Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 22NWCV00547, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00547, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00547 Hearing Date: October 10, 2023 Dept: C

CASE NO.: 22NWCV00547

HEARING: 10/10/2023 @ 9:30 a.m.

TENTATIVE ORDER

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Response for Request for Production is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. No sanctions are ordered.

Moving Party to give notice.

Background

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiff Jorge Ruiz (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) and Does 1-10 alleging violations under the Song-Beverly Act by failing to repair Plaintiff’s 2017 Chevrolet Silverado vehicle (the “Vehicle”) and, among other things, the transmission defects (“Transmission Defects” and/or “Defects”) within a reasonable number of attempts, and by refusing to repurchase the vehicle despite its knowledge that the Subject Vehicle suffers from those defects.

On May 12, 2023, Plaintiff propounded Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, seeking documents relating to GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the defects. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 19, Ex. 5.)

On June 9, 2023, Defendant provided its responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production and verified those responses on June 30, 2023. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. 6.)

Plaintiff is unsatisfied by the responses as Defendant has not produced any internal investigation documents related to the Defects, any National Highway Traffic Safety Administration communications, or any emails/ESI documentation or executive reviews. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 24.)

On August 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production, Set One.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s October 3, 2023, evidentiary objections to Declaration of Defendant’s Counsel is overruled as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

Analysis

A. Meet and Confer Requirement

A motion¿to compel further responses to requests for production “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(2).)¿ The declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented in the motion.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.)¿

“The Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain 'an informal resolution of each issue.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This rule is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order....”

(McElhaney v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 285, 289.) “This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.)

On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff sent an initial meet-and-confer letter regarding, in Plaintiff's view, Defendant’s boilerplate objections, inadequate production of documents, and deficient responses. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 29, Ex. 9.) Plaintiff also sent a proposed Stipulated Protective Order to Defendant. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 29, Ex. 9.) On June 27, 2023, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter and stood by its objections to the RFP and stated that it would not supplement the majority of the responses to the RFP, would execute a Protective Order, and would not enter into Plaintiff’s proposed ESI Stipulation. (Randolph Decl., ¶ 31, Ex. 11.)

Both parties engaged in meet and confer conversations although they did not reach agreement. Therefore, the meet and confer requirement was met.

B. Separate Statement

A motion to compel further responses requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) Plaintiff properly filed separate statements.

C. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production.

CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that on receipt of a response to a request for production of documents, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses if:¿¿

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.¿¿

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.¿¿

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.¿¿

In responding to a demand for production of documents, a party must either provide one of the following: (1) a legally adequate statement of compliance; (2) a statement of inability to comply; or (3) an objection to the particular demand.¿ (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) If any objections are made, they must: (1) “[i]dentify with particularity any document … falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made”; and (2) “[s]et forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection.”¿ (Id., § 2031.240, subd. (b).)¿¿

To prevail, a party moving for an order compelling further responses to a document production demand must first offer facts demonstrating “good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.”¿ (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)¿ If “good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure.¿ (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)¿

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s responses are not code-compliant, as they are boilerplate and fall short of the required standards to respond separately to each item and identify with particularity any document to which an objection is being made. (CCP § 2031.210(a) and § 2031.240(b).) In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s responses fail to include statements of compliance. Further, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has waived its Objections relating to ESI, because it does not identify the types or categories of ESI sources that are not reasonably accessible.

In Opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has submitted an inordinate amount of discovery requests, because it has submitted 178 requests total. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff seeks documents that have already been produced or are equally available. Defendant argues that the current requests are not about Plaintiff’s Vehicle, but about other vehicles and complaints from other consumers that are not relevant to the instant action. Defendant also argues that the meet and confer was not genuine as the one letter was insufficient to resolve the dispute and that the parties did not meet and confer after Defendant provided supplemental document on August 4, 2023. Defendant additionally expresses concerns over trade secrets and other proprietary information in the discovery being sought by Plaintiff. Defendant further contends that sanctions are unwarranted.

In Reply, Plaintiff points that Defendant has cited unpublished opinions contrary to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a). Plaintiff argues that the meet and confer did occur in good faith. Although Defendant argues that it has produced all relevant information, Defendant has failed to provide repair orders, work orders, technician time records, etc. and Defendant has “cherry-pick[ed] what it wants or does not want to produce.” (Reply, at pg. 4:28.) Plaintiff also contends that information regarding other vehicles is relevant to the instant action and that it has not produced relevant emails under the California Discovery Act for ESI.

General or boilerplate objections are improper and may not be indiscriminately raised to evade discovery obligations; see Korea Data Sys. Co. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1513, 1516 (1997) (noting that boilerplate objections “lack [] the specificity the statute mandates” and their use “may be sanctionable”). GM’s failure to provide adequate responses—and its refusal to explain the basis for its objections—evinces a lack of good faith; see Cembrook v. Super. Ct., 56 Cal.2d 423, 430 (1961) (objections to entire set of requests for admissions indicates a lack of good faith).

Request for Production Nos. 1, 3 and 7

These requests relate to the subject vehicle and are thus within the proper scope of discovery.

Request for Production Nos. 17, 23, 24, 25, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 ,45, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 91

These requests relate to GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the alleged “Transmission Defects” generally and in other customer’s vehicles. The Requests are overbroad as to scope because they seek documents related to vehicles outside of California. Vehicles of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff’s could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Defendant’s knowledge of defects like those experienced by Plaintiff and Defendant’s willful refusal to replace or repurchase the vehicle. Therefore, Defendant is ordered to provide further responses to these requests with the limitation that it shall produce responsive documents for California vehicles.

Request for Production Nos. 58, 59 and 68

These requests relate to GM’s warranty repair, document retention, customer calls, employee training, vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices, and vehicle recall policies, procedures and practices. Plaintiff’s Request No. 68 reads, “All LEMON LAW DOCUMENTS published by YOU and provided to YOUR employees, agents and representatives.” This request and vague and overbroad. Plaintiff’s requests as to Defendant’s policies and procedures will be limited to those published from the date of purchase to the filing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit because that information is relevant to whether Defendant followed its policies and procedures as to repairing or repurchasing Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Request for Production Nos. 76, 78 and 79

These requests relate to GM’s communications with governmental agencies and suppliers regarding the alleged defects in 2017 Chevrolet Silverado vehicles. The requests are vague and overbroad, and they seek information that is largely irrelevant to the pending litigation.

Request for Production No. 86

This request relates to Dealer Agreements and GM’s Financial Documents. This request is not within the proper scope of discovery because Plaintiff is not seeking punitive damages in this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs argue that defendant must produce Electronically Stored Information, but the cases cited by plaintiffs are non-binding District court cases. While the Code addresses situations where ESI is not readily accessible, none of the code sections impose additional discovery obligations on responding parties to search for documents beyond what is relevant and admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP § 2017.010.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Their Requests for Production is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. Defendant is to provide further responses within 20 days of this Order.

D. Sanctions.

Sanctions are mandatory against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §2030.300(d); CCP §2031.310(h).)

Given the overbreadth of certain discovery requests, the court finds that Defendant acted with substantial justification in opposing the motion. No sanctions are ordered.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Response for Request for Production is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. No sanctions are ordered.