Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV00405, Date: 2023-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV00405    Hearing Date: September 12, 2023    Dept: C

RODRIGUEZ v. TOTAL RENAL CARE, INC.

CASE NO.:  23NWCV00405

HEARING 9/12/23

 

#4

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Defendants Total Renal Care, Inc., DaVita Inc., Staffieri, and Batistelli’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is OVERRULED as to the 1st– 5th, 7th, and 13th causes of action, and SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the 6th and 17th causes of action.

 

Moving Parties to give NOTICE.

 

 

Defendants Total Renal Care, Inc., DaVita Inc., Staffieri, and Batistelli demur to the 1st – 7th, 13th, and 17th causes of action on the ground that they are barred by the statutes of limitations.

 

1.      Failure To Pay Wages

2.      Failure To Pay Overtime Compensation

3.      Failure To Provide Rest Breaks

4.      Failure To Provide Meal Breaks

5.      Waiting Time Penalties

6.      Failure To Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

7.      Failure To Reimburse Expenses to Employee

8.      Disability/Perceived Disability Discrimination

9.      Race Discrimination

10.  Work Environment Harassment

11.  Retaliation (Gov. Code § 12940(H))

12.  Failure To Prevent Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation

13.  Retaliation (Labor Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5)

14.  Failure To Provide Reasonable Accommodation

15.  Failure To Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process

16.  Unfair And Unlawful Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200)

17.  Wrongful Termination (In Violation of Public Policy)

 

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

 

1ST – 4TH, 7TH, AND 13TH CAUSES OF ACTION:

 

The three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CCP § 338(a) applies to the 1st – 4th, 7th, and 13th causes of action for violations of statute.

 

5th CAUSE OF ACTION: 

 

The three-year statute of limitations applies to the 5th cause of action for waiting time penalties under section 203.  (See Pineda v. Bank of Am., 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1396-97 - “The only plausible inference to be drawn is that the Legislature intended to ensure that the statute of limitations on an action for section 203 penalties tracks the statute of limitations governing actions for unpaid final wages.”)

 

Plaintiff was terminated on February 3, 2020 (FAC, ¶ 61), and filed the Complaint on February 6, 2023.

 

“[T]he statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.”  (CRC, Appx., Emergency Rule 9(a).”

 

“A tolling provision suspends the running of a limitations period. [citation]… the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded.  As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.”  (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 403.)

 

Relying on dicta in Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 326 n. 3, Defendants contend in their Reply that “[t]olling suspends the running of the statute of limitations before the statute of limitations expires.”  (Reply, 3:11-12.)  However, the Woods court did not explain how to apply tolling.  It stated at footnote 3, “Tolling may be analogized to a clock that is stopped and then restarted. Whatever period of time that remained when the clock is stopped is available when the clock is restarted, that is, when the tolling period has ended.” 

 

Here, Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on February 3, 2020, and was tolled from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020 pursuant to Emergency Rule 9.  Therefore, the time period in which the cause of action was tolled is available to Plaintiff when the clock is restarted as stated in Woods, and as stated in Committee for Sound Water & Land Development.

 

Defendants also cite Lacour v. Marshalls of California, LLC, 2023 Cal.App. LEXIS 653, but Lacour supports Plaintiff’s case.  There, the court approved the trial court and Plaintiff Lacour’s interpretation that Rule 9 “was put into effect by the Governor during the pandemic, the otherwise applicable limitations period for filing a PAGA claim was extended by six months.”  (Id. at 3.  See also id. at 16, “If for no reason other than to slow down the flow of newly filed civil cases during that period so that priority cases could be handled more easily, extending limitations periods out for several months made sense.”)  Unlike Woods, which did not deal with Rule 9, Lacour specifically discussed Rule 9 and referred to the provision as “extending” the limitations period.  Defendants have failed to cite any case that would apply Rule 9’s tolling provisions any differently.

 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the 1st – 5th, 7th, and 13th causes of action is OVERRULED.

 

6th CAUSE OF ACTION:  Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

 

Defendants contend that the one year statute of limitations applies to the 6th cause of action pursuant to CCP § 340(a).  Plaintiff appears to agree that the one-year statute of limitations apply to claims for statutory penalties under Lab. Code § 226(e).  (Opposition, 11:8-9.)

 

The 6th cause of action is brought under Lab. Code § 226(e), and is therefore subject to a one-year statute of limitations.  Plaintiff was terminated on February 3, 2020 (FAC, ¶ 61), and filed the Complaint on February 6, 2023. Even if the court were to apply the tolling provision of Rule 9 to the 6th cause of action, it is still time-barred.

 

The demurrer to the 6th cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

 

17th CAUSE OF ACTION:

 

The two-year statute of limitations applies to the 17th cause of action for Wrongful Termination in violation of public policy.  (See Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1189.)

 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “the FEHA statute of limitations [three years] may apply to Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination which is brought under FEHA.”  (Opp., p. 13.)  No authority is cited for this argument.    

 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the 17th cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.