Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV00995, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22NWCV00995 Hearing Date: October 10, 2023 Dept: C
GUADALUPE REYES v.
DHILLON FOODS, INC. et al.
CASE NO.: 22NWCV00995
HEARING: 10/10/23 @
10:30 a.m.
#8
TENTATIVE ORDER
Defendant Dhillon Foods, Inc.’s Motion to Set Aside
Default is GRANTED. Defendant to answer
within 5 days.
Moving party to give notice.
On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff Guadalupe Reyes (“Plaintiff”)
filed a complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for: (1)
constructive discharge in violation of public policy; (2) disability and
gender/pregnancy based discrimination; (3) gender based harassment; (4)
retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment & Housing Act; (5) failure
to engage in interactive process; (6) failure to accommodate; (7) failure to
prevent, investigate, and/or remedy unlawful discrimination and retaliation;
(8) violation of pregnancy disability leave law; (9) interfering with the
rights and refusing an employee’s request for a CFRA Family Care Leave; (10)
retaliatory termination in violation of the CFRA for requesting and going on
leave; (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (12) unfair business
practices; and (13) declaratory relief. The complaint arises from alleged
wrongful actions against Plaintiff during her employment with Defendants.
On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a proof of service
indicating that the summons and complaint was served on Defendant Dhillon
Foods, Inc. by substituted service. The proof of service shows that the summons
and complaint were left with Aliandra Bogardi. On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff
requested entry of default against Defendant Dhillon Foods, Inc. and default
was entered on such date.
On May 8, 2023, Defendant Dhillon Foods, Inc. (“Moving
Defendant”) filed and served a motion to set aside default. The motion is
brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 473(b)
and 473(d) on the grounds that the default is void and the default was caused
by Moving Defendant’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Moving Defendant contends that: (1) relief from default is
appropriate because the default is void; and (2) relief from default is
appropriate because the default was caused by mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.
Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that: (1) Moving
Defendant’s claim that the default is void is false; (2) Moving Defendant has
not established good cause and the Court must not exercise its discretion in
granting the motion; and (3) the Court should award sanctions against Moving
Defendant and award Plaintiff her attorneys’ fees and costs.
On reply, Moving Defendant contends that: (1) there is no
dispute that the default is void; (2) the default was caused by mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; and (3) imposing a monetary
penalty against Moving Defendant is not justified.
Initially, the Court finds that Moving Defendant’s motion is
timely under California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 473(b). Moreover,
Moving Defendant has attached its proposed answer as Exhibit 3 to the
declaration of its counsel in support of the motion. Thus, the motion is
procedurally compliant.
Evidentiary Objections
The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections numbers
1 and 2 to the declaration of Yashdeep Singh (“Singh”) in support of Moving
Defendant’s motion as the statements are speculative. The Court OVERRULES
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection number 3 to the declaration of Singh in
support of Moving Defendant’s motion.
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections numbers
1-4 to the declaration of Priyha Dhillon (“Dillon”) in support of Moving
Defendant’s motion.
Motion to Set Aside Default
“The court may . . . relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. Application for this
relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed
to be filed therein.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
473(b).) A motion to set aside default must be made within a reasonable time,
and in no event, exceeding six months after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding was taken. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) “[T]he law favors a trial on the merits . . .
and therefore liberally construes section 473.”
(Bonzer v.
City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.) “Doubts in applying section 473 are resolved
in favor of the party seeking relief from default . . . and if that party has
moved promptly for default relief only slight evidence will justify an order
granting such relief.” (Id. at p. 1478.) The court, may, upon motion of the injured
party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders
as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void
judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d).) Where a party does not
understand the significance of legal expressions then entry of default is
properly set aside. (Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208.)
Issue No. 1: Failure to Serve a Statement of Damages
Moving Defendant contends that the default is void because
Plaintiff failed to serve a statement of damages prior to the entry of default.
In an action to recover damages for personal injury or
wrongful death, a plaintiff must serve a statement of damages on a defendant
prior to the entry of default. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11(c).) In a personal
injury action, a statement of damages is a prerequisite before any default
judgment can be entered. (Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 681, 689.) When a statement of damages is required but not served,
the underlying entry of default is invalid also and is subject to being set aside.
(Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1521.)
Initially, the Court finds that Moving Defendant’s reliance
on Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428 for the proposition
that this action is a personal injury action is inapposite. In Schwab, plaintiffs
filed a complaint against defendant for housing discrimination and damages. Plaintiffs
thereafter obtained default judgment against defendant without serving a
statement of damages. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default and
default judgment, which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal reversed the trial court order setting aside the default. The defendant
in Schwab then appealed such ruling to the Supreme Court of California. The
issue in Schwab was whether a default may be entered and judgment taken
where a notice of damages was not served on the defendant. In reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Schwab court held that the defendant
was entitled to receive a statement of damages prior to the entry of default
judgment. The Schwab court stated that, because the prayer for relief
included damages for mental and emotional distress, the action was therefore one
for recovery of actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful
death.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is not one
for wrongful death or personal injury. Unlike the complaint in Schwab,
the complaint in the instant action does not include a prayer for relief
containing damages for mental and emotional distress. Moreover, a review of the
complaint, shows that neither personal injury nor wrongful death is the crux of
the complaint. Here, Plaintiff is seeking relief for alleged wrongful actions
during her employment. This is not an action for personal injury or wrongful
death.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not required
to serve a statement of damages prior to entry of default.
Issue No. 2 Grounds for Relief Under CCP 473(b)
In support of the motion, Moving Defendant presents the
declaration of Dhillon, which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the declaration of
Singh. Dhillon, who is an officer of Moving Defendant, declares that: (1)
copies of a summons and complaint were delivered to Moving Defendant’s old
corporate offer on or about November 4, 2022 (Dhillon Decl., ¶ 2); (2) she
honestly believed that the documents served were related to a pending workers’
compensation claim against Moving Defendant that was also brought by Plaintiff
(Id.); (3) she later learned that the documents related to this civil
lawsuit brought by Plaintiff (Id.); (4) she expected documents and
communications relating to any civil lawsuit to be to be directed to its
counsel as Plaintiff’s counsel had already communicated with Moving Defendant’s
counsel regarding potential civil claims (Id.); and (5) therefore, she
did not know that Moving Defendant had a duty to respond in this case at the
time of the alleged service (Id.).
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel, Navid
Kanani (“Kanani”) sets forth correspondence efforts with Singh in 2021. (Kanani
Decl., ¶ 2.) Kanani also declares that default was requested due to several
months without any communication from Defendants or Singh (Id., ¶ 8),
and Moving Defendant was served at the address they hold themselves to the
public via the Secretary of State website (Id., ¶ 7).
Here, the Court finds that Moving Defendant has made a
showing of mistake and inadvertence to warrant relief from entry of default. The
declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to the motion does not rebut
Moving Defendant’s showing of mistake and inadvertence. Dhillon has declared
that Moving Defendant did not know the applicability of the served documents to
this action and expected documents to be directed to Moving Defendant’s
counsel. Moreover, Dhillon has stated that she did not know that Moving
Defendant had a duty to respond at the time of service.
Issue No. 3: Monetary Sanctions
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should award sanctions
against Moving Defendant and award Plaintiff her attorneys’ fees and costs.
Whenever the court
grants relief from default or default judgment based on any grounds in Code
Civ. Proc. § 473, the Court may: (1) impose a penalty of no greater than one
thousand dollars ($1,000) upon an offending attorney or party; (2) direct that
an offending party pay an amount no greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000)
to the State Bar Client Security Fund; or (3) grant other relief as is
appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc. §
473(c)(1)(A)-(C).)
As to the issue of
payment of reasonable compensatory fees and costs to Plaintiff, the Court finds
that such sanctions are inappropriate as Moving Defendant has made a proper
showing warranting relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 473. Moreover, the declaration of Plaintiff’s
counsel in opposition to the motion sets forth no facts showing counsel’s
hourly rate, time spent, or fees incurred opposing the motion. The Court
therefore exercises its discretion and declines to impose any sanctions against
Moving Defendant or its counsel pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 473(c).
Accordingly, exercising its discretion, the Court GRANTS
Moving Defendant’s motion to set aside the default entered against Moving
Defendant on February 6, 2023 pursuant to Bonzer
v. City of Huntington Park, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 1474. The Court
orders Moving Defendant to separately file its proposed answer with the Court
so that it becomes an operative answer in this action.