Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00942, Date: 2023-10-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22NWCV00942 Hearing Date: October 3, 2023 Dept: C
MEJIA v. GENERAL MOTORS
LLC
CASE
NO.: 22NWCV00942
HEARING:
10/3/23
#7
TENTATIVE RULING
I.
Defendant General
Motors LLC’s demurrer to the third cause of action for fraudulent inducement is
OVERRULED.
II.
Defendant General
Motors LLC’s motion to strike is DENIED.
Defendant
is ORDERED to file and serve its Answer within 10 days.
Opposing
Party to give NOTICE.
Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) demurs to the 4th cause
of action on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
Plaintiff Luis Oscar Guerrero Mejia alleges that on June 27, 2019,
Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado, having VIN No.:
1GCRWCED9KZ22025. (Complaint, ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff’s vehicle suffers from transmission defects. (Id., ¶ 13.) Based thereon, the Complaint
asserts causes of action for:
1.
Violation of Song-Beverly – Breach of Express Warranty
2.
Violation of Song-Beverly – Breach of Implied Warranty
3.
Violation of Song Beverly Act § 1793.2
4.
Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment
4th CAUSE OF ACTION
FRAUDULENT
INDUCEMENT - CONCEALMENT:
“Fraudulent
inducement is a viable tort claim under California law. ‘The elements of fraud
are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce
reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. Fraud in the
inducement is a subset of the tort of fraud. It ‘occurs when ‘the promisor
knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual assent is
present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of the fraud, is voidable.’”
(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828,
838-839.)
“Our
Supreme Court has described the necessary relationship giving rise to a duty to
disclose as a ‘transaction’ between the plaintiff and defendant ... .” (Bigler-Engler,
supra, Cal.App.5th at p. 311, emphasis added.) Such a transaction must
necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant;
it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Bigler-Engler,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312, emphasis added.)
In
transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause
of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three
instances: (1) “the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known to the plaintiff,” (2) “the defendant actively conceals a material fact
from the plaintiff,” and (3) “the defendant makes partial representations but
also suppresses some material facts.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311; see also LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)
“Each
of the three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be actionable presupposes
the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in
which a duty to disclose can arise.” (LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at
336-337; Wilkins v. Nat'l Broad. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1082-83
- affirming summary judgment on alleged omissions because plaintiffs “presented
no evidence that they and [defendants] shared the requisite relationship which
would impose ... a duty to disclose”]. “[S]uch
a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction
between the parties.” (LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 337; Kovich
v. Paseo Del Mar Homeowners Ass'n (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 863, 866-867 - no
duty to disclose where complaint alleged no facts that defendant “acted as a
seller, was a party to [a]contract, or assumed a special relationship” with
plaintiff.)
In
Dhital, “Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan
dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that
Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale
of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to
hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship
requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Dhital v. Nissan North
America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.) The court concluded that at
the pleading stage, these allegations sufficiently allege a relationship.
The
Selling Dealership and the Repairing Dealership are not party Defendants.
Instead, Plaintiffs assert warranty claims against the “manufacturer and/or
distributor,” GM. (SAC, ¶¶ 4, 85).
The
Fraudulent Concealment claim is alleged against GM based on concealments made
its “agents”. (Id., ¶ 120, 122.) ¶ 131-133 allege that GM concealed the issues
at the time of sale and at the time of repair. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff
first presented the vehicle for repairs on June 2021, August 2021, and July
2022 for issues relating to the Transmission Defects at GM’s authorized
dealership for repairs, and the dealership told Plaintiff that the vehicle
required no repairs and was operating normally.
(SAC, ¶¶ 63-65.)
Less
specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that
defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more
in the knowledge of opposing parties. (Alfaro v. Community Housing
Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1384-1385.)
Accordingly,
the general demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s
accompanying motion to strike the 4th cause of action and punitive
damages is DENIED. The court finds that the Complaint sufficiently pleads
malicious conduct by concealment. Corporate ratification is alleged at ¶ 16.
Less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that
defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more
in the knowledge of opposing parties. (Alfaro v. Community Housing
Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1384-1385; Bushell v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
915, 931.)