Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV00645, Date: 2024-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV00645    Hearing Date: March 6, 2024    Dept: C

ILIANA GARCIA, ET AL. v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, ET AL.

CASE NO.:  23NWCV00645

HEARING:  3/6/24 @ 9:30 AM

 

#3

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Plaintiffs Iliana Garcia and Umbrella Professional Services’ motion for attorney fees and costs against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and House of Imports is GRANTED in part. Plaintiffs are entitled to $17,072.06 in attorney fees and costs.

 

Moving Parties to give NOTICE.

 

 

Plaintiffs Ilana Garcia and Umbrella Professional Services move for $23,295.50 in attorney fees and $1,322.06 in costs.

 

Prevailing Party

 

Under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

 

In the present case, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in the action and are entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Thus, the only question to be determined by this motion is the amount of the award.

 

Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees

 

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) As to Song–Beverly warranty claims, prevailing buyers have the burden to show that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable amounts.  (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.)  The question whether attorneys’ fees were reasonably incurred may depend on circumstances including, “factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved.”  (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470.)

Lodestar is the objective starting point to determine if attorney’s fees are reasonable. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242.) Lodestar is calculated by using the reasonable rate for comparable services in the local community, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case. (Ibid.) Lodestar requires the court to determine the reasonable number of hours expended for the work performed. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.) The lodestar approach has been applied to determining attorney’s fees under Song-Beverly. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.)

 

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees and costs in the amount of $23,295.50 for 48.2 hours of legal work and $1,322.06 in costs, with attorney Michael Saeedian of The Lemon Pros, LLP billing at $695.00 per hour, managing attorney Christopher Urner of The Lemon Pros, LLP at $525.00 per hour, and law clerk Jorge Acosta of The Lemon Pros, LLP at $250.00 per hour. (Decl. Saeedian, ¶¶ 3, 4, and 5.)

 

Counsel’s Hourly Rates

 

When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts consider whether the stated rates “are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Children’s Hosp. & Med. Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.)

 

In the moving papers, Plaintiffs assert that the rates charged by The Lemon Pros, LLP are commensurate with the experience and skill of the attorneys involved and the general rates of attorneys in Los Angeles, California that litigate consumer protection lawsuits on a contingency basis.

 

In opposition, Defendants argue that the rates should be reduced because lemon law cases are “simple, routine, and readily litigated with templates that require little editing.” Defendant presents several cases where the Court reduced hourly billing rates of Plaintiffs’ counsel in similar cases. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ hourly rates should be reduced to no more than $400 per hour for Saeedian and Umer and $150 per hour for Acosta.

 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates exceed the range of reasonable rates charged by attorneys in lemon law cases and judicially awarded in similar cases. Further, the Court finds that the straightforward nature of lemon law cases warrants a reduced rate. Thus, the Court modifies the attorney rates to $350 blended rate for all three attorneys.

 

          Time Expended

 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney fees in the amount of $23,295.50 for 48.2 hours of legal work. Plaintiffs submit an itemized list of time entries detailing the legal work on this matter. (Decl. Saeedian, ¶ 8, Ex. A.)

 

In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, the opposing party must point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

 

Defendants challenge the following specific entries in Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ time entries: (1) 0.8 hours related to the attorney-client agreement; (2) 0.9 hours for client updates when there were no updates; (3) 4.7 hours for clerical tasks; and (4) 0.5 hours for duplicative entries. The Court will discuss each category.

 

Regarding the attorney-client agreement, the Court subtracts the total hours Plaintiffs’ counsel spent drafting it and discussing it with their client because those are tasks that would not generally be billed to a paying client. (Rasooly v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021) No. CV 19-01927-JLS (KESx), 2021 WL 1583894, at *6.)

 

As for the client updates, the Court cannot determine whether there were no client updates based on the time entries. Defendants’ assertion that there were no updates is speculative. The Court will not subtract the 0.9 hours for client updates.

 

The Court deducts some of the entries that Defendants identify as clerical or administrative. Based on the Court’s review of the time entries, Plaintiffs’ counsel have billed for the following tasks: checking the case status on the court’s docket, calculating deadlines, organizing files, reviewing confirmations, reviewing court reservations, and reviewing invoices. (Decl. Hooper, ¶ 2, Ex. A: lines 37, 39-41, 104, 127, 143-144.) The above are administrative or clerical tasks performed by an attorney. Purely "clerical" work performed by attorneys is generally not compensable. (See, e.g., Pierce v. County of Orange (C.D. Cal. 2012) 905 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1031.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this point. The time entries also reflect that the attorneys reviewed complaint documents, proofs of service, notice of posting jury fees, and Plaintiffs’ case management statement. (Decl. Hooper, ¶ 2, Ex. A: lines 36, 42-44, 46, 67, 74, 102.) The Court finds those entries to be reasonably billed as attorney time. It will not deduct the time expended on those tasks. Thus, the Court deducts 2.4 hours for administrative and clerical tasks.

 

The Court agrees with Defendants that there are three duplicative entries in the time entries. (Decl. Hooper, ¶ 2, Ex. A: 55, 68, 100.) However, Plaintiff indicated they were duplicative in the time entries and did not bill for them. Thus, the Court will not deduct them.

 

Thus, the Court awards 45 hours of attorney work at $350.00 per hour for a total of $15,750.00 in attorney fees.

 

Costs

 

Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of costs on February 16, 2024. As of March 4, 2024, Defendants have not filed a motion to tax costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b).) Thus, the Court awards the costs as requested.