Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 22NWCV01374, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV01374, Date: 2023-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV01374 Hearing Date: December 5, 2023 Dept: C

RAMIRO MENDOZA ROMAN vs TUTTLE-CLICK FORD, INC., et al.

Case No. 22NWCV01374

Hearing Date: 12/05/23 @ 9:30am

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below.

Moving party to give notice.

Background

On November 18, 2022, Plaintiff Ramiro Mendoza (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company and Tuttle-Click Ford, Inc. alleging Negligent Repair and violations of the Song-Beverly Act in connection with Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2018 Ford F-150 pickup truck.

Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”) brings the instant motion to seek a protective order on its Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual, Customer Relationship Center Policies and Procedures, and Reacquired Vehicle (RAV) Policies and Procedures.

Discussion

a. Meet and Confer

The motion for a protective order must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (CCP § 2030.090(a).) The parties’ meet and confer efforts must be a significant attempt at informal resolution of the dispute. (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc.¿(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016 (internal quotations and citations omitted); CCP § 2016.040.) This rule encourages “parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order....”¿¿(McElhaney v. Cessna Aircraft Co.¿(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 285, 289.) And it lessens¿“the burden on the court and reduce[s] the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Townsend v. Superior Court¿(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.) The court has discretion in determining whether a significant attempt has been made. (Stewart, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 1016.)

Here, Defendant’s counsel demonstrates an attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiff prior to bringing this motion for a protective order. Therefore, Defendant has complied with CCP § 2030.090(a).

b. Legal Standard

“When interrogatories have been propounded, the responding party, and any other party or affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order.” (C.C.P. § 2030.090(a).)

Motions to compel discovery responses must be directed to the party to whom the discovery was propounded, because only the “the party to whom the [interrogatories or requests] have been propounded” must respond to the discovery. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§2030.210; 2031.210; 2033.210.)

"The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires
to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense." (CCP §§ 2030.090(b) [interrogatories], 2033.080(b) [requests for admission]; see also CCP §§ 2017.020(a) [discovery], 2019.030(a)(2) [discovery].) When deemed proper, a court may issue a protective order directing that written discovery need not be answered, that responses be provided only upon certain conditions, or that the time to respond to discovery be extended to a time beyond the normal 30 day statutory period. (CCP §§ 2030.090(b) [interrogatories], 2033.080(b) [requests for admission].)

c. Amendments to Model Protective Order

Defendant contends that its proposed Protective Order (based on the LASC Model Order), seeks to facilitate the exchange of Ford’s confidential and proprietary information and documents in this case. Defendant’s proposed revisions affect three paragraphs:

• Paragraph 7: Ford’s revisions clarify sub-section (b), confirming that the term “affiliated attorneys” mean attorneys in the same firm. Ford’s revision also provides that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office personnel who have access to Ford’s confidential documents must sign Exhibit A. Ford proposes a revisions to subsection (d) to include videographers and litigation support companies (along with court reporters), who may have access to Ford’s confidential documents by virtue of their retention in a case. Ford removed sub-section (f), which permitted mock jurors to access Ford’s confidential documents because Ford has no ability to identify such persons or ensure (or confirm) their compliance. Ford also revised sub-section (g) to include non-attorneys with experts, and to provide that Ford’s confidential documents may not be shown to competitors of Ford.

• Paragraph 8: Ford’s revisions provide that the receiving party may not post Ford’s confidential documents to any website or advertise Ford’s documents for sale.

• Paragraph 21: Ford’s revisions clarify the process for Plaintiffs’ counsel to return or destroy Ford’s confidential documents at the conclusion of the case, and require that all of Ford’s confidential documents be returned or destroyed when the case is over.

Defendant maintains its proposal does not inhibit Plaintiffs’ ability to litigate this matter in any way because it continues to allow for disclosure to counsel for use in this case, and it is necessary given Ford’s interest in protecting its confidential business and trade secret information from unfettered disclosure. (See Biemann Decl. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff argues the Motion is untimely. However, Defense counsel promptly sent a proposed protective order after Plaintiff served his initial discovery in January 2023. (Biemann Decl., ¶ 4.) Despite their meet and confers efforts, the parties were unable to agree, and the instant motion followed. The Court is persuaded that the motion is timely.

As to Paragraph 7, the Court is unpersuaded that access to confidential information should be limited to affiliated attorneys “in the same firm” because this would preclude Plaintiff from consulting with co-counsel. The protective order already limits the use of the documents “only for the purposes of preparing for, conducting, participating in the conduct of, and/or prosecuting and/or defending the Proceeding, and not for any business or other purpose whatsoever.” (Model Protective Order ¶ 8.) The Court determines it is unnecessary and burdensome to require each non-lawyer who is given access to confidential information to execute Exhibit A. The Court determines that the revised protective order reasonably allows access to videographers, litigation support consultants and vendors retained by the Parties. The Court determines that requiring mock jury participants to execute Exhibit A is sufficient to protect Ford’s trade secrets. As such, excluding mock juror participants is unreasonable. The Court determines that excluding experts employed by Ford’s competitors is reasonable to protect Ford’s trade secrets. Accordingly, the amendments to Paragraph 7 are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above.

As to Paragraph 8, the Court determines it is reasonable to prevent unauthorized online access to confidential information and the sale of confidential information. Accordingly, the amendments to Paragraph 8 are GRANTED.

As to Paragraph 21, the Court is unpersuaded that there is good cause for the amendment to the Model Protective Order. The Model Protective Order provides that “counsel for each party may maintain in its files, in continuing compliance with the terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order, all work product, and one copy of each pleading filed with the Court.” (Model Protective Order ¶ 21.) Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to a complete copy of the case file and the Protective Order will remain in effect even after the trial concludes. Accordingly, the amendments to Paragraph 21 are DENIED.