)
filed the subject Cross-Complaint (“XC”)
“Cross-Complainant is the daughter-in-law of
Cross-Defendant. Cross-Complainant was married to Cross-Defendant’s son,
Everardo Sandoval (“Decedent”), and remained married to him until his unfortunate
passing on January 30, 2022. (XC
¶4.) As Cross-Defendant and her late
husband had previously gifted real properties to each of their children upon
their marriages, she wished to provide the same gift to Decedent and
Cross-Complainant.” (XC ¶9.)
Cross-Complainant and Decedent were married on September 1, 2012. “[O]n September 12, 2012, Cross-Defendant
caused to be recorded… a Grant Deed, whereby Cross-Defendant … granted to
Decedent and Cross-Complainant sole ownership of the Property.” (XC ¶9.)
“Cross-Complainant… alleges, that during the time period in which the Property
has been owned by Decedent and Cross-Complainant, including through the present
date, Cross-Defendant has not issued payment for any expenses incurred by the
Property. Decedent and Cross-Complainant, and Cross-Complainant alone following
the death of Decedent, have issued all payments for liabilities incurred by the
Property without contribution from Cross-Defendants.” (XC ¶21.)
The XC asserts the following causes of action: (1) Quiet
Title; (2) Declaratory Relief; (3) Unjust Enrichment; (4) Fraud; (5) Promissory
Estoppel; and (6) Accounting.
Although not specifically stated in the Notice of Demurrer,
Cross-Defendant seemingly generally demurs to each cause of action. (See CCP
§430.60.)
Statute of Limitations
If it is shown that an action would otherwise be
time-barred, a plaintiff wishing to avoid the statute of limitations bar may
rely on the delayed discovery rule. Such a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving its application. (Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) “In order to rely on the discovery rule for
delayed accrual of a cause of action, a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its
face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule
must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and
(2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite a reasonable
diligence.” (Fox Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.)
In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court
places the burden on the plaintiff to “ ‘show diligence; ‘conclusory
allegations will not withstand demurrer.’” (Id.)
The face of the XC do not establish that Cross-Complainant’s
claims are necessarily barred by any statute of limitations. A determination of
such would require factual determinations inappropriately decided at the
demurrer stage.
First and Second Causes of Action – Quiet Title and
Declaratory Relief
The elements of an action to quiet tile are: (1) “the
plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land”; and (2) “the defendant
claims an interest therein adverse to [the plaintiff].” (South Shore Land
Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740-741.)
There are two
essential elements for declaratory relief: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory
relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating
to [plaintiff’s] rights or obligations.” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman
Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.) “Declaratory relief
operates prospectively only, rather than to redress past wrongs.” (Gafcon,
Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1404.) The
“actual controversy” requirement concerns the existence of present controversy
relating to the rights and legal duties of the respective parties pursuant to
contract, statute or order.” (see CCP §1060; see also Maguire v. Hibernia S.
& L. Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 728.)
Cross-Defendant does not argue that these claims are
specifically demurrable. Rather, Cross-Defendant argues that “[b]oth of these
causes of action seemed to be derivative of [other] causes of action…. Thus the
Court should consider demurring these causes of action as well.” (Dem. 6:4-7.)
Cross-Complainant has sufficiently alleged each element of
these causes of action. The demurrer to the first and second causes of action
is OVERRULED.
Third Cause of Action – Unjust Enrichment
Under the law of
restitution, an individual may be required to make restitution if he is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another's expense. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th
39, 51.)
There is a split of authority across the appellate courts regarding
whether unjust enrichment is a cause of action or a principle of law. Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 901, 911 and Melchior v.
New Line Prods., Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
779, 794 hold that unjust enrichment is a principle underlying various
doctrines and remedies, including quasi-contract. On the other hand, Hirsch v. Bank
of America (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 708, First Nationwide
Savings v. Perry (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, and Lectrodryer
v. Seoul Bank (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 723 view it as a separate
cause of action.
Regardless of whether
unjust enrichment is a cause of action or not, Plaintiff may still allege it as
a theory supporting the remedy of rescission.
A complaint may state multiple legal theories upon which recovery might
be predicated for one claim for relief.
(Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.
App. 4th 334, 351.)
Here, Cross-Complainant
alleges that Cross-Defendant would be liable for restitution to
Cross-Complainant if Cross-Defendant prevails in the suit: “In the event
that Cross-Complainant is not determined to be the legal owner of the Property,
Cross-Defendants will be unjustly enriched in the amounts that they have
acquired through fraudulent means.” (XC
¶31.) This argument is speculative
because, at this moment, Cross-Complainant retains ownership and possession of
the subject property. The demurrer to
the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.
Fourth Cause of Action – Fraud
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation cause of
action are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.” (Engalia v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th
951, 974.)
The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with
30 days leave to amend. As pled, Cross-Complainant does not allege the
requisite element of damages.
Fifth Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel
The elements of promissory
estoppel are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by
the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance must be both reasonable
and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting estoppel must be injured by his
reliance. (Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
411, 416; see also Smith v. City & County of San Francisco (1990)
225 Cal.App.3d 38, 48 [to allege promissory estoppel, pleadings must allege
facts demonstrating such reliance on promises, beyond just conclusory
allegations of reasonable reliance upon promises]; Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 218, 226 [agreement to work on a mortgage reinstatement
and loan modification was a “clear and unambiguous promise” and, in reliance,
plaintiff relinquished a legal right to stay foreclosure by filing
bankruptcy].)
The demurrer to the fifth cause
of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend. Damages as presently
alleged are speculative.
Sixth Cause of Action -
Accounting
Accounting is an independent cause of action in equity. (Teselle v.
McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 180.) A cause of action seeking an
accounting may be maintained when (1) a relationship exists between a plaintiff
and defendant that requires an accounting, and (2) some balance is due to the
plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. (Id. at 179.)
The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 30 days
leave to amend. Cross-Complainant has not adequately alleged facts to show the
existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between her and Cross-Defendant,
or that the balance allegedly due to Cross-Complainant is indeterminable
without an accounting.
The Motion to Strike is rendered MOOT by the Court’s ruling on the
Demurrer above.