Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 22NWCV01077, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV01077, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV01077 Hearing Date: April 2, 2024 Dept: C

Jane Doe 7064, et al. vs Doe 1, et al.

Case No.: 22NWCV01077

Hearing Date: April 2, 2024 @ 9:30 AM

Tentative Ruling

Cross-Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s DEMURRER is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.

Cross-Defendant to give notice.

Background

This is a childhood sexual abuse action. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 7064, Jane Doe 7035, and Jane Doe 7063 allege they were sexually abused and assaulted by teacher Jeffrey Scott Jones while they were students at Bell High School between 1987 and 2001. On or about November 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, asserting two causes of action against Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) for negligence and negligent supervision/retention, and two causes of action against Mr. Jones for sexual battery and sexual harassment. On or about August 23, 2023, Mr. Jones filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint for Indemnity against LAUSD.

The nine-paragraph First Amended Cross-Complaint alleges that: (i) Mr. Jones was an employee of LAUSD as a teacher (First Amended Cross-Complaint [“FAXC”] ¶ 4); (ii) as an employee of LAUSD, Mr. Jones is entitled to a defense and to be indemnified at the expense of LAUSD pursuant to Labor Code section 2802 (FAXC ¶¶ 5-6); (iii) Mr. Jones tendered Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint to LAUSD requesting a defense (FAXC ¶ 7); and (iv) LAUSD has refused and continues to refuse to provide a defense to him, “requiring him to retain outside counsel incurring attorney fees and costs and other expenses that should be reimbursed to him.” (FAXC ¶ 8.)

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) demurs to the first cause of action of the First Amended Cross-Compliant of Jeffrey Scott Jones for Indemnity on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for indemnity against LAUSD. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).)

Legal Standard

“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.” (City of Chula Vista v. County of San Diego (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1713, 1718.) A cross-defendant may object to a cross complaint by filing a demurrer, and a demurrer may be sustained where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).) A demurrer can be used to challenge any defects that appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) On demurrer, “the reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist, (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967). To avoid a successful demurrer, a cross-complaint must allege facts in support of each element of a cause of action, mere conclusions are insufficient. (Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 171, 189).

Discussion

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Jones has filed a cause of action against Defendant/Cross-Defendant LAUSD for a claim of indemnity.

In its moving papers, Cross-Defendant LAUSD argues that there is a claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act, that Jones has not fulfilled. LAUSD contends that there are no facts alleged demonstrating how Mr. Jones complied, when Mr. Jones complied and whether it was timely, and what claims statutes were complied with and instead merely alleges that he “complied with all applicable claim statutes.” (FAXC ¶ 3). Further, LAUSD maintains that the letter sent by Jones’ Counsel was inadequate to satisfy the claim presentation requirement. (See FAXC ¶ 7.)

In opposition, Jones contends his Cross-Compliant properly alleges he complied with all applicable claim statutes. Jones further maintains that after he was served, he retained Counsel who sent a letter to LAUSD. Jones also contends he is exempt from the claims presentation requirements under California Gov. Code Section 905(m).

In reply, LAUSD argues that Jones mistaken belief that he was excused from compliance with the claim presentation requirements does not mitigate the necessity of following the guidelines. LAUSD then turns back to its previous contention that Jones did not follow the guidelines and thus demurrer is appropriate.

Under Section 910, a claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following:

(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.

(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent.

(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.

(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.

(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case.

(Gov. Code, § 910.)

The Court notes that letter cited by Jones is not attached to the First Amended Cross-Complaint. Accordingly, the Court may not determine if the letter does meet the requirements under Section 910.

Government Code section 905 requires the presentation of “all claims for money or damages against local public entities”, subject to certain exceptions. (Gov. Code, § 905.) “[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented…until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board....” (Gov. Code, § 945.4; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767.)

Courts have found that letters sent to the district on behalf of the claimant by his attorney do not constitute a claim within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act. (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 36.) The Court notes that LAUSD does agree that there was a letter sent however, California Courts have held that “[e]ven if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied.” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990.) The DiCampli-Mintz Court found that “[t]he filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” (Id.)

This Court has not been presented with evidence in the letter. Therefore, the Court, at this point, may not determine the timeliness of the letter or whether it followed the statutory requirements set forth in Section 910. Since a claim is a condition precedent of any cause of action against LAUSD, the Court is persuaded that the demurrer must be SUSTAINED.

The Court is not persuaded that this defect is uncurable. Accordingly, the Court grants leave to amend, within 20 days of this order.