Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 22NWCV00511, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00511, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00511 Hearing Date: August 23, 2023 Dept: C

Gutierrez v. General Motors

CASE NO.: 22NWCV00511

HEARING: 8/23/23 @ 10:30 AM

Plaintiff Antonio Gutierrez’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant’s PMK is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to his Requests for Production at Deposition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production, set one, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Plaintiff Antonio Gutierrez’s (Plaintiff) moves for an order to compel the deposition of Defendant General Motors LLC’s (Defendant) Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) with production of documents pursuant to CCP § 2025.280(a) and for an order compelling further responses to his Requests for Production, set one, pursuant to CCP § 2031.210(d).

Background

This lemon law action arising out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2021 GMC Sierra was filed on June 23, 2022.

Legal Standard

“Pursuant to CCP §2025.450, if after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action, without having served a valid objection, fails to appear for examination, or proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, the party giving notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document.” (CCP §2025.450(a).)

Discussion

Categories of Testimony

· Categories Nos. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 31 pertain to communications with Plaintiff and repurchase requests or warranty claims.

· Categories Nos. 6 and 7 pertain to communications regarding the vehicle.

· Category No. 9 pertains to the repair of the vehicle.

· Categories Nos. 11 and 14 pertain to investigation and analysis of the vehicle.

· Categories Nos. 16, 19-21, and 24-28 pertain to Defendant’s customer assistance number.

· Categories Nos. 17, 22, 23, and 29 pertain to Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures.

· Categories Nos. 18, 30, and 32-34 pertain to documents related to this case.

As to Categories Nos. 1, 3, 5-10, 12, 13, 18, and 30-34, Defendant has agreed to produce its PMK.

As to Categories Nos. 11 and 14, these categories are within the scope of discovery because they are particularized to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Thus, Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMK for Categories Nos. is granted.

As to Categories Nos. 16, 19-21, and 24-28, these categories are not within the scope of discovery because they are not relevant to the issues of this case. Here, the only cause of action in the pleadings is for violation of the Song-Beverly Act. The basis of Song-Beverly is that the Subject Vehicle had defects and nonconformities and (1) Defendant was not able to conform the Subject Vehicle to the applicable warranties within a reasonable and failed to replace the Subject Vehicle after a reasonable number of repair opportunities or make restitution; (2) Defendant failed to service or repair the Vehicle so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days; (3) Defendant failed to make available to its authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period; and (4) the Subject Vehicle was not suitable for its intended use due to the defects that manifested. The court fails to see how information relating to Defendant’s customer service number is relevant to this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMK for Categories Nos. 16, 19-21, and 24-28 is denied.

As to Categories Nos. 17, 22, 23, and 29, these categories are overbroad because they are not specific to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff’s request as to Defendant’s policies and procedures will be limited from the date the subject vehicle was purchased or leased to the date the lawsuit was filed. This ensures that the information provided is relevant to whether Defendant followed its policies and procedures as to repairing or repurchasing Plaintiff’s vehicle. Thus, Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMK for Categories Nos. 17, 22, 23, and 29 is granted with aforementioned limitation.

Request for Production

· Requests Nos. 1, 5, 7, and 8 seek documents regarding Plaintiff’s vehicle.

· Requests Nos. 2 and 12-15 seek documents related to Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures.

· Requests Nos. 3 and 4 seek documents related to communications regarding the repair of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

· Requests Nos. 6 and 10 seek documents related to repurchase requests.

· Request No. 9 seeks documents related the deponent’s job description.

· Request No. 11 seeks all documents relied upon in preparing for the deposition.

· Request No. 16 seeks all technical service bulletins applicable to Plaintiff’s vehicle.

· Request No. 17 seeks documents related to Defendant’s affirmative defenses.

As to Requests Nos. 1, 3-8, 10, 11, and 17, Defendant has produced documents responsive to these requests. Plaintiff, in his separate statement provides a copy and pasted response to each stating that Defendant’s objections are without merit. However, Plaintiff has been provided with documents and this Court is not convinced that compelling a further response will provide Plaintiff with any additional documents. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 1, 3-8, 10, 11, and 17 is denied.

As to Requests Nos. 2 and 12-15, these requests are overbroad because they are not particularized to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Information pertaining to other vehicles is not necessary for Plaintiff to prove his case. Additionally, such requests would be unduly burdensome on Defendant because compliance would involve searching numerous documents related to hundreds, if not thousands, of vehicles world-wide.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 is misplaced. While Donlen discusses admissibility of evidence, it does so in the context of a motion seeking a judgment not withstanding a verdict and a new trial, which were granted due to the trial court’s ruling on the defendant’s motions in limine. Further, Donlen does not address the underlying merits of a discovery request that would make it applicable to this current motion. Further, the motion in limines that were in question in Donlen were related to (1) the admittance of evidence showing a non-warranty repair on the plaintiff’s vehicle occurred and (2) evidence of other vehicles that had the same type of malfunction, which were included in the trial. However, unlike the case at hand, the evidence of other vehicles was an expert’s opinion where the expert contacted and the appellate court held that the evidence did not concern “simply other vehicles,” but that the testimony applied equally to the plaintiff’s vehicle. (See Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154-55.) Thus, Donlen is distinguished from the issue at hand which concerns the production of documents for hundreds, if not thousands, of vehicles worldwide at the discovery stage.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s reliance on Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 is misplaced. Doppes concerns a trial court’s decision to not impose terminating sanctions against a defendant for a misuse of the discovery process. The issue presented with the motor vehicle in Doppes was “an obnoxious odor in the interior.” (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971; see also id. at 972.) The causes of action to which discovery was needed were violation of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and fraud. (Id. at 971.) The appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to impose terminating sanction was an abuse of discretion in the context of the Doppes case which included four orders compelling the documents at issue, the discovery referee’s findings, defendant’s expert’s failure to state the truth at a Better Business Bureau hearing, defendant’s expert’s failure to be forthcoming in his deposition, the imposition of monetary sanctions, and requests for sanctions at trial. (Id. at 993-94.) The discovery abuse led to a default judgment against the defendant on the fraud cause of action only. (Id. at 996-97.) The Court notes that the number of files at issue in Doppes were 30-40 files. (Id. at 994.) The holding by the appellate court in Doppes makes clear that the issue of other vehicles concerns only the fraud cause of action. Further, as mentioned, ante, the wording of this request is broad enough to encompass vehicles of the same year, make, and model world-wide as opposed to 30-40 files. Thus, Doppes, too, is distinguished.

Finally, Santana’s discussion of the evidence used to support civil penalties does not extend to evidence of other vehicles as requested by Plaintiff. “Here, there was evidence to support a finding that Chrysler's ‘repair’ of the faulty fuel pump relay was intentionally inadequate during the warranty period.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 347.) Thus, Santana, is similarly distinguishable.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that evidence of defects in similar vehicles would support a finding of civil penalties, in that it would evidence that the alleged failure to repair or repurchase was “willful.” Plaintiff contends that widespread defects in similar vehicles would evidence that Defendant had knowledge that “such problems are common and that Plaintiff’s vehicle should be repurchased or replaced....” However, the issue in this case is whether Plaintiff’s vehicle was defective and whether Defendant failed to repair and repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle. Documents regarding other vehicles are not relevant to these issues. Thus, Requests Nos. 2 and 12-15 will be limited to policies and procedures for the year in which Plaintiff filed his complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 2 and 12-15 is granted in part with the one-year limitation.

As to Request No. 9, Plaintiff offers the same copy and pasted reason to compel further responses and offers no argument as to the relevance of the deponent’s job description to the issues of this case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Request No. 9 is denied.

As to Request No. 16, Defendant has produced a list a TSBs and offered to produce the TSBs Plaintiff contends are relevant to this case. The parties are ordered to meet and confer to narrow the list to those TSBs which pertain to defects Plaintiff alleges his vehicle suffered from. Thus, Plaintiff’s request to compel for further responses to Requests Nos. 16 is granted.

Request for Production, set one

· Requests Nos. 1 and 2 seek documents identified in Defendant’s responses to interrogatories.

· Request No. 3 seeks documents related to Defendant’s affirmative defenses.

· Requests Nos. 4-8 and 12-14 seek documents regarding Plaintiff’s vehicle.

· Requests Nos. 9 and 11 seek documents regarding communications with Plaintiff.

· Requests Nos. 16-28 and 37 seek documents related to Defendant’s lemon law policies and procedures.

· Requests Nos. 29-32 seek documents related to general lemon law statistics and policies.

· Requests Nos. 33-36 seek documents related to other vehicles.

As to Requests Nos. 1-8 and 10-14, Defendant has produced documents responsive to these requests. As to Request No. 9, Defendant represents that it does not have any responsive documents. Plaintiff, in his separate statement provides a copy and pasted responses to each stating that Defendant’s objections are without merit. However, Plaintiff has been provided with documents and this Court is not convinced that compelling a further response will provide Plaintiff with any additional documents. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 1-14 is denied.

As to Requests Nos. 16-28 and 37, these requests are overbroad because they are not particularized to Plaintiff’s vehicle, similar to the Requests Nos. 2 and 12-15 to the Requests for Production at Deposition. Thus, for the same reasons these Requests will be limited to policies and procedures for the year in which Plaintiff filed his complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 16-28 and 37 is granted in part with the one-year limitation.

As to Requests Nos. 29-32, these requests are not relevant to the issues of the case and seek only general information that cannot be particularized to information relevant to Plaintiff’s vehicle similar to Requests Nos. 16-28 and 37. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 29-32 is denied.

As to Requests Nos. 33-36, these requests are not relevant to the issues of this case because they only pertain to other vehicles and for the same reasons Doppes, Donlan, and Santana are not persuasive. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to compel further responses to Requests Nos. 33-36 are denied.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant’s PMK is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to his Requests for Production at Deposition are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production, set one, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. Defendant is ordered to provide available dates for its PMK(s) and further responses within 20 days of this order.