Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV00682, Date: 2024-08-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV00682    Hearing Date: August 6, 2024    Dept: C

Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs Champion Power Equipment, Inc.

Case No.: 23NWCV00682

Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 @ 10:30 a.m.

 

#8

Tentative Ruling

     I.        Defendant Champion Power Equipment, Inc.’s Motion to Strike is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as set forth below.

    II.        Defendant’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice.

 

BACKGROUND

In the original Complaint filed on March 6, 2023, Plaintiff CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC. (“Plaintiff”) alleged causes of action for 1) Open Book Account, 2) Account Stated, and 3) Reasonable Value against Defendant CHAMPION POWER EQUIPMENT, INC. (“Defendant”).  The Complaint listed the Plaintiff’s Assignor as SUZHOU AAVIX GARDEN EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. (Complaint, ¶1.)  “The Debt” referred to a sum of $401,760.00 (Id., ¶2) with a “Due Date” of May 20, 2020 (Id., ¶3). 

In the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on October 23, 2023, Plaintiff alleges the same causes of action against Defendant.  However, the FAC now lists the Plaintiff's Assignor as CHINA EXPORT & CREDIT INSURANCE CORPORATION. (FAC, ¶1.) The amount of the “The Debt” remains unchanged (Id., ¶2), but the “Due Date” is changed to August 9, 2022. (Id., ¶3.)

The FAC also alleges: “[o[n June 1, 2022, SUZHOU WARRIOR MACHINERY CO., LTD assigned to SUZHOU AAVIX GARDEN EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. the balance due and owing from CHAMPION POWER EQUIPMENT, INC. in the amount of $401,760.00.” (Id., ¶4.) “On June 6, 2022, SUZHOU AAVIX GARDEN EQUIPMENT, INC. assigned the balance due by CHAMPION POWER EQUIPMENT, INC. in the amount of $401,760.00 to CHINA EXPORT & CREDIT INSURANCE CORPORATION for collection.” (Id., ¶5.)

Defendant demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action in the FAC on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Defendant also demurs to the Third Cause of Action on the grounds that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  Defendant moves to strike: 1) the FAC on the grounds that it is a sham pleading, and 2) the prayer for attorney’s fees. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the original complaint. The Court GRANTS the Request for Judicial Notice under California Evidence Code § 452(d).

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿¿(Hahn v.¿Mirda¿(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿¿(Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)¿¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.¿(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿¿“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿¿Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”¿¿(SKF Farms v. Superior Court¿(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)¿¿“The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿¿(Hahn,¿supra,¿147 Cal.App.4th at¿p.¿747.) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Motion to Strike

 

Defendant contends that the FAC should be stricken as a sham complaint because it alleges a different assignment, regarding a different debt, owed to a different company, with a different due date.

“Under the sham pleading doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.”  (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.)  “‘Generally, after an amended pleading has been filed, courts will disregard the original pleading. However, an exception to this rule is found ... where an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring them. The court may examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended complaint is merely a sham.’ Moreover, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. [Citation.] Accordingly, a court is ‘not bound to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.’ [Citation.]”  (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343; quoting Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946.)¿¿ 

In opposition, Plaintiff explains that SUZHOU AAVIX GARDEN EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. (“Aavix”) manufactured the goods which were sold to Defendant. (Opp., p. 2:1.) SUZHOU WARRIOR MACHINERY CO., LTD. (“Warrior”) acted as Aavix’s agent, directly contracted with Defendant for the sale of the goods, and issued invoices to Defendant for the goods manufactured by Aavix. (Opp., p.2:2-4.) CHINA EXPORT & CREDIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (“CECIC”) insured Aavix against the risk of non-payment on those invoices. (Opp., p. 2:4-5.)

Plaintiff contends that the original complaint mistakenly identified Aavix as the assignor of the claims.  Plaintiff argues the FAC correctly alleges the chain of assignments: Warrior (the agent) assigned its claims to Aavix (the manufacturer) which assigned its claims to CECIC (the insurer).  CECIC assigned its claims to Plaintiff.  The Court determines that Plaintiff has sufficiently explained why the assignor in the FAC (CECIC) is different than the assignor in the original complaint (Aavix). 

As to the discrepancy in the due date, Plaintiff contends that the date listed in the original complaint (May 20, 2020) was likely a typographical error.  Plaintiff points out that the due date listed in the FAC (August 9, 2022) is also listed in two other paragraphs in the original complaint (¶¶14 and 17). After reviewing the original complaint and the FAC, the Court determines that the discrepancies relied upon by Defendant do not establish that the FAC is a sham pleading. 

Defendant urges this Court to strike the FAC based upon its claim that Exhibit 1 to the FAC (the assignment from Warrior to Aavix) is fraudulent.  However, the grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (CCP § 437.) Defendant’s argument relies upon extrinsic evidence which may not be considered by the Court at this stage of the proceedings. 

The motion to strike is not granted on the grounds that the FAC is a sham pleading.

Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees is GRANTED as to the second and third causes of action.  The FAC alleges that attorney’s fees are recoverable in all three causes of action pursuant to Civil Code § 1717.5.  However, this section only pertains to an action on a contract based on a book account.  The prayer for attorney’s fees as to the first cause of action for open book account is not stricken.    

Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as set forth above.

Demurrer

First Cause of Action: Open Book Account 

 

Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for open book account on the grounds that it fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.  Plaintiff does not oppose the demurrer on this ground. 

 

To establish an open book account claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the parties had financial transactions, (2) that plaintiff kept an account of the debits and credits involved in the transactions, (3) that defendant owes plaintiff money on the account, and (4) the amount of money that defendant owes plaintiff.  (CACI 372.)        

 

A book account is “‘a detailed statement which constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between a debtor and a creditor arising out of a contract or some fiduciary relation, and shows the debits and credits in connection therewith, and against whom and in favor of whom entries are made, is entered in the regular course of business as conducted by such creditor or fiduciary, and is kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner and is (1) in a bound book, or (2) on a sheet or sheets fastened in a book or to backing but detachable therefrom, or (3) on a card or cards of permanent character, or is kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner.’”  (Eloquence Corporation v. Home Consignment Center (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 655, 664 (quoting CCP section 337a).)  “A book account is ‘open’ where a balance remains due on the account.”  (Id. at 664-65.) 

 

Here, the FAC does not adequately plead the elements of an open book account.  For example, the FAC is devoid of any facts tending to establish the existence of a “detailed statement” or “contract or some fiduciary relation” between Warrior and Defendant. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action: Account Stated 

 

 

Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for account stated on the ground that it is uncertain as to the existence of a written contract.  Plaintiff does not oppose the demurrer on this ground. 

 

“The essential elements of an account stated are: (1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; [and] (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due.” (Zinn v. Fred R. Bright Co. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 597, 600; see CACI 373.)  

 

“An account stated is ‘an agreement, based on prior transactions between the parties, that the items of an account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing.’”  (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 968 (quoting Maggio, Inc. v. Neal (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 745, 752).)  “‘[A]n element essential to render the account stated is that it receive the assent of both parties, but the assent of the party sought to be charged may be implied from his conduct.’”  (Id. (quoting Hansen v. Fresno Jersey Farm Dairy Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 402, 408) (alteration in original).)  “For example, ‘[w]hen a statement is rendered to a debtor and no reply is made in a reasonable time, the law implies an agreement that the account is correct as rendered.’”  (Id. (quoting Maggio, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at 753).)  

 

Here, the FAC does not adequately plead the elements of the second cause of action for account stated.  For example, Plaintiff does not allege an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due. 

 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Third Cause of Action: Reasonable Value (Quantum Meruit)

 

Defendant demurs to the third cause of action for reasonable value (quantum meruit) on the grounds that it is uncertain as to the existence of a written contract and it is barred by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff does not oppose the demurrer on these grounds.

The statute of limitations for quantum meruit claims is two years. (CCP § 339.) Defendant argues that the third cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations because the actual due date for the debt, as alleged in the original complaint, was May 20, 2020, and the original complaint was filed on March 6, 2023.  As indicated above, Defendant has failed to establish that the FAC is a sham pleading.  Because the running of the statute does not appear “clearly and affirmatively” from the face of the FAC, the demurrer to the third cause of action is not sustained on this basis. (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 321.)

To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant. (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 248.)

Here, the Court determines that the third cause of action for reasonable value is not adequately pleaded.  The FAC does not allege the existence of an express or implied request for services from the defendant, and that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.