Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV00753, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV00753    Hearing Date: June 5, 2024    Dept: C

HERNANDEZ v. ANGEL’S TIRES, ET AL.

CASE NO.: 23NWCV00753

HEARING:  6/5/24 @ 10:30 A.M.

#14

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Silvestre Madrigal and Maria Madrigal’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.  

Moving party to give notice.

Plaintiff Geronimo Hernandez (“Hernandez”), customer of Defendant Angel’s Tires (“Angel’s Tires”), alleges that while using an air dispenser to fill a tire while at Angel’s Tires, the tire exploded and injured his left hand. Defendants Silvestre Madrigal and Maria Madrigal (the “Madrigals”) own the premises.  They entered into a lease agreement with Defendant Sabino Pedraza, whose son, Defendant Sevino Pedraza, operated Angel’s Tires. (UMF Nos. 1, 2, and 3.) On March 13, 2023, Hernandez filed suit alleging Negligence and Premises Liability.  On September 25, 2023, the Madrigals filed a Cross-Complaint against Angel’s Tires and Sabino Pedraza seeking indemnity and declaratory relief, among other things. 

The Madrigals seek summary judgment on the negligence and premises liability causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Separate Statement

An opposing Separate Statement must comply with the requirements of California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350(e), (f) and (h).  The opposing Separate Statement must indicate if a fact is unequivocally disputed and, if so, state the opposing fact with a citation to admissible evidence. The rules do not permit a fact to be “disputed in part,” nor is argument permitted in an opposing Separate Statement. (Page v. Miracosta Community College District (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 471, 479, fn. 2.) If a party opposing summary judgment fails to comply with the requirements in a separate statement, the court, in its discretion, may grant the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,¿subd. (b)(3).) 

Hernandez’s opposing separate statement includes arguments. For example, in fact number two, Hernandez states, “Plaintiff has no reason to doubt such a lease exists; HOWEVER, given the arguments raised in Defendant’s motion, this fact is entirely irrelevant to this matter.” The Court will not consider these arguments.

Evidentiary Objections

Hernandez submitted evidentiary objections as part of his opposing papers. The Court overrules the fourth and sixth objection. It does not rule on the others because it finds that they are not material to the disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Legal Standard

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing no triable material fact exists. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a converse prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) 

A defendant moving for summary judgment may meet its initial burden by proving that for each cause of action alleged, Plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).)

Discussion

The Madrigals argue that they did not owe any duty to Hernandez, nor did they breach it. In support, they argue that the air dispenser was a movable piece of equipment on the premises, it was on the premises for Angel’s Tire’s business operations, and the Madrigals did not own, possess, control, or maintain it. (UMF Nos. 19, 20, 21.) They submit the declaration of Silvestre Madrigal. (UMF Nos. 19, 20, 21.) They also submit the lease agreement. (UMF No. 2.)

“The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)  The elements of premises liability are the same as those for general negligence. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

Generally, landlords are not liable for injuries to tenants’ guests caused by the tenant’s acts. (See Goodman v. Harris (1953) 40 Cal.2d 254, 265.) In Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 767, 785 the Court found that the landlord had no interest in, right to inspect, or right of control over a portable heater. Also, there was no express or implied covenant in the lease agreement whereby the landlord had to furnish heat to her tenant. (Ibid.)

Based on the above, the Court finds that the Madrigals have shown that no triable issue of fact exists as to duty and breach.  The Madrigals are also landlords who did not own, possess, control, or maintain the movable air dispenser. The burden now shifts to Hernandez to raise a triable issue of material fact as to duty and breach. 

Hernandez submits his own declaration in opposition to the motion.  Essentially, Hernandez alleges that he was told by employees at Angel’s Tires that he could use the air dispenser and they did not warn him about the risks involved.  However, nothing in Hernadez’s declaration raises a triable issue of material fact as to duty and breach by the Madrigals.  Therefore, Hernandez fails to meet his burden. 

The Madrigals also argue that they did not cause Hernandez’s injuries. Because there are no triable issues of material fact as to duty and breach, the Court will not adjudicate causation.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.