Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV00400, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV00400 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 Dept: C
The Windmill Co. Inc. vs Fayek Sedrak, et al.
Case No.: 21NWCV00400
Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 at 10:30 a.m.
#5
Tentative Ruling
Plaintiff
The Windmill Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Resumption of Deposition Testimony
and Production of Documents from John Soldat is GRANTED. John Soldat is ORDERED to appear for resumption
of deposition within 30 days or within such time as agreed upon by the
parties.
The
Court awards sanctions against Defendants and their counsel, jointly and
severally, payable to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s Counsel in the reduced sum of
$2,785.00.
Moving
Party to give notice.
Background
On June 21, 2021, Plaintiff The Windmill Co., Inc.
(“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Fayez Sedrak and O&C Hillside
Resources Management Co. (collectively “Defendants”) alleging Breach of
Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and
Declaratory Relief. Plaintiff alleged that on January 3, 2020, Plaintiff
entered into a Sale of Business Agreement with Defendants to purchase the
business known as ARCO AM PM located at 13550 Beach Blvd., La Mirada, CA 90638 (“Subject
Property”) for $1,590,0000.00. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to
perform on the agreement and refused to sell the business to Plaintiff
resulting in lost profits.
The instant motion is a Motion to Compel Further Deposition
Testimony and Production of Documents from Third-Party Accountant John Soldat. Mr. Soldat is the tax preparer for Defendants
and provides no other services other than tax return preparation.
Pursuant to a Deposition Subpoena issued on May 16, 2023, Plaintiff
requested the production of documents
relating to the Profit & Loss statements (“P&Ls”) for each year,
including but not limited to bank records, credit card statements, and receipts
that support the P&Ls, as well as documents pertaining to journal entries
regarding any and all bookkeeping records pertinent to the Subject Property from
01/01/2015 to present date. Plaintiff also requested any and all email or phone
call records (including but not limited to call logs) from Fayez Sedrak or any
person on behalf of O&C Hillside to Mr. Soldat, pertaining to requests for
tax returns, profit and loss statements, and journal entries related to
bookkeeping, relating to sale of the Subject Property from 01/03/2020 to
present date.
On May 22, 2023, the deposition of Mr. Soldat commenced but
was suspended pending resolution of this discovery dispute. Plaintiff contends Mr.
Soldat failed to produce any documents requested in the Subpoena and erroneously
claimed every document is privileged.
Separate Statement
Any motion involving the
content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be
accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate
statement include a motion:
(4)
To compel answers at a deposition;
(5)
To compel or to quash the production of documents or tangible things at a
deposition
(Cal. Rules of Court 3.1345(a)(4) and (a)(5).)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Separate Statement is not
a Statement of Facts, but rather, it consists of arguments which duplicate those
made in Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel. Defendant argues
that on that basis alone the Court should not consider the instant motion.
The Court is unpersuaded. The proper response in
most instances, if the trial court is not prepared to address the merits of the
motion in light of the deficient separate
statement, is to give the opposing party
an opportunity to file a proper separate
statement rather than entering judgment
against that party based on its procedural error. (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211.)
However,
the Court determines that it may properly address the merits of the motion
despite the inadequate separate statement.
Analysis
A. Whether
the Documents May be Propounded by Plaintiff
On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff issued a Subpoena for the
Deposition of Third-Party Accountant John Soldat which requested the following:
“a. Any and all DOCUMENTS
relating to Profit & Loss statements (“P&Ls”) for each year (cash basis
and accrual), audited (if applicable), including but not limited to bank
records, credit card statements, and receipts that support the P&Ls; Any
and all DOCUMENTS pertaining to journal entries regarding any and all
bookkeeping record pertinent to O&C Hillside ARCO AMPM located at 13550
Beach Blvd., La Mirada, CA 90638 from 01/01/2015 to present date.
“b. Any and all DOCUMENTS YOU
submitted to Tesoro relating to sale of the ARCO AMPM located at 13550 Beach
Blvd., La Mirada, CA 90638 from 01/03/2020 to present date.
“c. Any and all DOCUMENTS YOU
submitted to ABC relating to sale of ARCO AMPM located at 13550 Beach Blvd., La
Mirada, CA 90638, from 01/03/2020 to present date.
“d. Any and all email or phone
call records (including but not limited to call logs) from Fayez Sedrak or any
person on behalf of O&C Hillside to YOU, pertaining to request for tax
returns, profit and loss statements, and journal entries related to bookkeeping,
relating to sale of ARCO AMPM located at 13550 Beach Blvd., La Mirada, CA
90638, from 01/03/2020 to present date. TAX RETURNS ARE NOT DEMANDED TO BE
PRODUCED.”
Mr. Soldat did not have responsive documents for Items “b”
and “c.” He produced a Privilege Log and then a Supplemental Privilege Log for
Items “a” and “d” which identified documents and emails utilized to prepare tax
returns for Defendants. Mr. Soldat’s
Privilege Log claimed four (4) privileges: Tax Preparer Privilege; Tax Return
Privilege; Financial Information Privilege with no court Order Under Civil Code
section 3295; Invasion of Privacy.
i.
Tax
Preparer Privilege
As to the tax preparer privilege claim, Defendants rely upon
California Revenue & Taxation Code § 7056.6 for the proposition that Mr.
Soldat could not disclose any information he received to facilitate the
preparation of tax returns. However, a close reading of California Revenue & Taxation Code § 7056.6 shows
that the Section “shall not apply to
disclosure of information if that disclosure is made pursuant to the person's
consent or pursuant to a subpoena, court order, or other compulsory legal
process.”
Here, it is undisputed that Mr.
Soldat was subpoenaed to appear for deposition.
Accordingly, the argument that Mr. Soldat would be in violation of the
Tax Preparer Privilege if he were to disclose the information requested is without
merit.
ii.
Tax Return
Privilege
Secondly, Defendants argue Mr.
Soldat may not turn over tax return information because of the tax return
privilege.
Under Revenue and Taxation Code section §§ 19542 and 7056,
taxpayers have a privilege against any forced disclosure of their taxpayer
information. (Save-On Drugs v. Superior Court, (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 1, 6.) The privilege protects tax returns as
well as specific entries in the returns. (Id. at 7.) Moreover, the
“California tax privilege applies to tax returns and records that are an
'integral part' of the tax returns, such as W -2 and 1099 forms. (Brown v.
Super. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of San Francisco, (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d
141, 143-44.)
Plaintiff acknowledges that the tax return itself is privileged. In
fact, Plaintiff explicitly stated in correspondence with Defendants that it does
not seek the production of tax returns. (Mot., Ex. 1 and Ex. E.) Upon review, the Court differentiates W-2’s
and 1099 forms from the emails, phone calls, and logs pertaining to tax returns
in Mr. Soldat's possession and is unpersuaded by Defendant’s claims that the
latter materials are privileged. Plaintiff
does not seek “specific entries” in Defendants’ tax returns, nor does Plaintiff
seek any documents that are normally attached to a tax return, such as a W-2 or
Form 1099. Accordingly, the court
determines that the requested information is not an “integral part” of a tax
return and does not fall within the scope of the Tax Return Privilege.
iii.
Financial Information Privilege with no
court Order Under Civil Code section 3295
Defendant cites Civil Code § 3295 to support the
proposition that a protective order may be granted to require Plaintiff to “produce
evidence of a prima facie case of liability for damages pursuant to Section
3294, prior to the introduction of evidence of… the financial condition of the
defendant.” (Cal. Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2).) Section 3294 requires clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Cal. Civ.
Code, § 3294.)
It is true that “[w]here the only reason for seeking such
financial information is to give a tactical edge to the party who has obtained
discovery of the information by allowing that party the benefit of pressure in
settlement negotiations by threat or implication of disclosure, the party
against whom the discovery is sought should be afforded the full benefit of
Civil Code § 3295, including a protective order limiting access to such
information.” (Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86, 91
(internal quotations and citations omitted).) Where, however, “the financial
information goes to the heart of the cause of action itself, a litigant should
not be denied access so easily.” (Id.)
Unlike the situation in which a plaintiff seeks to discover
a defendant's financial status solely for the purpose of assessing a punitive
damages claim, the documents sought by Plaintiff are fundamental to its case.
Plaintiff argues that the only way to prove loss of profit, punitive damages,
and alter ego liability is by obtaining such financial documents. Since the
financial information requested goes “to the heart of the cause of action
itself” Plaintiff should be granted access to the financial documents. Accordingly, the Court determines Civil Code §
3295 does not preclude disclosure of the information Plaintiff seeks.
iv.
Privacy Rights
Finally, Defendants argue that their records are subject to
privacy protections. However, as a
corporation, Defendant O&C Hillside has “lesser privacy rights than natural
persons assuming such rights exist at all.” (See State Water Resource
Control Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40, 63 &
fn. 29; Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corporation (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770,
798.). “In general, corporate financial records are discoverable.” (See Schnabel
v. Superior Ct. (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 704, 723.)
Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded by the privacy rights
claim.
B. Whether
Plaintiff May Compel Deposition
On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff began to take the deposition of
Mr. Soldat. Plaintiff argues that Mr.
Soldat did not produce the requested records and did not answer questions,
resulting in the suspension of the deposition.
CCP
§ 2025.450(a) provides, “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to
the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or
a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230,
without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear
for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any
document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the
deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling
the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of
any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in
the deposition notice.” CCP § 2025.450 requires the Court to compel the
deposition unless it finds a valid objection was served under §2025.410. The
objecting party has the burden to justify objections asserted, (See Denari
v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1488, 1494-95.) Code of Civil Procedure
§ 2025.480, subdivision (a) permits parties to bring a motion to compel the
appearance of a deponent that failed to answer any question or produce
documents. Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.610, subdivision (b) also permits a
party to take a further deposition of a person upon the order of the Court for
“good cause shown.” (McCoy v. Gustafson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 56, 97.)
Further, “the scope of questioning at a
deposition is very broad. Objections for ‘irrelevancy’ are difficult to
sustain and instructions not to answer on that basis are never proper.” (Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The
Rutter Group 2011) ¶ 8:704, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) California Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.480
states in pertinent part: “(a) If a deponent fails to answer any question or to
produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing
under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a
deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an
order compelling that answer or production. (b) This motion shall be made no
later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and
shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”
(See also Unzipped Apparel v. Bader, (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 123, 127.)
When attempting to pause the initial deposition Plaintiff’s
Counsel stated: “Okay. I would like to state this on the record that although
we are adjourning this deposition, this deposition is not over, because I was
not given the opportunity to ask the questions that I would have gleaned from
the documents that Mr. Soldat should have produced.” (Mot., Ex. 5.)
Plaintiff’s counsel argues that he was deprived of the
opportunity to ask questions regarding non-privileged documents due to the
erroneous claim that the documents were privileged. Given the analysis above, the Court agrees.
Therefore,
the motion to compel is granted. (CCP § 2025.450(a).) John Soldat is
ordered to resume his deposition testimony within 30 days or within such time
as agreed upon by the parties. His
objections based upon privilege are OVERRULED as set forth above.
C. Sanctions
CCP
§ 2025.450(g)(1) requires the Court to impose sanctions unless it finds the
deponent acted with substantial justification or there are circumstances that
render imposition of sanctions unjust.¿ The Court may also impose sanctions for
misuse of the discovery process, including employing a discovery method in a
manner or to an extent that causes undue burden or expense, and making,
unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or
limit discovery. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010, 2023.030.)
A court has discretion to award sanctions that
are “suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery to obtain the
objects of the discovery he seeks” but they should not be punitive in nature or
levied for the purposes of punishing an offending party. (Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545.)
Plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of
$4,010.50 (consisting of five hours to prepare the instant motion and three
hours to appear at the hearing at a rate of $400.00 per hour. Plaintiff also
requests a filing fee of $90.00 and the Court reporter fee of $720.50 for the
initial deposition.)
The Court finds the requested sanctions excessive.
As a preliminary matter the filing fee associated with this motion is $60.00. Taking into account the e-filing service fees
for the motion and reply, the total would not amount to more than $64.50. The Court also recognizes that Plaintiff does
not cite any controlling authority which explicitly permits the disclosures it requests. However, the Court finds that Defendants
failed to act with substantial justification when they refused to provide any
documents in response to Plaintiff’s demand.
Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the reduced total amount of $2,785.00,
inclusive of fees, against Defendants and Counsel, jointly and severally, payable
within 30 days.