Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 23NWCV01116, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01116, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV01116 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: C

Bobby Contreras, et al. vs Vicente Arbogust, et al.

Case No.: 23NWCV01116

Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Vicente Arbogast’s Motion to Strike is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant to give notice.

Background

This is a personal injury action arising from a car crash that occurred on May 31, 2021. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs Bobby Contreras, Brittney Contreras, and Angela Silva were traveling southbound on Bellflower Boulevard when their vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant Vicente Arbogast (erroneously sued as Vicente Arbogust) who was traveling northbound on the same street. The Complaint alleges Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and suddenly swerved into oncoming traffic, striking Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Plaintiffs sustained serious injuries and losses. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for Negligence and Negligence Per Se.

Defendant moves to strike the language in the complaint which alleges that he drove under the influence of alcohol and he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant also moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages.

Legal Standard

Upon motion, or at any time in its own discretion, a court may grant a motion to strike any of the following material: (1) irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436.) These provisions also authorize “the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi, (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528, emphasis in original.)

Discussion

Punitive Damages

“The act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 [punitive damages] if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892.) However, not every act of driving under the influence of alcohol is sufficient to warrant punitive damages. “The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89.

Here, the Complaint alleges in pertinent part:

“Defendant VICENTE ARBOGUST was under the influence of alcohol at the time of THE CRASH. Defendant Arbogust was then arrested by authorities for driving under the influence. Defendant Arbogust's conduct was despicable and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the safety of others (here, Plaintiffs). Defendant knew or should have known that operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol could have dangerous consequences in which defendant deliberately failed to avoid those consequences when he intentionally operated a vehicle while being intoxicated. Defendant Arbogust acted with malice and oppression.” (Complaint, ¶ 16.)

The Complaint is devoid of any facts tending to establish that Defendant drove with malice. In Dawes, the court determined that punitive damages were properly sought where plaintiff alleged Defendant failed to stop at a stop sign, was zigzagging in and out of traffic, was travelling in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone and lied to police following the accident. Nothing along these lines is alleged here. Plaintiffs indicate that “Defendant had two prior DUIs and currently has his driver’s license suspended.” (Opp., p. 2.) However, this is not alleged in the Complaint itself. Allegations concerning a Defendant being under the influence are not sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages. If it were, it would essentially mean anyone driving under the influence would be subject to punitive damages. The law does not compel such an outcome.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

Allegations that Defendant Drove Under the Influence of Alcohol

Defendant also moves to strike portions of the complaint which allege Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant does not explain why these portions of the complaint should be stricken, and Plaintiff does not explain why they are proper. Because Defendant carries the burden of demonstrating improprieties in the complaint, the remaining portions of the complaint shall remain.

Accordingly, the motion to strike language pertaining to Defendant driving under the influence of alcohol is DENIED.