Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00593, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00593    Hearing Date: November 13, 2024    Dept: C

CHAVEZ, et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC

CASE NO.:  22NWCV00593

HEARING:  11/13/24

#2

TENTATIVE ORDER

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED in the amount of $48,433.50 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND $7,753.06 COSTS for a total of $56,186.56.

Moving parties to give notice.

Background

This is a Song-Beverly action. On July 14, 2022, Plaintiffs Alexa Chavez and Mayra Ruth Picado (Plaintiffs) filed suit against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiffs alleged that on May 3, 2020, they purchased a 2020 Chevrolet Traverse (the Subject Vehicle). (Compl., ¶ 8.) The sale included express warranties under which Defendant undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs’ vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs also alleged that the Subject Vehicle had a series of defects and nonconformities. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Song-Beverly Act, including breaches of express and implied warranties.

On October 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement.

On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorney fees and costs. Defendant filed an untimely opposition at 3:59 p.m. on October 21, 2024. Plaintiffs filed a reply on October 22, 2024. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental reply on October 29, 2024.

Analysis

Plaintiffs move for $63,076.06 in attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Plaintiffs’ request is comprised of (i) a lodestar of $19,379.50, (ii) costs of $7,753.06, and (iii) anticipated fees for the reply and hearing on the motion of $35,943.50.

A motion for attorney’s fees must be filed and served within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Cal. Rules of Court Rule 8.822. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1702(a).) Cal. Rules of Court Rule 8.822 states that an attorney’s fees motion must be filed within either (1) 30 days after the trial court clerk served the party filing the motion with notice of entry of judgment; or (2) 90 days after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court 8.822(1).) The Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs was timely filed the day after judgment was entered.

          Legal Standard

Attorney’s fees under a 998 offer may be awarded pursuant to the contractual grounds for such an award. (Linton v. County of Contra Costa (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 628, 635 [citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)].) The fees awarded are based on the parties’ agreement, which is determined by general contract principals. (Id. at p. 636.) First, the Court looks at the plain meaning of the entire agreement’s language. (Ibid.; see ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1785 [“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other”].)

Here, the parties’ 998 offer includes a provision for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. (Declaration of Larry Castruita [Castruita Decl.], Exh. A – Offer to Compromise, filed 10/10/23, ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs move for $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees “‘is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].’” (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the “time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿(1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

If the buyer is the prevailing party, the court should allow the buyer to “to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action, as the party with the net monetary recovery. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

A court may “reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”¿¿(Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Id.¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be “reasonably specific” and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. (Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿(2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) 

Attorney’s Fees

A calculation of attorneys’ fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the “lodestar” approach, under which the court fixes the lodestar at “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005; see also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322 [“‘starting point of every fee award … must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in terms of the time he has expended on the case.’”].) “California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Ibid.) “‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’” (Id. at p. 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) 

“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So, trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” (Fox v. Vice (2011) 563 U.S. 826, 838.)

Here, the court has considered the declarations of Kevin Jacobson and Larry Castruita, submitted in support of the motion, along with the other papers filed in support of the motion. The court also considered opposing papers and the declaration of Cameron Major. With respect to the hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the court concludes that some reduction of both hours and billing rates is warranted.

Hourly Rates

In assessing the reasonableness of hourly billing rates,¿“the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.”¿¿(569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.¿(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437; see¿Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 272 [“‘a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors…[including] the level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case’”].)¿

Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ time records reflect hourly rates ranging from $250 to $595. Of note is that Plaintiffs engaged Quill and Arrow LLP as primary counsel from 2022 until 2023. Beginning September 2023,[1] Plaintiffs engaged Castruita Law Firm to serve as lead co-counsel in this case. (Declaration of Larry Castruita, ¶ 6.)

With respect to billing rates, the court reduces Matthew Treybig’s hourly rate down to $395.00. Mr. Treybig passed the bar in 2021. While Mr. Treybig has practiced for three years, the court concludes that $425.00, based on Ms. Tirmizi’s experience is unreasonable. In so concluding, the court notes the hourly rate of Mr. Yowarski, also barred in 2021.

The approved rates are as follows:

          Reasonableness of Expenditures

The court does not find that, for a Song-Beverly Act case, Plaintiff’s counsel overstaffed this case. The court’s inquiry is whether expenditures were unreasonable because they were duplicative or unnecessary. Certain entries that reflect issues arising from block billing are reduced, also discussed below. The court makes the following adjustments to the hours for which Plaintiff seeks compensation:

Based on these adjustments the court reduces Quill and Arrow’s requested lodestar of $19,379.50 to $16,660.50, laid out as follows:

Based on these adjustments the court reduces Castruita Law Firm’s requested lodestar of $35,943.50 to $31,773.00, laid out as follows:

          TOTAL ATTORNEY’S FEES: $48,433.50

Costs and Expenses

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk . . . The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700, subd. (a) (1) [emphasis added].)

Under the law, the court presumes a verified memorandum of costs is correct. However, a party may contest the costs that a prevailing party seeks. (Code Civ. Proc., §1034 subd. (a).) The challenging party has the burden of demonstrating that those costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486

Here, Plaintiffs seek a total of $7,753.06 in costs. (Declaration of Kevin Jacobson, Exh. 10 - Memorandum of Costs, at pp. 22-27; Declaration of Larry Castruita, ¶ 38.)

Defendant opposes the requests on the grounds that the motion practice in this case was one-sided. Defendant claims Plaintiffs’ filing fees ($14.31) and subpoena fees ($324.30) were optional and unnecessary because this case did not go to trial. (Opposition, p. 15:12-19.) Next Defendant argues the $93.75 in courtesy copy and photocopy fees were unnecessary and excessive. (Id. at p. 15:20-22.) Plaintiffs’ convenience fees ($82.81) for One Legal are also excessive because the costs were not reasonable to litigation and One Legal already waived several of these charges. (Id. at p. 15:23-26.) Defendant challenges travel fees totaling $46.16 because traveling is an inherent cost of doing business. (Id. at p. 15:27-28.) Finally, Defendant states it should not have to reimburse Plaintiffs for $1,866.55 in deposition transcripts because it was an optional cost, and Plaintiffs’ case never advanced to trial.

In reply, Plaintiffs argue all their costs are recoverable because the Legislature intended to include the prevailing party’s “costs and expenses,” including fees for expert witnesses, under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Reply, p. 10:3-12 [citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.].)

The court finds that Plaintiffs’ costs memorandum is proper and that Plaintiffs’ costs and expenses are not unnecessary or excessive.

TOTAL COSTS: $7,753.06.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs Alex Chavez and Mayra Ruth Picado’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $48,433.50 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND $7,753.06 COSTS for a total of $56,186.56.