Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case 22NWCV00652 2023-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00652, Date: 2023-02-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00652 Hearing Date: February 28, 2023 Dept: C

GODOY v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.

CASE NO.: 22NWCV00652

HEARING: 2/28/23 @ 10:30 AM

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the action pending arbitration is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff Roberto Rivera’s complaint is severed from Ana Barrera’s complaint, and Rivera is ordered to arbitration. The action is STAYED pending arbitration.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”) moves to compel arbitration pursuant to CCP § 1281.2.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. (Cal. Ev. Code § 452.)

Objections to the Declaration of Jacqueline Lee are OVERRULED. Defendant may meet its initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement bearing the opposing party’s signature. “[A]s a preliminary matter the [trial] court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity. [Citations Omitted.]” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058.)

Except for specifically enumerated exceptions, the court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate a controversy if the court finds that a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (See CCP §1281.2.) “In California, [g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420.) “A petition to compel arbitration or stay proceedings pursuant to CCP §§1281.1 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (CRC Rule 3.1330.)

The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Engalia v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951.)

This is a lemon law action. Plaintiffs Roberto Rivera Godoy aka Roberto Rivera and Ana Barrera allege that Nissan is the vehicle manufacturer. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Arbitration Agreement at issue was signed by Plaintiff and the selling dealership — Downey Nissan. (Polyakov Decl., Ex. 1, Retail Sales Installment Contract (“RISC”).) The Agreement states in pertinent part, “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise… between you and us or our employees, agents successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by court actions.” (Id.)

It is undisputed that Nissan is not a signatory to the RISC containing the Agreement.

As a general rule, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement. (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613.) However, the equitable estoppel exception may enable a non-signatory party such as the vehicle manufacturer to invoke an agreement to arbitrate. (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-37.) A plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in a contract where he or she relies on contract terms in acclaim against a non-signatory defendant, and when the causes of action against the non-signatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations that are subject to the arbitration clause. (Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271.) Applying these principles, the Third District recently affirmed a trial court’s granting of an order compelling SBA plaintiffs to arbitrate their claim against a manufacturer even though the manufacturer was not a party or signatory to the sales contract that contained the arbitration provision. (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 493.) In Felisilda, the sales contract provided that “[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise ... between you and us ... which arises out of or relates to ... [the] condition of this vehicle ... shall ... be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.” (Italics added.) There was no dispute that the Felisildas’ refund-or-replace claim against the manufacturer under the SBA related directly to the condition of the vehicle, because the suit alleged the existence of nonconformities covered by the express warranty that the selling dealer did not remedy after a reasonable number of attempts to repair.

Relying on Felisilda, Nissan argues that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out the purchase of the subject vehicle that form the basis of the RISC, and thus, that it may enforce the Arbitration Agreement in the RISC under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Nissan may not compel arbitration because it did not establish that such an arbitration agreement exists. The Plaintiff’s name was redacted from the agreement attached as Ex. 1 to Polyakov’s declaration.

Prior to this hearing, Nissan submitted the unredacted copy of the Contract, which indicates that the Buyer is “Roberto Rivera.” The court finds that Roberto Rivera Godoy aka Roberto Rivera did sign the agreement that contains the arbitration provision.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff Roberto Rivera’s complaint is severed from Ana Barrera’s complaint, and Rivera is ordered to arbitration. The action is STAYED pending arbitration.