Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV01368, Date: 2024-01-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22NWCV01368 Hearing Date: February 6, 2024 Dept: C
Jose Luis Velasco vs General Motors, LLC
Case No.: 22NWCV01368
Hearing Date: February 6, 2024 @ 10:30 AM
#8
Tentative Ruling
I.
Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC’s Demurrer is
OVERRULED and its Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Answer due in 20 days.
Plaintiff to give NOTICE.
Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) demurs to the
Fifth Cause of Action for Fraud – Fraudulent Inducement -- Concealment in the
operative First Amended Complaint and moves to strike the claim for punitive
damages.
Background
On June 17, 2017, Plaintiff Jose Luis Velasco (“Plaintiff”)
purchased a 2017 Chevrolet Colorado (“Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiff alleges Defendant General Motors,
LLC. (“Defendant”) violated the Song-Beverly Act and fraudulently induced
Plaintiff into purchasing the Subject Vehicle manufactured by Defendant. Plaintiff
alleges Defendant knew about a transmission defect in 2015 and knew that the
transmission installed in Plaintiff’s vehicle had that defect, which caused
sudden and premature failure.
I.
Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike
Legal Standard
The party against whom a
complaint has been filed may object to the pleading, by demurrer, on several
grounds, including the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) A party may demur to an
entire complaint, or to any causes of action stated therein. (CCP § 430.50(a).)
Motions to strike are used to reach defects or
objections to pleadings which are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words,
phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (CCP §§ 435, 436 & 437.) A motion to
strike lies only where the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter,
or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (C.C.P. § 436.) The
grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way
of judicial notice. (C.C.P. § 437.)
Discussion
Defendant demurs to the Complaint’s Fifth Cause
of Action for Fraud -- Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment on the grounds that
it is untimely and it fails to state a claim. Defendant also moves to strike
Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.
Defendant also argues that the Fraud cause of action fails to state a
claim because it was not pled with particularity.
Defendant argues that the Fifth Cause of Action
is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud (CCP § 338(d).) and
the FAC fails to allege facts justifying its late filing. According to Defendant, Plaintiff cannot
invoke the delayed discovery rule because she affirmatively states that the
alleged “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within
the applicable express warranty period….” (FAC, ¶ 11.) Because the warranty period expired in June
2020, the filing of the FAC on July 5, 2023 was untimely. Plaintiff argues that a claim for fraud
accrues once the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting fraud. By pleading when the defect was discovered,
Plaintiff does not plead when the fraud was discovered. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the
accrual date for purposes of the Fifth Cause of Action is not clearly and
affirmatively apparent from the allegations in the FAC. As such, the demurrer to the Fifth Cause of
Action is not sustained on the grounds it is untimely.
For fraudulent concealment, Plaintiffs must
plead: (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact, (2) a duty to
disclose the fact to the plaintiff(s), (3) intentional concealment or
suppression of the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff(s), (4) that
the plaintiff(s) was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as they did
if they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of
the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff(s) sustained damage.
(Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc., 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 (2011).)
Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and
specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance, 219 Cal.App.3d 1252,
1262 (1990).)
Here, the FAC details allegations that
Defendant knew of the defect since 2015, that the defect is unreasonably
dangerous to consumers, Defendant published technical service bulletins
regarding the defects in the transmission, and Defendant knew the transmission
in Plaintiff’s vehicle was defective. (FAC ¶¶ 63-66 n. 5.) Thus, the Complaint
contains adequate allegations to support a cause of action for fraud at this
stage.
Moreover, Defendant argues that there is no
transactional relationship between itself and Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that
Defendant expects its dealerships to sell its vehicles to purchasers. Additionally, citing Khan v. Shiley Inc.
(1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 850-51, Plaintiff states that privity of contract
is not required for a deceit cause of action. Plaintiff cites the following
holding that addresses transactional relationships and privity:
“At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a
more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs’
allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from
a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty,
and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the
sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we
decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no
relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.”
(Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84
Cal. App. 5th 828, 844 (emphasis added).)
Here, Plaintiff adequately argues that
Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract directly with Defendant GM and that
Simpson Chevrolet was an authorized dealer of Defendant. (FAC ¶¶ 6-7.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff has properly pleaded agency.
Therefore, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Fraud
cause of action is OVERRULED on both grounds.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages should be struck from the Complaint because there
are no supporting allegations of fraud. However, this Court finds that
Plaintiff properly alleged a fraud cause of action.
Thus, Defendant’s Motion to Strike Punitive
Damages is DENIED.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer is OVERRULED and its Motion to Strike is DENIED.
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel Further Responses
Meet and Confer Requirement
A
motion¿to compel further responses to requests for production “shall be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. §
2031.310(b)(2).)¿ The declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and
good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented in the
motion.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.)¿
The Court finds that Plaintiff has fulfilled the meet and
confer requirement.
Separate Statement
A motion to compel further
responses requires a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1345(a).) Plaintiff properly filed separate statements.
Legal Standard
A
party may make a demand for production of documents
and propound interrogatories without leave of court at any time 10 days after
the service of the summons on, or appearance by, the party to whom the demand
is directed, whichever occurs first. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.020, subd. (b);
Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.020, subd. (b).) The demand for production of documents
is not limited by number, but the request must comply with the formatting
requirements in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.
The party whom the request is propounded upon is required to
respond within 30 days after service of a demand, but the parties are allowed
to informally agree to an extension and confirm any such agreement in writing.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.060, subd.
(a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.070, subd. (a) - (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.070,
subd. (a) - (b).)
If a party fails to timely respond to a request for production or
interrogatories, the party to whom the request is directed waives any right to
exercise the option to produce writings under Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230, and
waives any objection, including one based on privilege or on the protection for
work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.290, subd. (a).)
Discussion
Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 77
Defendant argues that it produced the responsive documents
within its possession, custody, and control, and as expressly permitted under
Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230. Defendant
further argues it has identified and referred Plaintiffs to those documents.
Accordingly,
Defendant
has properly responded to Nos. 1-3 and 7-9 because it stated that it conducted
a diligent search and produced the relevant documents.
Request No. 12:
Request No. 12 seeks “All pre-sale or pre-purchase
DOCUMENTS that YOU made available to purchasers or lessees concerning the
disclosure of a problem, failures, malfunctions, or defect(s) regarding the
TRANSMISSION DEFECT(s) in CHEVROLET VEHICLES equipped with the 8-speed transmission
like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”
This request is overbroad because it seeks documents
related to vehicles worldwide. Therefore, the request will be limited to pre-sale
or pre-purchase documents concerning the disclosure of problems, failures,
malfunctions, or defects regarding transmission defects in 2017 Chevrolet
Colorado vehicles sold in California. Defendant is ordered to provide further
response to Request No. 12 for 2017 Chevrolet Colorado vehicles sold in
California.
Requests Nos. 17, 19, 22, 24, 30, 35, 38 and 41
These requests relate to GM’s Internal Knowledge and
Investigation regarding the Transmission Defects in 2017 Chevrolet Colorado
Vehicles, including internal investigations, emails, and other ESI.
These
requests are overbroad because they seek documents related to vehicles
worldwide. Therefore, the requests will be limited to documents relating to
internal knowledge, investigations, and customer complaints concerning 2017
Chevrolet Colorado vehicles
sold in California. Defendant is ordered to provide further responses to
Requests Nos. 17, 19, 22, 24, 30, 35, 38, and 41 as to 2017 Chevrolet Colorado
sold in California.
Requests
Nos. 42 and 50
Requests Nos. 42 and 50 relate to documents concerning
Summaries, Memoranda, and Power Points regarding the Transmission Defects in
2017 Chevrolet Colorado Vehicles.
These
requests are overbroad because they seek documents related to vehicles
worldwide. Therefore, the requests will be limited to documents relating to
summaries, memoranda, and PowerPoints concerning 2017 Chevrolet Colorado
vehicles sold in California. Defendant is ordered to provide further responses
to Requests Nos. 42 and 50 as
to 2017 Chevrolet Colorado sold in California.
Requests Nos. 55, 57, 58, and
67
These requests seek documents relating to GM's warranty
repair, document retention, customer calls, employee training, vehicle
repurchase policies, procedures, and practices, and vehicle recall policies,
procedures, and practices.
These
requests are overbroad because they seek documents related to vehicles
worldwide. Therefore, the requests will be limited to documents relating to policies,
procedures, and practices concerning 2017 Chevrolet Colorado vehicles sold in
California. Defendant is ordered to provide further responses to Requests Nos. 55,
57, 58, and 67 as to
2017 Chevrolet Colorado sold in California.
Requests Nos. 75, 76, 78 and 89
These
requests relate to documents concerning Communication with
Governmental Agencies and Suppliers regarding the Transmission Defects in 2017
Chevrolet Colorado Vehicles.
These
requests are overbroad because they seek documents related to vehicles
worldwide. Therefore, these requests will be limited to documents relating to
communications with Government Agencies and Suppliers in 2017 Chevrolet
Colorado vehicles sold in California. Defendant is ordered to provide further
responses to Requests Nos. 75, 76, 78 and 89 as to 2017 Chevrolet Colorado
vehicles sold in California.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Jose Luis Velasco’s Motion
to Compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above.
Sanctions
The
court shall impose a monetary sanction against the party who unsuccessfully
makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories or
demand for production of documents unless the party subject to the sanction
acted with substantial justification or the sanction would otherwise be unjust.
(Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h), 2033.290,
subd. (d).)
The Court finds that Defendant acted
with substantial justification.