Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00656, Date: 2024-02-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22NWCV00656 Hearing Date: February 14, 2024 Dept: C
m.g. v. montebello
unified school district
CASE NO.: 22NWCV00656
HEARING: 2/14/24 @ 9:30 AM
#2
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is DENIED.
Moving Party to give NOTICE.
Defendant Montebello Unified School District
(Defendant) moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiff M.G.’s
(Plaintiff) claims against Defendant are barred by the California Constitution.
Plaintiff
alleges he was sexually assaulted by his teacher, Frederick David Johnson while
he was a student at Bell Gardens High School during the 1990-1991 school year.
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Assembly Bill 218 (AB
218), for:
1.
Negligence
(against Defendant)
2.
Negligence
(against DOES 2-25)
3.
Negligent
Hiring (against Defendant)
4.
Negligent
Hiring (against DOES 2-25)
Defendant
filed a Cross-Complaint against Frederick David Johnson for Total Indemnity,
Partial Indemnity, and Declaratory Relief. Default against Johnson was entered
on November 2, 2023.
Request
for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff’s
Requests for Judicial Notice Nos. 1-12 are granted under Evidence Code § 452.
Legal
Standard
The standard for ruling
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that
applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings,
together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum v. California
Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) “A demurrer tests the
sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law; as such, it raises only a
question of law.” (Osornio v. Weingarten (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 304,
316.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the complainant’s allegations must
be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb
Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) However,
the Court does not need to assume the truth of “contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2
Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Discussion
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings
on the ground that Plaintiff failed to present a timely government claim as a
predicate to filing the lawsuit. Defendant
argues that the Legislature’s retroactive elimination of the government claim
requirement for child sexual-abuse cases violates the State’s
Constitution.
In 2019, the Legislature passed AB 218, which
amended CCP § 340.1 by authorizing a three-year window within which claims of
childhood sexual abuse were revived, regardless of how long ago the abuse
occurred. (See CCP § 340.1 (q).) AB 218 also amended Government Code § 905
to retroactively remove the timely claim requirement for claims “made pursuant
to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages
suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.” (See Gov. Code, § 905
(m).)
Defendant argues that AB 218 violates the State’s
Constitution because it creates a private gift of public funds by retroactively
stripping the statutory protection under Government Code section 905. The State
Constitution “forbids the legislature from making any gift of public money or
other thing of value to any person,” thus the Legislature “has no power to
create a liability against the state for any such past act of negligence upon
the part of its officers.” (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690,
693.) More specifically, the Legislature cannot create a liability against the
State “for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or
employees” where doing so “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.” (Heron
v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) In this context, the term “gift”
includes “‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no
authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable
obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
431, 450, quoting Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17,
21-22 (Conlin).) “In determining whether an appropriation of public
money is to be considered a gift within the constitutional prohibition, the
primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a private
purpose. If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift
even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.” (County
of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-877.)
Defendant cites a line of cases where the
Supreme Court held that the Legislature’s appropriation of public funds to
specific persons were unconstitutional. See Bourn v. Hart (1982) 93 Cal.
321, 326-328 (legislative appropriation of $10,000 to specific individual for
injuries sustained due to public entity employer's negligence was impermissible
gift because employer could not be sued for negligence at the time of injury); Conlin,
supra, 99 Cal. 17, 19-24 (legislative appropriation of payment to specific
individual for work performed on road improvements, for which the public entity
had no liability for under the subject contract, was impermissible gift).
“The rule is well established [] that if a
public purpose is served by the expenditure of public funds, article XIII,
section 25, is not violated even though there may be incidental benefits to
private persons.” (Board of Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) 45
Cal.App.3d 237, 243 (Dolan) (municipal authorization of low-interest
loans to finance residential rehabilitation in depressed residential areas was
not a gift even though the loans benefited private parties because
redevelopment and prevention of slums is valid public purpose).) The
determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for
the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long
as that determination has a reasonable basis. (County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746 (Carleson).)
Here, AB 218’s legislative history demonstrates
that the Legislature enacted the bill to expand access to justice for the
victims of childhood sexual assault as a means of preventing similar abuses by
future perpetrators. Noting that there “should not be a reasonable expectation
that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these
despicable past acts by individuals and entities[,]” the authors of AB 2018
expressly intended that the bill confront the pervasive problem of cover-ups in
institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing
victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. (Plaintiff’s RJN,
Ex. 12, p. 2.) AB 2018’s authors expressly intended that the bill serve “as an
effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect
the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.” (Plaintiff’s RJN,
Ex. 12, p. 2.)
AB 218’s legislative history demonstrates that
the Legislature enacted it to serve the public purpose of deterring future
sexual abuse against minor children, including in schools. The
Legislature’s determination that deterring future sexual abuse against minor
students is a worthy public purpose is properly a matter for the Legislature to
decide, and this Court shall not disturb such legislative discretion so long as
the Legislature appears to have had a reasonable basis for its
conclusions. (See Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 746; see also Dittus
v. Cranston (1959) 53 Cal.2d 284, 286 (invalidity of legislation must be
clear before it can be declared unconstitutional).)
Here, it is apparent from the legislative
history that a reasonable basis exists for the Legislature’s determination that
deterring childhood sexual abuse is a public purpose, and that AB 218 was
enacted to achieve that purpose. AB 218 does not constitute an
unconstitutional provision of a public gift to private individuals because the
expenditure of public funds serves the greater public purpose of deterring
childhood sexual abuse. (See Dolan, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d at p. 243.)
Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.