Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 22NWCV01691, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 22NWCV01691, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV01691 Hearing Date: October 2, 2024 Dept: C

TAYLOR V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

CASE NO.: 22NWCV01691

HEARING: 10/2/2024

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint is OVERRULED.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (Defendant) demurs to plaintiff Terry Taylor’s (Plaintiff) first cause of action on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a statutory basis for liability and that plaintiff has failed to present a government claim as required under the Government Claims Act.

JUDICIAL NOTICE is taken of Plaintiff’s exhibits. (Ev. Code 452.)

Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges that from approximately 1984 to 1985, when Plaintiff was a minor housed in the Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional Facility, located in Whittier, California, and operated by Defendant, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a Group Supervisor/Night Warden at the Facility. (SAC, ¶ 2.) On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act). On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint against Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant interfered, through violence, intimidation, and coercion, with Plaintiff’s rights to free speech, freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and privacy. (SAC, ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated a duty of care by conspiratorial silence and inaction leading to failure to protect Plaintiff from sexual assault perpetrated by one of Defendant’s employees. (SAC, ¶¶ 19, 23, 34.)

On January 22, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the second amended complaint.

On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer.

On September 20, 2024, Defendant filed a reply to the opposition.

Merits

Defendant demurs to the entire complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a statutory basis for liability and that plaintiff has failed to present a government claim as required under the Government Claims Act. (Demurrer, p. 3.)

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240 (Harris).)¿¿¿¿

“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Ibid.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿¿¿

A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿¿¿

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Meet and Confer

Prior to filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41 and 435.5.)

Defendant has submitted a declaration establishing efforts to meet and confer with Plaintiff. The parties have been unable to reach an agreement. (Whitmore Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied.

The Government Claims Act

A petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6 is a special proceeding in which a petitioner seeking to file a civil action against a public entity asks the court for relief from the Government Claims Act requirements. (Gov. Code, § 946.6; Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 612, fn. 16.) The purpose of the Government Claims Act requirements is to provide a “public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455.)

The Government Claims Act requires potential plaintiffs to present an administrative claim before filing a civil action against “public entities.” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) Courts have applied this requirement to lawsuits against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and state prisons. (See Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844 [Government Claims Act applied to suit for false imprisonment against CDCR]; see also State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237, fn. 3 [Government Claims Act applied to suit against CDCR, California State Prison—Wasco, Centinela State Prison, and Corcoran State Prison].)

An administrative claim under the Government Claims Act for death or injury to person, personal property, or growing crops must be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, §911.2, subd. (a).) A claim relating to any other cause of action must be presented not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Ibid.) However, former Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, as of the date of the filing of the original complaint in 2022, provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for [childhood sexual assault damages] that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because of the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived…” (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, §1.) Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 has since been amended to state that an administrative claim need not be presented prior to the commencement of an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).)

Government Code, section 905(m) provides that claims made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault are not subject to the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 905(m) applies only to “local public entities,” which is defined as including “a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State, but does not include the State.” (Gov. Code § 900.4.) “State” means the state of California and “any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.” (Gov. Code § 900.6.)

The interpretation of a statutory provision is determined by first looking at the provision’s words in the context of the substance of the statute to determine the scope and purpose of the provision, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute. (People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1130.) Whenever reasonably possible, courts avoid reading statutory provisions in a manner that renders them meaningless language. (People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 73.) Statutes generally operate prospectively unless it is the clear and unambiguous intent of the legislature that the statute operate retroactively. (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840.) However, where a statute creates or expands a civil remedy without creating liability that did not previously exist, constitutional issues against retroactive application typically do not arise. (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 425 (Coats).)

The court finds that both the former and current versions of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 overrides the requirement that Plaintiff have filed an administrative claim under the Government Claims Act. Defendant argues that only the current version does so, and because the amendment to the statute was made after this claim was brought, the former version is applicable. (Demurrer, p. 5.) Section 340.1 alters the time limit for an action for recovery of damages, not an administrative claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1; Stats. 2019, ch. 861, §1.) The current statute expressly states that an administrative claim need not be presented prior to the commencement of an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) The former statute has been held to retroactively revive claims otherwise barred by a claim presentation deadline. (Coats, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 428-430.) Both the former and current versions of the statute state that, notwithstanding any other provision of law a claim that would otherwise be barred by the claim presentation deadline is revived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1; Stats. 2019, ch. 861, §1.) Therefore, Plaintiff need not have filed an administrative claim under the Government Claims Act. The instant action is not barred on these grounds.

Statutory Basis for Liability

Government Code section 815 holds that a public entity cannot be sued absent a statute permitting imposition of liability. The Bane Act provides for a cause of action against a person or persons who “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” (Civ. Code § 52.1, subd. (b).) Previous courts have found that public entities qualify as persons under the Bane Act. (See, e.g., Reese v. County of Sacramento (2018) 888 F.3d 1030; Murchison v. County of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867.)

The Court finds that Defendant qualifies as a “person” under the Bane Act. Defendant cites Towery v. State of California (2017), 14 Cal. App.5th 226 (Towery) for the proposition that the Bane Act does not permit imposition of liability against public entities. In Towery, the court states that “nothing in the language of the Bane Act indicates that it creates even a general rule of actionable duty for public entities.” (Id., at 233.) However, since Towery was decided and before this case was filed, the Bane Act was amended to include express references to the possibility of actions brought under the Bane Act against public entities that employ peace officers or custodial officers. (Civ. Code § 52.1, subd. (n).) Accordingly, the language of the Bane Act implicitly indicates that it permits imposition of liability against public entities. Reading this in conjunction with other case law indicating that public entities qualify as persons under the Bane Act, the Court finds that Defendant qualifies as a “person” under the Bane Act and Plaintiff has therefore adequately alleged a statutory basis of liability against Defendant. The present action is not barred on these grounds.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.